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5Introduction
Nils Muižnieks
According to sociological surveys, the inhabitants of Russia have long 
considered Latvia to be among the “least friendly” countries towards Russia.1 
At the same time, the Russian government has devoted an astonishing 
amount of energy to demonising Latvia in international organisations and 
elsewhere.2 As documented and analysed below, the Russian media has 
devoted significant attention to Latvia, much of it negative. Why has Latvia 
evoked such animosity? To what extent are the Russian media responsible 
for manufacturing an enemy image of Latvia?  
At first glance, a combination of several factors would seem to explain 
negative media portrayal and perceptions of Latvia among many Russians. 
Latvia hosts a large Russian-speaking minority whose status has diminished 
significantly since independence. Latvia and its Baltic neighbours pose a 
systematic challenge to the official Russian understanding of history and 
core Soviet/Russian legitimising myths (e.g., regarding the “Great Patriotic 
War”). After independence, Latvia adopted a distinctly pro-Western foreign 
policy with a focus on accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and the European Union (EU). 
However, other countries also share these characteristics without evoking 
anywhere near the same degree of animosity from Russian officialdom, the 
Russian media, and the Russian public. Ukraine and the Central Asian 
countries, for example, also have large Russian-speaking minorities whose 
status has diminished significantly since the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Poland has been just as active as Latvia and its Baltic neighbours, if not more 
so, in reminding the world of the darker episodes of Soviet history, especially 
during World War II. Latvia is but one of many post-communist countries 
neighbouring Russia to have joined NATO and the EU. If Latvia is not so 
different from many other neighbours of Russia, why has it merited pride of 
place among Russia’s enemies? This book seeks to answer that question. 
The Russian government and the Russian media, which became 
increasingly beholden to the Russian government during the presidency 
of Vladimir Putin, have played a central role in creating Latvia’s image in 
Russia.  Of course, the creation of Latvia’s image did not begin under Putin, 
 1  See, e.g., Stephen White, “Russia and ‘Europe’: the public dimension,” in Roy 
Allison, Margot Light and Stephen White, eds., Putin’s Russia and the Enlarged 
Europe (London: Chatham House, 2006), 143.
 2  See Nils Muižnieks, “Russian Foreign Policy Towards ‘Compatriots’ in Latvia,” 
in Nils Muižnieks, ed., Latvian-Russian Relations: Domestic and International 
Dimensions (Rīga: University of Latvia Academic Publishers, 2006), 121-5.
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6or even under Yeltsin for that matter. Russians have long considered Latvia 
a “window to Europe,” one of the most Western parts of first, the Russian 
empire, then, the Soviet Union.3  Many Russians, particularly members of 
the elite, harbour a certain nostalgia for Latvia in general, and the Latvian 
seaside resort Jūrmala in particular.  Along with Crimea on the Black Sea, 
Jūrmala was the prime vacation destination for the nomenklatura during 
the Soviet years. While the image of Latvia as “the West” and nostalgia about 
Jūrmala persist, these positive associations intermingle with and are often 
overshadowed by far more negative ones in contemporary Russian political 
and media discourse.
Insofar as most inhabitants of Russia have not been to Latvia personally 
and do not have relatives there, they acquire their information and get an 
impression about Latvia primarily from media discourse. Another source of 
information about Latvia, particularly among younger inhabitants of Russia, 
is teaching materials in Russian schools. This topic is not examined here, but 
is the subject of a new research project planned by the Advanced Social and 
Political Research Institute (ASPRI). This book examines how the media 
in Russia construct the image of Latvia – the topics covered, the discursive 
strategies employed, and the way in which Latvia is portrayed.
Thus far, Russian media portrayal of Latvia has received very little 
academic attention in both Russia and Latvia.4 Thus, the research below 
is based almost solely on an investigation of primary source materials. The 
research team benefited from access to a unique source of information – a data 
base of Russian media materials mentioning Latvia and/or Latvians that the 
Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs commissioned from a media monitoring 
company in Russia.5 The data base covers press, radio, and television reports 
mentioning Latvia or Latvians. It is solely a text database, which means 
that images, often so crucial for understanding media portrayal, were 
not analysed.  The data base contains materials covering the time period 
January 2002 through May 2005. Subsequent materials are available, but 
not in as comprehensive a fashion. Thus, the research team decided to focus 
only on the portrayal of Latvia for the period in which the full data base was 
available. 
As the chronology at the end of the book suggests, January 2002 
through May 2005 was a very eventful period in Latvia, Russia and in 
Latvian–Russian relations. On the Latvian side, it saw accession to the EU 
 3  See, e.g., Roman Szporluk, ed., The Influence of East Europe and the Soviet West on 
the USSR (New York, Praeger, 1977). 
 4  For a rare Russian analysis, see R.X. Simonyan, “Obraz stran Baltii v Rossiskikh 
SMI,” Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya 2004, No. 6, pp. 98-106.  For a Latvian 
analysis, see Mārtiņš Lācis, “Baltijas valstu tēli un ar tiem saistītie stereotipi 
Krievijas federācijas plašsaziņas līdzekļos” [“The Images of the Baltic States and 
Related Stereotypes in the Mass Media of the Russian Federation”], unpublished 
master’s thesis, University of Latvia Communications Department, 2003.  For 
Russian media influence on Latvia, see Ainārs Lerhis, ed., Outside Influence on 
the Ethnic Integration Process in Latvia (Rīga: Centre for East European Political 
Studies, 2008).
 5  The company is called Agenstvo monitoringa SMI WPS.  See its website at www.
wps.ru.
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7and NATO, as well as mass mobilisation of Russian-speakers against the 
education reform. On the Russian side, it saw the consolidation of Putin’s 
power as president, moves to bring media and Russian “oligarchs” to heel, 
the onset of the Iraq War, as well as challenges to Russian influence posed 
by the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. 
In bilateral Latvian-Russian relations, the period was marked by a failed 
attempt to reach agreement on a border treaty, as well as controversy over 
the Latvian president’s participation in events in Moscow commemorating 
the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II.     
The Advanced Social and Political Research Institute at the University 
of Latvia assembled a team of young scholars from the departments of 
political science and communication studies to analyse the media materials. 
The methodologies used by the authors are broadly the same, combining 
elements of discourse analysis, sociology, and political analysis. As a first step 
towards making sense of the vast amount of empirical material in the data 
base, the team reviewed the evolution of topics concerning Latvia, and found 
that the materials could be divided into a number of categories: the situation 
of Russians, controversies over history, Latvian (in both the ethnic and 
territorial sense) culture and Russian culture in Latvia, Latvia’s accession to 
the EU and NATO, and issues pertaining to the economy, including energy 
relations. However, in order to understand media portrayal of these topics 
during the period in review, some background analysis was necessary.   
Thus, Part I begins with an analysis by Toms Rostoks of the evolution of 
relations between the Russian state authorities and the media.  It is important 
to bear in mind that the media situation in Russia differs significantly from 
that in most Western countries, with Putin-era Russia witnessing increasing 
censorship and self-censorship, restrictions on access to information, direct 
and indirect state ownership of media outlets, and dangerous conditions for 
journalists to work in. As Edward Lucas has noted, in national television 
in particular, the official view became increasingly predominant during 
the Putin years, as “editors receive weekly or even daily instructions from 
the Kremlin on the ‘line to take’ on important stories.”6 As elaborated in 
subsequent chapters, the “line to take” on Latvia was generally a negative 
one.
As noted above, Latvia already had an image in Russia upon which 
media coverage from 2002 to 2005 could build. The next chapter by Kristīne 
Doroņenkova explores the key turning points in Latvian-Russian relations 
throughout the 1990s and compiles the available survey data in Russia 
about Latvia to provide a portrait of the legacy of the Yeltsin years regarding 
Latvia’s image. As suggested by the evidence marshalled in this chapter, 
Latvia’s foreign policy orientation was a critical element in placing Latvia, 
along with Estonia and Lithuania, on Russia’s “enemy list.”
Many of the stories about Latvia in the Russian media are written, 
recorded or filmed by journalists based in Latvia. In order to gain a deeper 
understanding of how these journalists work, Dmitrijs Petrenko and Solvita 
Denis interviewed a number of them about political interference in their 
 6  Edward Lucas, The New Cold War (London: Bloomsbury, 2008), 84.
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work, their relations with Moscow-based editorial offices, and the role played 
by market, political and ideological factors. Insights from the interviews are 
presented in Chapter Three. 
Subsequent chapters analyse in depth the core themes regarding 
Latvia that appear in the Russian media: the situation of Russian-speakers, 
controversies over history, Latvian culture, Latvian accession to the EU 
and NATO, and the Latvian economy.  This analysis should provide a useful 
baseline for future studies analysing the evolution of Latvia’s image in the 
Russian media. It could well be that Russian media portrayal of Latvia 
is beginning to change as this book goes to press. There is evidence that 
Russian media interest in Latvia is waning as other, more “problematic” 
Russian neighbours elicit greater interest. Moreover, after ratification of the 
Russian-Latvian border treaty in 2007, a certain warming in relations has 
taken place. As a consequence of this warming, new Russian ambassador to 
Latvia Alexander Veshnakov recently claimed that one of his tasks was to 
“enhance the positive perception of Latvia by inhabitants of Russia.”7 If the 
ambassador’s stance has the Kremlin’s backing, his possibilities of success 
are quite good, given Russian officialdom’s influence in the media.  
The materials in this book should prove of interest not only to students 
of Latvian-Russian relations, but also to those interested in Russian media 
policy and Russian foreign policy more broadly.  Clearly, with increasing state 
control, the media in Russia have become an important tool for implementing 
both domestic and foreign policy.  How this tool is used should be a matter of 
concern not only for the inhabitants of Russia, but for Russia’s neighbours 
and partners in the region and beyond.  
The project benefited greatly from the support of the Latvian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, which provided the research team with the media data 
base and start-up funding for the project. While grateful for the support, 
the authors would like to stress that the analysis and conclusions are solely 
their own and reflect in no way the official stance of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs or the Latvian government.  At the same time, the team would not 
have embarked on such an ambitious project without financial support from 
the University of Latvia, which provided a research grant in 2007. Finally, 
I would like to extend my gratitude to the other members of the research 
team for excellent cooperation in bringing this project to fruition and to Ieva 
Zlemeta for indispensable administrative assistance.    
 7 N.A., “Vešņakovs vēlas vairot Krievijas iedzīvotāju pozitīvu uztveri par Latviju” 
[Veshnakov wants to enhance the positive perception about Latvia among Russia’s 
inhabitants], LETA, 8 February 2008. 
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9Relations between the Media 
and the State in Russia
Toms Rostoks
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of relations between 
the media and the state in Russia since the Cold War, especially over the past 
8 years. This time period covers the Putin presidency, during which media 
relations with the state changed considerably. At the same time, the database 
used for analysing Latvia’s image in Russia’s media in this project covers the 
time period from 2002 until mid-2005. The main focus in this chapter will be 
on radio, TV and the press. While the internet has been growing in impor-
tance during the past 10 years in Russia, its changing character and diversity 
make it difficult to draw any broader conclusions at this point. Moreover, 
internet sources are not included in the database used in this project.1
 1 The importance of the internet as a source of information has risen dramatically 
in Russia in the past 10 years, but there is little agreement among researchers 
as to how many Russians actually use the internet and whether this is a credible 
source of information. Available information indicates that in 2000 approximately 
10 million Russians used the internet, but only 20% of them could be considered 
active users. Yelena Vartanova, “Media Structures: Changed and Unchanged,” 
in Kaarle Nordenstreng, Yelena Vartanova and Ivan Zassoursky, (eds.) Russian 
Media Challenge (Helsinki: Kikimora Publications, 2001), 57-62. Research done 
by the Russian public opinion research centre VCIOM in 2006 indicates that 10% 
of Russians are using the internet for obtaining information, but its importance 
compared to other types of mass media is negligible. People mostly use the internet 
during working hours, and they do not look for information on the internet during 
weekends. Internet users are mostly young people who live in big cities such as 
Moscow and St. Petersburg. “Internet v Rossii,” VCIOM, 2006 at http://wciom.
ru/files/06-07-12-Internet.doc. Last accessed on 25.07.2007. That the internet is 
largely used by the younger generation of Russians indicates that its importance is 
on the rise, but most internet users think that the internet is not a reliable source 
of information. Only 13% of respondents indicated that they consider information 
on the internet trustworthy. “Publikatsii v SMI,” VCIOM, 12.10.2006, at. http://
wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/3372.html. Last accessed on 
25.07.2007. Information about the actual number of internet users in Russia is 
controversial. A survey undertaken by the Russian public opinion research centre 
VCIOM about sources that Russians use for obtaining information about political 
events indicates that 29% of respondents have looked for information about 
politics on the internet, but only 13% were of an opinion that information that 
could be found on the internet was trustworthy. “Televidenie – glavnoe oruzhie 
izbiratel’nikh kampanii,” Press-vypusk, No 657. VCIOM, 23.03.2007. at http://
wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/4248.html. Last accessed on 
25.07.2007. Recent research shows that the number of Russians going online has 
slowed down in 2007. See Paul Goble, “Growth Slowing in Last “Relatively Free” 
Sector of Russian Media – the Internet,” 17.10.2007. 
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10
While regional media outlets are also significant players in Russia’s 
media market, this chapter will focus upon national mass media. First, it is 
impossible to embrace the multiplicity of both national and regional media 
in Russia in a single chapter. Second, there are good reasons to believe that 
the national media are more important players with regard to portraying 
Latvian-Russian relations, because regional media are far more likely to 
be more concerned about national politics, while national media pay more 
attention to Russia’s relations with its neighbours. 
This chapter starts with an overview of the development of Russia’s 
media system after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Subsequent sections 
discuss relations between the media and the state. The second section high-
lights the process through which the media became a valuable instrument 
for capturing political power. The third section describes the main problems 
that Russia’s mass media have encountered over the past 10 years. Among 
these problems are ownership issues, possibilities for obtaining and distrib-
uting information related to politics, and the physical safety of journalists. 
Most experts are of the opinion that freedom of expression has worsened 
during the past 10 years, therefore the aim of this chapter is to provide an 
overview of this process. At the end of the chapter, some implications for 
Latvia’s image in Russian media are discussed. 
The Media in Russia after the Collapse of 
the Soviet Union
The media in every society perform certain functions, and the most 
important of these is mediation between society and those who are in power. 
Sarah Oates writes that there are several important questions with regard 
to the relationship between the media and the state. First, are people con-
sumers or citizens? Second, do the media assume leadership in initiating 
discussions about politically significant issues or do they follow the lead of 
others? Third, do media create the impression that they can influence those 
who are in power or that they lack power? Fourth, do media try to expose 
those who are in power or provide help in concealing failures and imperfec-
tions? Fifth, are the media socially responsible?2 There are also important 
questions to be asked about media ownership, but all these questions clearly 
point to the fact that the social and political context greatly influences the 
way the media perform their functions. 
The media have attracted a lot of attention, not least because of the key 
role they played in Russia during the transition period and in the demise 
of the Soviet Union. However, media were not only the cause of change, 
they were also greatly affected by political, social and economic changes in 
Russia’s society. In the Soviet Union the mass media were used to strengthen 
the impact of the ruling communist ideology and contribute to regime stabil-
ity. Although the break-up of the Soviet Union brought significant changes 
to Russia’s mass media, some continuity can also be observed. Yelena 
 2 Sarah Oates, Television, Democracy and Elections in Russia (Routledge, 2005), 4–5. 
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Vartanova writes that the Soviet and post-Soviet Russian media environ-
ments share two characteristics. First, in geographic terms Russia is the 
biggest country in the world, therefore it inevitably consists of several media 
markets. Of course, there are national TV and radio stations and newspa-
pers, but there are also significant regional media outlets. Vartanova argues 
that regional newspapers do not even take Moscow newspapers seriously as 
rivals for local audiences.3 Second, the density of Russia’s population is very 
low and the transport infrastructure is underdeveloped, which means that 
linkages between Russia’s regions are weak.4 As a consequence, the situa-
tion in Russia’s regions with regard to freedom of the press is very diverse. 
However, Russia’s media sector has also been characterised by signifi-
cant change. Vartanova argues that there are three key trends of trans-
formation. First, Russians have ceased to be a reading nation and have 
become a watching nation, primarily because of economic constraints.5 In 
1999 95% Russians watched television on a regular basis. Radio was the 
second most important source of information with 82% listeners, and 80% 
read newspapers and magazines.6 The transition from a reading to a watch-
ing society was marked by several events that significantly affected circula-
tion of Russia’s newspapers. Ivan Zassoursky argues that the circulations of 
most newspapers and magazines fell by 10 times or more in 1992 and 1993.7 
The national press was affected more by the economic meltdown than the 
regional press. The collapse of the press distribution system also signifi-
cantly contributed to falling press circulation. People disapproved of con-
stant delays in press delivery, and this problem was especially acute in the 
most remote regions. What is more, people started to lose confidence in the 
media. During the first years of transition, the media had moral authority,8 
but this changed, and in 1999 only 13% of Russians trusted newspapers and 
magazines while 36% trusted television.9 
The second important aspect of transformation is the change in the 
structure of the Russian press media market. This market was vertically 
 3 Elena Vartanova, “Russia,” in Mary Kelly, ed., Media in Europe: The Euromedia 
Research Group (London: Sage Publications, 2004), 193. 
 4 Vartanova, “Media Structures,” in Nordenstreng, Vartanova, Zassoursky, (eds.), 
Russian Media Challenge, 22-23. 
 5 Sarah Oates refers to a survey that was conducted during the first half of the 
1970s in Leningrad and argues that 75% of inhabitants of Leningrad were reading 
newspapers on a daily basis. Another 19% were reading newspapers several times 
a week, therefore it can be argued that an absolute majority of Russians were 
reading newspapers almost daily. It is hardly surprising that daily circulation 
of the biggest newspapers such as Pravda and Izvestiya reached several millions 
(Pravda – 11 million, Izvestiya – 7 million). Oates, Television, Democracy and 
Elections in Russia, 11.
 6 Vartanova, “Media Structures,” in Nordenstreng, Vartanova, Zassoursky (eds.), 
Russian Media Challenge, 25. 
 7 Ivan Zassoursky, “Media and Power: Russia in the Nineties,” in Ibid., 75.
 8 In 1996 more than two thirds of Russians trusted the mass media. 
 9 Vartanova, “Media Structures,” in Nordenstreng, Vartanova, Zassoursky, (eds.), 
Russian Media Challenge, 25. 
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integrated in the Soviet Union, but in the years following the demise of the 
Soviet Union it has become horizontally integrated.10 This means that the 
national press became less important, while the regional press gained im-
portance because it provided Russians with information relevant for their 
regions. 
The third important aspect of Russia’s media transformation was the 
gradual introduction of advertising that allowed the media to attract ad-
ditional financing in order to compensate for falling circulation. It should be 
noted that advertising has two main functions. First, it is one of the most 
important sources of financing for mass media. Second, advertising provides 
information about prices of goods and services. Most Russians experienced 
economic difficulties after the break-up of the Soviet Union, therefore the 
media performed a crucial function of providing people with information that 
helped them to get by. It is hardly a surprise that some of the newspapers 
with high circulations were advertising newspapers that were distributed 
free of charge. Introduction of advertising stimulated segmentation of the 
media because many newspapers and magazines had to find their specific 
audience and organise advertising accordingly.11 
The media had to learn how to function according to market principles, 
and the transformation from being state outlets to normal business projects 
was inevitable. Functioning according to the rules of the market meant that 
revenues depended on broader economic trends. Thus, the economic crisis of 
1998 was a particular financial blow for the media, because people bought 
fewer newspapers and magazines, and there was less advertising. Other sig-
nificant transformations in Russia’s media sector include growing regionali-
sation. It should be noted that not all of Russia’s media have become part of 
the market economy because many are supported by regional authorities or 
controlled by government-owned industries.12 
Mass Media and Political Power after the Demise of 
the Soviet Union
The media were an important part of Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost’ 
policy. When the reforms went beyond the government’s control, the media 
provided society with communication channels and reliable information. 
After the break-up of the Soviet Union in the beginning of the 1990s, Boris 
Yeltsin was supported by Russia’s media because, as Ivan Zassoursky writes, 
the authorities simply registered the media during the first wave of privatisa-
tions. This allowed the media to escape their former owners, because property 
rights were not even mentioned in the Soviet media law of 1991. Of course, 
the state retained property rights over several important media outlets, but 
 10 Ibid., 26. 
 11 Ibid. 
 12 There is a widespread belief in Russian society that “he who pays orders the music.” 
Many think that this is inevitable and therefore take into account the possibility 
that information in the media may be biased in favour of those who control or own 
them. See Oates, Television, Democracy and Elections in Russia, 44-65. 
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even these enjoyed considerable freedom both in terms of expression and 
management.13 Russia’s media highly valued their newly gained freedom and 
supported Yeltsin and his team, as it was believed that freedom of the press 
wouldn’t survive under the rule of the Communist Party.14 
Relations between the media and those with political power remained 
controversial throughout the 1990s, because most media supported Boris 
Yeltsin when his position became weaker against the communists. At the 
same time, the media were also aware of possible illegal actions during the 
privatisation of Russia’s large formerly state-owned enterprises. Journalists 
turned away from Boris Yeltsin in 1994 when the first Chechen war started, 
but the media again supported the president in 1996 when his re-election 
was endangered. 
It would be a mistake to argue that all Russia’s mass media are po-
liticised, as those in power have been more interested in exerting control 
over the large national TV and radio stations. National radio stations and 
newspapers that featured news and analytical programmes also experienced 
attempts at control by the state, but there were many smaller media outlets 
that were not politically important, and these could operate rather freely.15 
However, the distinction between political and commercial media outlets 
doesn’t coincide with the divide between national and regional media. 
Growing politicisation of Russia’s mass media took place in the mid-
1990s. The development of independent media was considered to be one of 
the greatest successes of Russia’s political transformation up to the presiden-
tial election of 1996, when the media made a tactical retreat.16 Support from 
the media turned out to be decisive in Boris Yeltsin’s victory over Gennady 
Zyuganov, and experts saw the elections as the turning point towards state 
control, because they clearly highlighted the importance of the media in 
influencing public opinion.17 In the beginning of 1996 Yeltsin’s popularity 
was at its lowest, and it seemed that only a miracle could get him re-elected 
for a second four year term. Despite media support for Yeltsin, “reformers” 
suffered a major defeat in the parliamentary elections of 1995. Yeltsin’s re-
election became possible because of the joint support from state television, 
Vladimir Gusinsky’s media holding Media-Most (television channel NTV)18 
 13 In fact, freedom of Russia’s mass media was actively supported by the state because 
a large part of the newly independent media continued to receive support from the 
state even after 1992 when prices were liberalised. 
 14 Zassoursky, “Media and Power,” in Nordenstreng, Vartanova, Zassoursky (eds.), 
Russian Media Challenge, 73-74. 
 15 Ibid., 75. 
 16 Laura Belin, “Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media,” in Archie 
Brown, ed., Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 323. 
 17 Osmo Kuusi, Hannah Smith, Paula Tiihonen, (eds.), Russia 2017: Three Scenarios 
(Helsinki, 2007), 72. 
 18 It should be noted that Gusinsky’s TV channel NTV very harshly criticised the 
Chechen war and didn’t support Boris Yeltsin from the very beginning. Only later, 
when it became clear that negative publicity could ruin Yeltsin’s campaign, did 
NTV start to support Yeltsin. 
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and Boris Berezovsky’s media holding MNVK (television channel TV6). 
These elections clearly demonstrated that with the help from mass media 
it is possible to gain and to keep political power even in seemingly hope-
less situations. Television emerged as the prime instrument for gaining and 
keeping political power. In the presidential elections of 1996 opposition can-
didates were not allowed to express their opinion and the mass media were 
flooded with positive news about the economic situation in the country.19 In 
other words, a virtual reality was created with the help of the media that did 
not match the true situation in the country. 
Most experts on Russian politics would probably agree that it was very 
profitable to support those who were in political power in the 1990s. Of 
course, this applies only to owners of media holdings and not to journal-
ists, who gradually became puppets used to fight off business or political 
opponents. Owners of media holdings benefited enormously from supporting 
Boris Yeltsin in 1996. For example, Vladimir Gusinsky’s television channel 
NTV was allowed to pay a discount fee for transmission services, and a few 
months later it received permission to broadcast around-the-clock on the 
fourth channel where previously it could broadcast only a few hours daily.20 
Vladimir Gusinsky sold 30% of his shares in NTV to Gazprom for about 
USD 120 million, which was enough to establish a satellite TV network. 
Gusinsky also managed to acquire the oil company Sibneft.21 This suggests 
that the drawing together of the media and political power was caused by 
economic rather than ideological considerations. 
The media were used not only to fight political battles, but also to fight 
off economic competitors. As a result of the presidential elections of 1996, 
political and economic groupings increasingly tried to gain control over 
the media. It became a well-known principle that unless you had your own 
media holding, you were doomed to lose out to your economic and politi-
cal competitors. This resulted in a situation where at the end of the 1990s 
there were approximately 10 media holdings in Russia, but only four were 
able to influence political outcomes at the federal level. These holdings were: 
state owned and controlled television channels, Vladimir Gusinsky’s Media-
MOST holding with its crown jewel NTV, Boris Berezovsky’s MNVK with 
TV-6, Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov’s media holding with TV-Centre. These 
were the most influential media holdings when Vladimir Putin was chosen 
by Boris Yeltsin as prime minister in summer 1999. 
Russia’s Media after 1999
After the 1996 presidential elections, businessmen rushed to invest in 
the media, but these investments were politically rather than economically 
motivated, as large portions of Russia’s mass media were not profitable. The 
 19 Zassoursky, “Media and Power,” in Nordenstreng, Vartanova, Zassoursky, (eds.), 
Russian Media Challenge, 78-79. 
 20 Andrei Raskin, “Television: Medium to Elect the President,” in Nordenstreng, 
Vartanova, Zassoursky, (eds.), Russian Media Challenge, 93-94. 
 21 Zassoursky, “Media and Power,” in Ibid., 79. 
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independence of Russia’s mass media was further eroded in 1998 when the 
economic crisis dealt a heavy blow to the last independent media outlets. 
The advertising market crashed, and the last independent media went on 
sale. When Vladimir Putin became the prime minister in 1999 the situation 
in Russia’s mass media sector was such that almost all significant media 
outlets were controlled by influential economic and political actors. The next 
presidential elections were scheduled for the year 2000, and ownership over 
mass media was acquired with an aim to use the media as an instrument 
during the election campaign. The only thing that was unclear was which 
media holding was going to support which candidate. 
It should be noted that Russia’s mass media at the end of the 1990s were 
characterised by a growing convergence of opinions, but this did not imply 
that there would be no serious competition before the elections. Vladimir 
Putin became Russia’s prime minister in August 1999 replacing Sergey 
Stepashin. Yeltsin emphasised that he saw Putin as the next president. On 
the same day Putin agreed to run for president in the forthcoming elections. 
At that time a very strong coalition was formed between Yuri Luzhkov and 
Yevgeny Primakov, and Putin had to face this coalition if he was to become 
president. Primakov was nominated as the candidate for president by the 
coalition of political forces Fatherland – All Russia. This coalition was 
supported by regional leaders and several political groupings in Moscow. 
However, as Tom de Waal argues, it was evident that Primakov was not 
the best candidate for president because his appearance reminded Russian 
voters of the old communist leaders of the Soviet Union. As a result, it could 
have been difficult for him to obtain enough votes to become president.22 
Putin’s becoming a prime minister coincided with terrorist attacks on 
several cities in Russia and the war in Dagestan. It was decided later in 
August to start the second Chechen war. This decision paid off for Putin, 
whose popularity skyrocketed during the first weeks of war.23 The reason 
behind his popularity was his uncompromising stance with regard to the 
Chechen issue. A new political party – Unity – was formed before the par-
liamentary elections that were scheduled for December 1999. This political 
party was supported by both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin and it came 
in second in the December elections, losing only to the Communist Party 
and gaining considerably more seats than Fatherland – All Russia. 
Boris Yeltsin caught many by a surprise when he resigned on New 
Year’s Eve and announced Vladimir Putin as the new president of Russia. 
The time was right for this move because Putin enjoyed overwhelming 
 22 Tom De Waal, “Analysis: The problems facing Primakov,” BBC, 18.08.1999, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/423914.stm. Last accessed on 
25.07.2007. 
 23 In 1995 the government lost the battle over shaping the coverage of the first 
Chechnya war. As Laura Belin argues, the coverage of the second war was 
qualitatively different. Due to rampant crime and kidnappings Russia’s journalistic 
community had become alienated. As a consequence, coverage of Russia’s military 
action in Chechnya was neutral or positive in most media outlets. See Laura Belin, 
“Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media,” 323. 
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popular support. For example Andrei Raiskin writes that Putin’s popularity 
rose from 14% at the beginning of October up to 41% in November (percent-
age of people who were ready to vote for Putin in presidential elections). His 
popularity rose further to 56% in January 2000. Besides, approximately 70% 
supported his policy with regard to Chechnya, and ¾ believed that he was 
going to become the next president of Russia.24 Yeltsin’s resignation allowed 
the organisation of presidential elections in March (originally elections were 
scheduled for June), before Putin’s popularity had started to decrease and 
before other candidates had been able to organise meaningful election cam-
paigns. The timing for Yeltsin’s resignation was very symbolic, because it took 
place at the turn of millennia and because an older politician (Yeltsin) handed 
over power to a younger politician (Putin), thus symbolising the beginning of 
a new political era. As most Russians spend New Year’s Eve at home watching 
television, almost the whole country watched the transfer of power. 
The media played a significant role in the presidential elections of 2000. 
Initially, various media holdings could not agree on a single candidate, but 
later the media supported Vladimir Putin and reflected upon his personality 
and activities, thus showing loyalty to the would-be president of Russia. At 
this moment one might ask: how could this happen? Political and economic 
groups prepared for presidential elections, and there were other candidates 
to be considered. Why did Putin win so easily? First, he was supported 
by state television. Second, “administrative resources” were used against 
private media. At the beginning of 2000, the media in Russia still felt the 
consequences of the 1998 economic crisis, which means that they were 
vulnerable to external pressure. Media outlets such as Gusinsky’s NTV 
that took the liberty of criticising Vladimir Putin over his conduct of the 
Chechen war were punished, and Gusinsky himself started to feel pressure 
from the authorities. Third, soon after parliamentary elections in December 
1999 political groupings agreed on a candidate – Vladimir Putin – that was 
most likely to become the next president and therefore tried to establish 
productive and mutually beneficial relations with him. This mood was soon 
picked up by the media that supported Putin and let other candidates build 
support on their own. The Russian press was more impartial in the run-up 
to the presidential elections, but there were also many publications where 
Vladimir Putin was portrayed in a favourable light. The press also informed 
the public about his biography and his friends and colleagues at school, 
university and place of work.25 
Russia’s election law stipulates that presidential candidates are granted 
free advertising time on national television. Usually advertising for agita-
tion was granted during the day, when a majority of television watchers 
were still at work. Besides, Putin never used free advertising time, because 
his activities and opinions were highlighted by the media in prime time. 
Vladimir Putin also did not participate in television debates with other can-
didates, thus creating an image of himself as a candidate who stands above 
 24 Andrei Raskin, “Television: Medium to Elect the President,” in Nordenstreng, 
Vartanova, Zassoursky, (eds.), Russian Media Challenge, 102, 107. 
 25 Ibid., 98, 99. 
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quarrels with other candidates. His image was strengthened by opinions of 
political commentators that appeared in the media. Thus, the media played 
an important role in Russia’s presidential election of 2000, though Putin’s 
elevation to the office of president was facilitated by strong popular support 
and a successful election campaign. 
Though most media supported Putin during the election campaign in 
spring 2000, there was some evidence that dissent and criticism would not 
be tolerated. Though the freedom of the press decreased in Russia since 
2000, it would be a mistake to conclude that they were free and independ-
ent before Putin, because this was clearly not the case in the 1990s. There 
are three models of how relations between mass media and political and 
economic groupings can develop. First, the media can be independent from 
political and economic groupings. In this model, the media ensure their fi-
nancial existence by attracting advertisement and (in the case of the press) 
by increasing the circulation of newspapers and magazines. Second, media 
are owned by big businesses and are used as instruments to fight political 
and economic battles. It was typical for Russia that owners of media holdings 
had developed close relations with political groupings who were in power. As 
a consequence, the media were used as a tool for improving their owners’ 
relations with the Kremlin by providing the public with information that 
showed the president and his supporters in a favourable light. Third, the 
state takes control over the media from their owners because the media 
are thought to be too important not to be controlled directly by the political 
authorities. The transition from the second to the third model was caused 
in Russia by fear that powerful economic interests could turn against those 
in power. The second model was characteristic for Russia at the end of the 
1990s, but Russia moved towards the third model after the year 2000 when 
Vladimir Putin was elected Russia’s president. This transition from the sec-
ond model to the third was also marked by a considerable decrease in the 
freedom of press.26 
The freedom of press has been curtailed in all aspects during the past 
8 years. The following sections will examine three important aspects of 
freedom of the press. First, issues of ownership will be examined, with the 
primary attention devoted to highlighting the process by which the televi-
sion channels NTV and TV-6 came under state control. Second, issues of 
access to information will be discussed. Third, the situation with regard to 
the physical security of journalists will be investigated. 
Ownership Issues 
The most important mass media in Russia are those television chan-
nels that broadcast on a national scale. Media holdings whose owners were 
Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky were not politically neutral, 
but were also sufficiently powerful to be able to criticise political authori-
ties. Both NTV and TV6 did not go openly against Vladimir Putin during 
 26 See, e.g., the sections on Russia in the Annual Reports of the International Helsinki 
Federation for Human Rights for 1999-2007. 
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the 2000 presidential elections, but it was widely known that at least NTV 
offered viewers different and critical information about Russian politics. 
Thus, it was natural that Vladimir Gusinsky with his media holding Media-
MOST was the first to be punished. Although formally NTV and TV6 were 
closed down legally, there is good reason to believe that the main goal was to 
silence TV stations that were criticising political authorities.27 
On the surface, the reason for closing down NTV was purely commer-
cial, as the Media-MOST company owed more than USD 200 million to 
Russian oil and gas giant Gazprom, and in March 2000 Gazprom demanded 
reimbursement for a USD 211 million loan that it had repaid to a bank on 
behalf of Media-MOST.28 Charges were brought against the owner of Media-
MOST Vladimir Gusinsky and Gazprom tried to take over the Media-MOST 
holding company. Gusinsky was arrested and later released when he agreed 
to sell enough Media-MOST shares so that Gazprom would be in a position 
to control NTV. Representatives from the ministry of press and informa-
tion were also present during negotiations between Gusinsky and Gazprom, 
which has been interpreted as a clear sign that these representatives were 
primarily interested in securing state control over Media-MOST. This has 
been confirmed by Gusinsky himself after he fled Russia, when he accused 
Russian authorities for pressing him to sign an agreement with Gazprom. 
This information has been strongly rejected by the Russian authorities. 
Although accusations against Gusinsky were lifted after he agreed to sign 
the agreement with Gazprom, charges were again brought against him 
when he provided the press with information about the circumstances under 
which the agreement with Gazprom was signed.29 
The role of Gazprom in the Gusinsky and NTV affair was rather ironic 
because this company invested in NTV and Media-MOST in 1996 to secure 
itself against potential attacks and accusations by the Russian authorities. 
Gazprom also guaranteed several large loans that NTV needed. When the 
authorities wanted to collect higher taxes from Gazprom in 1998, NTV was 
used to defend its patron. Relations between Gazprom and NTV became 
worse only in February 2000, when after a meeting with Vladimir Putin, the 
company’s representative criticised NTV’s reports from the second Chechen 
war. A month later in March, Gazprom demanded that NTV repay its debt. 
NTV and Gusinsky were not able to comply, and Gazprom gained control 
over NTV.30 
 27 It has been noted by the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights that 
on the federal level the situation with regard to freedom of the press started to 
worsen in 2000, while in Russia’s regions the situation started to deteriorate three 
years earlier in 1997. See International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights 
“Russia,” in IHF Annual Report 2001, 260. This is confirmed by Belin, “Political 
Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media,” in Brown, ed., Contemporary 
Russian Politics, 340.
 28 Belin, “Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media,” in Brown, ed., 
Contemporary Russian Politics, 335. 
 29 See International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, “Russia,” IHF Annual 
Report 2002, 266-267. 
 30 Laura Belin, “Ten Ironies of the NTV Saga,” RFE/RL Russia Report, 1.11. 2001. 
latvkriev-medijos-A.indd   18 2008.07.16.   16:31:58
19
LUKoil, an oil company, played a crucial role in the events that led to 
the elimination of TV-6. In the case of NTV, it could be argued that Gazprom 
defended its legitimate economic interests, while liquidation of TV-6 was 
against the economic interests of its minority shareholder LUKoil-Garant 
which owned 15% of TV-6 shares. LUKoil-Garant employed a very rarely used 
paragraph of the joint-stock company law that allowed minority shareholders 
to defend their interests by liquidating companies whose liabilities exceed 
assets for two years in a row or longer. The ruling of the court in favour of 
LUKoil-Garant was not logical, because after several years of losses TV-6 
became profitable in 2001 when Yevgeni Kiselev together with other former 
employees of NTV started to work for TV-6. Surprisingly, the court managed 
to produce the ruling very quickly, though court proceedings often drag on 
for years. The court’s quick decision played into the hands of LUKoil-Garant 
and the authorities, as longer proceedings would have allowed TV-6 to pro-
vide a positive balance sheet for 2001. It should also be noted that minority 
shareholders usually try to sell their shares if they are dissatisfied with how a 
company works, but LUKoil-Garant did not attempt to sell its shares in TV-6. 
Boris Berezovsky even made a public statement about his readiness to buy out 
shares that were owned by LUKoil-Garant, but this company did not respond 
to the offer.31 In short, there is enough evidence to argue that the goal of the 
whole process was to silence TV-6 rather than to seek economic profitability. 
It should also be noted that it would have been possible to use the 35th 
paragraph of the law on joint-stock companies to do away with more than 
half of all Russian companies, but this option was seldom utilised. Finally, 
in January 2002 the court ruled in favour of liquidating TV-6. Soon after 
the court’s ruling, the management of TV-6 reached a deal with the min-
istry of press and information that it would voluntarily give up its licence 
and would later try to establish a new company without Boris Berezovsky’s 
participation, and this company would participate in a tender that would 
be announced later. Several days later the management of TV-6 stated that 
this deal was imposed on them, and then the authorities suspended TV-6 
broadcasts a few hours later.32 
Part of the management and employees of TV-6 then participated in 
the competition for a new license. They managed to obtain the licence after 
forming a partnership with another bidder Medium-Socium. The new televi-
sion channel TV Spektrum (TVS) started broadcasting on 1 June 2002, but 
it was not as popular as NTV and later TV-6. A year later in June 2003 TVS 
was liquidated and replaced by a sports channel. The Ministry of Press and 
Information explained this decision as caused by the inability of TVS to 
generate profits and by the necessity to defend the public interest. Sceptical 
voices were of an opinion that this was the last step towards ensuring full 
state control over national television channels.33
 31 Larua Belin, “Will TV-6 Go Out With a Bang or a Whimper?,” RFE/RL Russia 
Report, 1.31. 2001.
 32 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, “Russia,” IHF Annual 
Report 2003.  
 33 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, “Russia,” IHF Annual 
Report 2004, 324-326. 
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Of course, the events surrounding NTV, TV-6 and TVS do not provide 
a full picture of the changes that took place in Russia after 2000, as many 
other cases when the Russian authorities have silenced the mass media have 
been registered. It would be an exaggeration to argue that the NTV and TV-
6 television channels were politically neutral and that they always honestly 
informed society about Russian politics. Although journalists who worked 
on NTV were considered to be more professional and objective than journal-
ists working on national television channels, there have been cases when 
NTV and TV-6 have put particular political and economic interests ahead of 
the necessity to provide society with honest and reliable information.34 
Today the situation is that the state remains the main actor in the tele-
vision business.35 The three largest television stations are partially or fully 
state-owned. The state owns the Rossiya channel (RTR), it has a majority of 
shares in Channel One (ORT) and through Gazprom, and it owns the private 
channel NTV. Moreover, “Gazprom Media” owns the NTV+ satellite channel, 
the TNT regional TV channel, the Ekho Moskvy radio channel, the Izvestiya 
and Kommersant’ newspapers, and Itogi, a weekly current affairs magazine. 
The state also owns the Radio Mayak and Radio Rossiya radio stations. 
Similarly, the news agencies RIA and ITAR-TASS are owned by the state.”36
Accessibility of Information 
Restricted accessibility of information is a major problem in Russia in 
the context of freedom of the press. The previous section dealt with infringe-
ments on the freedom of the press that were caused by the fact that the 
authorities took control of private television channels. However, freedom of 
the press can also be curbed in more subtle ways, for example, by restricting 
access to information. 
Basically, there are three ways in which the authorities can use access 
to information as an instrument for controlling journalists. First, authori-
ties can hide information from journalists, thereby making their work dif-
ficult. Second, authorities can use access to information as a tool that can be 
played selectively against some reporters who are too critical. The authori-
ties can grant access to information to some reporters, while restricting it 
to others. The first group would be afraid to criticise the authorities for fear 
of losing their access to information, while the second group would become 
less critical in order to gain access to information. Third, the government 
can deter journalists from writing about sensitive issues by blurring the line 
between confidential and permissible information. 
The latter strategy was widely used throughout the 1990s when the 
Russian army tried to silence journalists who wrote about the impact of 
 34 For example, before the presidential elections of 1996, NTV concealed information 
about Boris Yeltsin’s poor health condition. Oates, Television, Democracy and 
Elections in Russia, 43.
 35 Elena Vartanova, “Russia,” in Mary Kelly (ed.) Media in Europe: The Euromedia 
Research Group (London: Sage Publications, 2004), 196. 
 36 Kuusi, Smith and Tiihonen, (eds.), Russia 2017, 72-73. 
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Russian military forces on the environment. For example, in 1997 charges of 
treason were brought against Grigory Pasko who had written an article for a 
Japanese newspaper about how the Russian army disposed of nuclear waste, 
thus causing environmental damage.37 Usually court proceedings in these 
cases dragged on for a long time, and suspects had to spend a considerable 
amount of time in jail. The case of Grigory Pasko was only one among sev-
eral such cases. What is more, citizens of other countries have been accused 
of spying, and have been sentenced to jail in Russia. 
The issue of Chechnya has proved to be especially sensitive, and many 
journalists have been denied access to Chechnya during the second Chechen 
war. Journalists have been detained and humiliated. For example, Anna 
Politkovskaya arrived in Chechnya in 2001 in order to collect evidence about 
human rights abuses in the region. She was detained and later released, but 
after another visit to Chechnya she started to receive threats and was forced 
to leave the country for a while.38 
Many journalists started to practice self-censorship after the NordOst 
hostage crisis in October 2002. The media collected information about the 
hostage crisis and published interviews with people who participated in lib-
erating the hostages.39 The authorities disapproved of such initiatives and 
issued warnings that journalists should use only those bits of information 
that were approved by the authorities. As a result, journalists increasingly 
practiced self-censorship.40 The effects of the NordOst hostage crisis were 
evident in September 2004 during the Beslan hostage crisis, when journal-
ists’ reports were very cautious. Journalists were forced to coordinate infor-
mation for publishing with the authorities. Many journalists were detained 
and their materials were confiscated. Such actions were also directed against 
foreign journalists. Several journalists under suspicious circumstances were 
denied access to Beslan, while Anna Politkovskaya was poisoned during the 
flight to Beslan.41 
Freedom of the press in Russia deteriorated further in 2005 and 
2006. For the first time since 1991, Freedom House assessed the situa-
tion in Russia with regard to freedom of the press as “not free” because 
legislation was passed that allowed the authorities to curb the activities 
 37 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, “Russia,” IHF Annual 
Report 1999, 215-217. 
 38 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, “Russia,” IHF Annual 
Report 2002, 266-267. 
 39 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, “Russia,” IHF Annual 
Report 2003. 
 40 The decision to practice self-censorship was prompted not only by restricted access 
to information, but also by threats to journalists’ physical security - more than 
100 attacks on journalists related to their professional activities were registered in 
2003. It is very difficult to verify that attacks are directly related to a journalist’s 
professional activities, but there are many cases when such linkages were evident. 
See International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, “Russia,” IHF Annual 
Report 2004, 324-326. 
 41 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, “Russia,” IHF Annual 
Report 2005, 347-349. 
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of non-governmental organisations (especially those that received financial 
assistance from abroad). Moreover, Anna Politkovskaya, who was one of the 
most vocal critics of the Kremlin, was murdered in 2006.42 National televi-
sion channels were already under state control, and the press was cautious in 
dealing with politically sensitive issues. Live broadcasts almost disappeared 
from national television channels, and this measure allowed authorities to in-
crease control over the content of news reports. Reporters were denied access 
to those regions where armed forces conducted anti-terrorism operations. 
Foreign reporters were denied Russian visas. Government authorities fre-
quently refused to provide journalists with information, and there were cases 
when journalists were not allowed to enter government buildings. There were 
also cases when journalists were not issued press cards. Publishing houses 
sometimes refused to print independent newspapers, and occasionally the 
media were caught by surprise by sudden increases of office rent.43 
Negative trends have been balanced by a few positive developments 
when the authorities have backed journalists after having taken inappro-
priate decisions. For example, in November 2002 Vladimir Putin decided 
not to approve amendments to the law on the mass media and the fight 
against terrorism. These amendments would have seriously endangered 
journalists’ ability to cover anti-terrorism operations. However, some ex-
perts were of an opinion that Putin’s move was staged in order to show 
him as a democratic leader who backs journalists and is ready to go against 
other forces who want to curb freedom of the press.44 There have been other 
positive examples when federal authorities have curbed illegal restrictions 
that have been imposed upon journalists in Russia’s regions,45 but on the 
whole it would be fair to conclude that journalists’ access to information 
deteriorated after 2000. 
The Physical Security of Journalists 
Infringement of the physical security of journalists is the last and ulti-
mate test of freedom of the press. Russia has been known as one of the most 
dangerous countries in the world for practicing journalism because of the 
numerous attacks on journalists. Several journalists have been murdered, 
and concerns have been expressed that these murders have been related to 
their professional activities. It should be noted that available data on in-
fringements on physical security of reporters are rather controversial and 
inconsistent, but, nevertheless, experts are of an opinion that regional and 
federal authorities have been involved in some of the murders. 
 42 Freedom House, “Map of Freedom 2007. Country Report Russia,” available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=7258&year=2007. 
Last accessed on 25.07.2007. 
 43 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, “Russia,” IHF Annual Report 
2006. “Russia,” IHF Annual Report 2007, 140-141. 
 44 Laura Belin, “Putin Vetoes Media Restrictions,” RFE/RL Russia Report, 2:40, 
2002. 
 45 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, “Russia,” IHF Annual 
Report 2000, 311-313. 
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For example, nine journalists were murdered in the first eight months of 
1998, and six out of nine murdered reporters were investigating cases of cor-
ruption in government institutions and private banks.46 11 journalists were 
murdered in 1999, while 19 journalists died in Russia in 2002. These statis-
tics clearly indicate that Russia was one of the most unfavourable countries 
in the world for journalists.47 It would be a mistake to conclude that all cases 
were related to the professional activities of reporters, but at least some 
cases were clearly contract killings because journalists had received threats 
and were under constant pressure.48 10 journalists were murdered in 2003, 
and at least 100 attacks on journalists were registered.49 Other experts ar-
gue that the number of murdered journalists is much smaller. For example 
Sarah Oates argues that 29 journalists have been murdered in Russia since 
the break-up of the Soviet Union, and 11 of them died during the first presi-
dency of Vladimir Putin.50 In most cases journalists’ deaths are related to 
the wars in Chechnya or can be regarded as contract killings. 
Journalists have also been persecuted and attacked in subsequent 
years. One of the most well-known cases was the death of the editor-in-chief 
of Forbes magazine’s Russian edition Paul Hlebnikov.51 6 journalists were 
murdered in 2005 and 3 in 2006. Although there is an overall tendency 
for the number of death cases to decrease, this cannot be interpreted as 
reflecting any improvement in journalists’ working conditions. Rather, 
it is the result of journalists’ decreasing ability to provide impartial and 
critical information to the public. The absence of cases when journalists 
have suffered because of their professional activities is an indicator of the 
disappearance of critical and investigative journalism in Russia. As this type 
of journalism has been on the decline, the number of attacks on journalists 
has also decreased. 
Conclusions
Freedom of the press (and other media) in Russia has been in continu-
ous decline since the end of the 1990s. It would be a mistake to argue that 
the mass media have experienced true independence in Russia after the 
break-up of the Soviet Union, but throughout the 1990s the possibilities for 
critical and investigative journalism were greater than they are today. The 
Russian media gained freedom from the state at the beginning of the 1990s, 
but they soon became an instrument in the hands of political and economic 
groupings, because it was difficult for the media to successfully adapt to the 
 46 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, “Russia,” IHF Annual 
Report 1999, 215-217.
 47 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, “Russia,” IHF Annual 
Report 2000, 311-313. “Russia,” IHF Annual Report 2003. 
 48 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, “Russia,” IHF Annual 
Report 2003. 
 49 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, “Russia,” IHF Annual 
Report 2004, 324-326.
 50 Oates, Television, Democracy and Elections in Russia, 21.
 51 Ibid. 
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rapid economic and political transformations of Russian society. Financial 
weakness was the main reason the media could not exist without the help of 
either state or private owners. 
Freedom of the press deteriorated after 2000, when Vladimir Putin be-
came president. Since then power has become more centralised and federal 
and regional authorities have tightened their grip on the media. Various 
mechanisms have been used for establishing control over Russia’s mass 
media, starting with law-suits – instrumental in establishing government 
control over Vladimir Gusinsky’s and Boris Berezovsky’s media holdings – 
and ending with restricted access to information and physical attacks on 
journalists. 
Of course, developments with regard to the media have not gone un-
noticed by the Russian public, and therefore it is interesting to examine 
public opinion and interpretations of what has been happening with Russia’s 
media. Public opinion surveys reveal that people think the media have suf-
ficient opportunity to be critical, and the political opposition can freely ex-
press its opinion on television. VCIOM survey data show that 59% of those 
surveyed think that the political opposition is allowed to express its opinion 
on the most important national television channels. People are even more 
positive when it comes to evaluating opportunities to voice one’s opinion 
in the press – two thirds think that the political opposition can express its 
opinion rather freely.52 62% of those surveyed are of an opinion that censor-
ship is required,53 and more than half pays more attention on TV to news 
programmes.54 People trust the president, but do not trust political parties. 
Sometimes attitudes are rather controversial, but it seems that Russians like 
the idea of a strong and powerful Russia, and there is a widespread belief 
that achieving this requires censorship. Interestingly, Russians are aware 
that state-controlled television channels are not telling the whole truth. 
Nevertheless they have confidence in these television channels precisely 
because they are creating an image of Russia that Russians would like to 
see, instead of showing Russia with all its real problems and shortcomings. 
People are tired of bad news, and therefore they prefer to watch television 
programmes with good news that raise their national self-esteem. It is bet-
ter to watch good news that do not correspond with reality than bad news 
that remind Russians of persistent social problems.55 
The freedom of the press and the possibility to choose alternative sourc-
es of information are on the decline in Russia, therefore the mass media 
cannot function as a supporting mechanism for civil society. The authori-
ties continue to control the flow of information, therefore the media cannot 
 52 VCIOM, “Pust’ govoryat’!”, 16.08.2006., available at http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/
tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/3015.html. Last accessed on 25.07.2007. 
 53 VCIOM, “Nuzhna li tsenzura v sredstvakh massovoy informatsii?” 30.08.2006, 
available at http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/3107.html. 
Last accessed on 25.07.2007.
 54 VCIOM, “Kakie novosti nam nuzhny?,” 07.09.2006., available at http://wciom.ru/
arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/3102.html. Last accessed on 25.07.2007.
 55 Oates, Television, Democracy and Elections in Russia, 17. 
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provide the public with impartial and critical information. Legislation is 
applied selectively, and there is a wide array of instruments available for 
punishing media outlets that do not want to yield to government control. 
Journalists are easy to intimidate not least because of the high crime rate, 
the omnipresent corruption and the willingness of authorities to silence 
critical voices in the mass media. However, it would be a mistake to assume 
that only corrupt and repressive political authorities and an indifferent so-
ciety are the root of the problem, because to some extent journalists them-
selves are to blame for the sad situation with regard to the freedom of press. 
Low ethical and professional standards are part of the problem, because 
journalists themselves are of an opinion that there can be no independent 
mass media, that mass media are part of the power structure and that a 
multitude of opinions is a sign of weakness of those in power.56 Therefore 
many journalists support façade democracy and order because they fear 
chaos and deep political divisions. 
Implications for Latvia’s Image in the Russian Media
What are the implications for Latvia of the changed relations between 
the state and the media in Russia? What effect do these changes have on 
Latvia’s image in the Russian media? To answer these questions, one has to 
examine who reports from Latvia and how. This issue is analysed in greater 
depth by Dmitrijs Petrenko and Solvita Denis in another chapter in this 
volume, so only the most important aspects are mentioned here. The context 
in which Latvia’s image in the Russian mass media is created is that most 
important television and radio channels as well as newspapers and the main 
news agency ITAR-TASS are either owned or controlled by the state. This 
makes it possible for the state to develop a certain image of Latvia in the 
Russian media. 
The actual process through which Latvia’s image is created looks some-
what different. Most news reports for the main Russian television stations 
are made by Latvian journalists. Relations between the Russian media and 
journalists in Latvia can be characterised in terms of supply and demand. 
For example, NATO should be depicted as an unfriendly alliance or shouldn’t 
be mentioned at all. Also, demand exists to report on events on certain dates 
of historic importance, such as March 16, May 9, etc. However, even taking 
into account existing demand, not all news reports will be accepted even 
if they are in line with state policy towards Latvia. It seems that it has 
become more difficult in recent years to sell news reports from Latvia to 
the Russian media. Demand has decreased, and currently supply is stronger 
than demand. 
It would be wrong to assume that certain rules of the game are im-
posed upon Latvian journalists working for the Russian news market. 
There are several reasons for this assumption. First, local journalists often 
have friendly relations with professionals representing the demand side in 
 56 Ibid., 192. 
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Russia. Second, there is a certain degree of convergence of opinions be-
tween Latvian journalists (especially Russian-speaking journalists) and 
the Russian media. Latvian journalists working for the Russian market 
assume that it is their mission to improve the status of Russian-speakers 
in Latvia. Third, on the Latvian side there is a pronounced economic inter-
est to sell news reports to the Russian market, therefore journalists and 
producers are more interested in selling news reports than in not being 
censored or “guided” by the demand side. Occasionally, news reports are 
somewhat modified after having been submitted to the Russian side, but 
such “adjustments” are accepted, as both sides know the rules of the game, 
have good personal relations, think alike and tend to perceive their rela-
tions in economic rather than political terms.
latvkriev-medijos-A.indd   26 2008.07.16.   16:31:58
27
Latvia’s Image in Russia: 
The Legacy of the 1990s
Kristīne Doroņenkova
The Baltic Challenge to Post-Soviet Integration and 
to Soviet/Russian Myths
The 1990s witnessed a dramatic change in Russia’s position, both in-
ternationally and domestically. The former superpower rapidly lost its eco-
nomic and military position, and the standard of living of the majority of its 
citizens dropped swiftly. A serious additional blow to Russian dignity was 
the unwillingness of the Baltic States to remain protectorates of Russia. 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania demonstrated no interest in joining in the 
creation of the first post-Soviet integration project under Russian tutelage, 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).1 Instead, from the onset of 
independence, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania demonstrated a strong pro-
Western foreign policy course. The unwillingness of the Baltic States to join 
the CIS and their pro-Western foreign policy had a crucial influence on both 
official Russia’s and the Russian public’s attitude towards the Baltic States, 
which in turn, set the parameters for future bilateral relations.
In a survey conducted three years after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, a significant percentage of Russian respondents believed that the 
Baltic States gained the most from the dissolution of the Soviet Union (21% 
named Latvia, 19% Lithuania, and 17% Estonia).2 At the same time only 4% 
of respondents in Russia considered it in the interests of Russia to reunite 
with Latvia (one percent more than for Lithuania and Estonia, which drew 
3% each). In comparison, reunion with both Ukraine and Belarus drew a 
positive response from 24% of respondents, whereas nearly 23% said that 
Russia should not unite with any of the former Soviet republics.3 Two years 
later, 61% of Russians regretted the disintegration of the Soviet Union. For 
these 61%, the independent course of the Baltic States was clearly not a 
sign of friendship. Another year later only 5% of Russians said that they 
 1 Officially, Russia never attempted to impose CIS membership on the Baltic 
countries. See Dmitri Trenin, Baltic Chance. The Baltic States, Russia, and the 
West in Emerging Greater Europe (Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, Carnegie Moscow Centre, 1997), 14.
 2 Svetlana Migdisova and Elena Petrenko, “Po mneniyu respondentov, bol’she vsego 
vygrali ot rasspadu SSSR strany Baltii,” 29 July 1994, available at www.bdfom.
ru/report/cat/frontier/countries/latviya/of19941805.
 3 Public poll conducted in June 1994 by the fund “Obshchestvennoe mnenie,” 
available at www.bdfom.ru/report/cat/frontier/countries/latviya/of19941292.
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would like to see Latvia (5% said Lithuania and 3% Estonia)4 as part of 
the Russia-Belarus Union that was considered a step towards revival of the 
Soviet Union.
The Baltic States posed a challenge not only to Russia’s attempts to 
reintegrate the former Soviet space, but also to official Russian historiog-
raphy and core legitimising Soviet/Russian myths.5 While victory over Nazi 
Germany in the “Great Patriotic War” remains a foundational myth, the 
Baltic States undermined this myth by pointing out that the Soviet Union 
and Nazi Germany signed a non-aggression treaty leading to the occupation 
of the Baltic. Influenced by the Soviet propaganda machine throughout most 
of their lives, many Russian citizens had never heard about the occupation 
and continued to believe the official line that the Soviet Union had “liberated” 
the Baltic States, which joined the Soviet Union “voluntarily.” Thus, accord-
ing to an opinion poll carried out in 2005, 36% of respondents believed that 
absorption of Latvia into Soviet Union in June 1940 was Latvia’s decision, 
while an equal number believed that it was a forced Soviet occupation.6
Independence notwithstanding, the Baltic States have traditionally 
been seen in Russia as “a space in the middle – between the CIS and the 
countries of the old Warsaw Bloc.” They are neither considered part of the 
CIS nor full-fledged countries, like, for example, Poland. The Baltic States 
are largely seen as a non-integrated part of the post-Soviet space.7 It would 
not be an exaggeration to say that many Russians consider the Baltic States 
to have been a part of the country since the eighteenth century, rather than 
since 1940 (and then 1944).8 A negative Russian response to the independ-
ent course adopted by the Baltic States was, then, logical and flowed from 
historical perceptions of the region, as well as the challenge the Baltic gov-
ernments posed to Russian assumptions about the inevitable reintegration 
of the post-Soviet space and foundational regime myths.
The First Years of Independence: 1991-1997
Russia’s very first foreign policy paper adopted at the end of 1992, the 
“Foreign Policy Conception of the Russian Federation,” defined the so-
called “near abroad,” including the Baltic States, as a traditional sphere of 
 4 Anna Petrova, Svetlana Klimova, “Khotyat-li rossiyane vosstanovleniya SSSR,” 
26 April 1997, available at http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/frontier/border/latviya/
of19972502.
 5 See David Mendeloff, “Causes and Consequences of Historical Amnesia: the 
Annexation of the Baltic States in Post-Soviet Russian Popular History and 
Political Memory,” in Kenneth Christie and Robert Cribb, eds., Historical Injustice 
and Democratic Transition in Eastern Asia and Northern Europe: Ghosts at the 
Table of Democracy (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 79-117.
 6 Vserossiskii tsentr izucheniya obchchestvennogo mneniya, “Rossiya i Latviya: 
rossiyane luchshe otsenivayut proshloe nashikh otnoshenii, zhiteli Latvii – 
nastoyashchee i budushchee,” Press-vypusk No. 202, May 3, 2005, available at 
wciom.ru/tematicheskii-arkhiv/single/1234.html
 7 A.Foldin, “In Russia, Private Doesn’t Mean Independent,” Transition, Vol. 4, No. 
5, October 1997, 90-92.
 8 Trenin, Baltic Chance, 14.
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Russian influence, a space in which it must not lose that influence.9 While 
Russian officials ceased using the term “near abroad” in the latter half of 
the 1990s, the policy of seeking to maintain influence in neighbouring post-
Soviet countries was consistently followed. Despite the mild rhetoric of then 
Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev (who even recognised the Soviet occupa-
tion of the Baltic States in 1940), the 1992 strategy envisaging a special role 
for Russia in the Baltic countries remained a high priority; in Russia itself, 
Kozyrev was widely criticised for ignoring the Baltic issue in the country’s 
foreign policy.10
Latvian relations with Russia in the first part of the 1990s were com-
plicated by an inheritance from Soviet times – the presence of Russian 
troops and military installations in Latvia until August 1994 (the Skrunda 
early warning radar station in Western Latvia was operational until 1998). 
Latvia’s uncompromising position on the necessity of withdrawing Russian 
troops and closing all Russian military facilities also raised additional ten-
sions. However, due to international pressure, the troops were withdrawn 
and the facilities were shut down, but as was to be expected, this added to 
the tension with Russia. It was also the time when the issue of the Russian 
language and Russian minorities was first raised by Russia, though maybe 
not as vocally as several years later.11
As Žaneta Ozoliņa argues, the two years that followed the withdrawal 
were overshadowed by the military and political ambitions of Russia in 
Latvia. It was not until 1995-1996 that economic interests gained prec-
edence in Russia’s policy towards Latvia and the other Baltic States.12 As 
subsequent events would demonstrate, however, Russia never pursued its 
economic interests in isolation from broader political goals in the Baltic 
States.
In the mid-1990s, the possible membership of the Baltic States in NATO 
entered the international political agenda, and Russia demonstrated strong 
reservations and disapproval. One of the major themes of the “The Main 
Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” adopted on 2 
November 1993 said that Russia might use military force in the event of an 
expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the military se-
curity interests of the Russian Federation.13 In 1996 President Boris Yeltsin 
 9 Aivars Stranga, “Russia and the Security of the Baltic States: 1991-1996,” in Atis 
Lejiņš and Daina Bleiere (ed.), The Baltic States. Search for Security (Rīga: Latvian 
Institute of International Affairs, 1996), 143.
 10 Ibid., 144-145.
 11 On the link between the troop withdrawal and the minority issue, see Sven Gunnar 
Simonsen, “Compatriot Games: Explaining the ‘Diaspora Linkage’ in Russia’s 
Military Withdrawal from the Baltic States,”Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 53, No. 5, 
2001, 771-791.
 12 Žaneta Ozoliņa, “Crisis Prevention or Intervention: Latvia’s Response to the 
Proposed Russian Security Guarantees,” in Eric K. Stern and Dan Hansen (eds.), 
Crisis Management in a Transitional Society: The Latvian Experience (Stockholm: 
Forsvaghogskolan, 2000), 191.
 13 Draft Russian Military Doctrine, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/
991009-draft-doctrine.htm.
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sent a letter to his American counterpart warning the US not to include the 
Baltic States in the expansion of NATO.14 This suggests that the core issue 
from Russia’s perspective was NATO enlargement; other issues contribut-
ing to the tensions and rhetorical warfare that existed between the Baltic 
States and Russia from 1995 to the beginning of 1997 were secondary in 
importance.15
The Baltic bid to join NATO evoked a new policy response from Russia. 
In 1997, Russia developed a long-term strategy in regard to the Baltic States. 
Though the document did not introduce any radically new elements, it aimed 
to create a buffer zone in which neutral Baltic States would remain outside 
NATO. In the context of the new strategy, in autumn 1997 Russia tabled two 
initiatives, namely Russian Security Guarantees and a Pact for Regional 
Security and Stability.16 All three Baltic States rejected the Russian initia-
tives outright. What irritated Russia more than the rejection was perhaps 
the fact that in January 1998 Latvia (as well as Estonia and Lithuania) 
signed a Partnership Charter with the United States.
At the same time, Russian think-tanks also took a more active role in 
analysing the prevailing state of affairs regarding Russia’s relations vis-à-
vis the Baltic States, rendering advice on possible models for future develop-
ment. In autumn 1997 two reports on Russia’s Baltic Policy were prepared. 
Sergey Karaganov’s Council on Foreign Policy recommended a combination 
of sharp pressure (on Latvia and Estonia) with a more effective use of the 
Russian-speaking community in both countries in pursuit of Russian goals.17 
The second report by Dmitry Trenin recommended toning down the rhetoric 
over NATO expansion and offering the Baltic States a security model outside 
the alliance while supporting EU membership as well as signing of border 
agreements without linking them to the situation of the “Russian-speaking 
populace” in Latvia and Estonia. Clearly, both initiatives were launched as 
a reaction to increasing cooperation between Latvia (and the other Baltic 
States) with the EU and NATO.
While Russia focussed increasingly on the NATO issue, in the mid-
1990s it also regularly began to link the further development of relations 
with the issue of the “Russian-speaking” minority. For example, a scheduled 
visit to Moscow by Prime Minister of Latvia Andris Šķēle was cancelled 
by the Russian side as Russia wanted political concessions on the issue of 
“Russian speakers” as a condition for approving the visit. The issue of the 
Russian-speaking minority was also brought up by Russia in connection to 
the issue of the unsolved border agreement between Latvia and Russia that 
 14 Trenin, Baltic Chance, 29.
 15 Aivars Stranga, “Baltic-Russian Relations: 1995-beginning of 1997”, in Atis Lejiņš 
and Žaneta Ozoliņa, (eds.), Small States in a Turbulent Environment: the Baltic 
Perspective (Rīga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs,) 192
 16 Ozoliņa, “Crisis Prevention or Intervention,” in Stern and Hansen, (eds.), Crisis 
Management in a Transitional Society, 189.
 17 See I.Yu. Yurgen and S.A. Karaganov, eds., “Rossiya i Pribaltika (Analitichesky 
doklad),” subsequently republished in S.K. Oznobishchev and I.Yu. Yurgens, eds., 
Rossiya – Baltiya: Doklady SVOP, Materialy konferentsii (Moscow, 2001), 13-80.
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was to be signed in 1997. In 1998, Russian concerns over NATO enlargement 
combined with the interminable minority issue and economic grievances to 
generate a full-fledged crisis.
The “Crisis” of March 1998
In 1998, Russia’s anti-Latvian propaganda reached its highest point. 
The political environment influencing relations between Latvia and Russia 
in early 1998 was charged by the fact that the Prime Minister of Latvia 
was a representative of the nationalist party “For Fatherland and Freedom 
Party/Latvian National Independence Movement.” This party steadfastly 
opposed international pressure to liberalise Latvia’s Citizenship Law, which 
was an ongoing irritant to Russia. Moreover, the Latvian government re-
stricted the participation of Russian companies like Gazprom, Lukoil, and 
Yukos in the privatisation of such Latvian companies as Ventspils Nafta and 
Latvijas Gāze, at the same time increasing tariffs for Russia’s transit of oil 
through the Latvian port of Ventspils.18
On 2 March 1998, a daily Russian language newspaper in Latvia 
Panaroma Latvii called for an unauthorised picket in the centre of Rīga the 
following day to protest poor socio-economic conditions. While all pension-
ers, regardless of ethnicity, lived in deprivation at the time, the readers of 
the newspaper, and thus, the protesters who went out on the streets of Rīga 
on 3 March 1998 were primarily Russian-speakers. Poorly trained in crowd 
control, the police were caught off guard by several thousand pensioners who 
blocked a major thoroughfare. Police dispersed the crowd using excessive 
force, attracting a negative reaction in Russia’s media without precedent.
Scenes of policemen violently dispersing elderly protesters were broad-
cast throughout Russia, and the incident was actively employed by Russia’s 
politicians to create and further develop negative sentiments towards Latvia. 
The results of an opinion poll held on 18 March 1998 showed that only 14% 
of respondents were not aware of the events of 3 March 1998.19 Events in 
Rīga attracted the attention of 83% of respondents, 84% of which supported 
the reaction of Russia’s politicians and only 7% objected. Immediately af-
ter the demonstration, the media in Russia widely discussed the possibility 
of applying economic sanctions against Latvia. Nevertheless, considerably 
fewer respondents expressed their support for radical steps – 53%, while 
22% objected.20
After the events in March 1998, a number of surveys were conducted in 
Russia in connection with treatment of ethnic minorities in Latvia and the 
Russian reaction thereto. Though many Russian politicians called for a boy-
cott of Latvian goods to protest alleged discrimination against minorities, 
 18 Daina Bleiere and Aivars Stranga, “The Latvian Russian Crisis of 1998,” in Stern 
and Hansen, (eds.), Crisis Management in a Transitional Society, 218.
 19 Public poll carried out by the fund “Obshchestvennoe mnenie” on 18 March 1998, 
available at http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/frontier/border/latviya/t8033811.
 20 Anna Petrova, “Sobytiya v Rige ne bezrazlichny Rossiyanam,” 26 March 1998, 
available at http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/frontier/countries/latviya/of19981204.
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49% of survey respondents in Russia gave a positive answer to the ques-
tion: “will you purchase goods if they appear to be of Latvian origin,” while 
35% gave a negative answer, and 16% could not provide a definite answer.21 
Paradoxically, 42% of respondents thought that a boycott of Latvia’s goods 
should be applied as one of the measures to exert pressure on Latvia, 41% 
responded that it should not be done.22 On the other hand, Russia’s respond-
ents in general agreed that some kind of pressure on Latvia “to defend the 
interests of the Russian-speaking population” should be employed – 75% 
were in favour and only 15% were against.23
Interestingly, alongside questions on human rights, the survey of March 
1998 asked questions on the perceived economic situation of minorities. To 
the question: “in which former Soviet Union republic does the Russian-
speaking population live worse, poorer than in Russia,” Latvia topped the 
list with 19% of respondents claiming that Russian-speaking minorities 
in Latvia were worse off than Russians in Russia, while only 6% thought 
they lived better in Latvia. To compare, the figures for Estonia were: 12% 
thought minorities in Estonia were worse off than in Russia, with 7% ren-
dering an opposite view. Latvia also took first place as the country where the 
rights of the Russian-speaking population were thought to be suppressed in 
comparison to the rights of the ethnic majority with 46% concurring, leav-
ing Lithuania (40%) and Estonia (32%) considerably behind.24 Remarkably, 
Lithuania, with its relatively small portion of Russian-speakers, was second 
on the list, 8 points ahead of Estonia. The three Baltic States together create 
a separate group, since the fourth country in this list was Kazakhstan, with 
just 8%. The results of this particular poll show how uninformed Russian 
respondents were about their “compatriots” outside Russia.
Less than two weeks after the dispersal of the pensioners’ demonstra-
tion, Russia seized on another event – the annual commemorative procession 
of veterans from the Latvian Legion on 16 March – to tar Latvia as a country 
where “fascism was being reborn.” While some Latvians joined the Latvian 
Legion voluntarily to fight against the Soviet army under Nazi Germany 
from 1943-1945, many more were conscripted. For several years in a row in 
the mid-1990s, veterans had commemorated their fallen comrades each year 
on March 16, the day in 1944 when the two Latvian Legion divisions fought 
side by side. Until 1998, Russia’s media had largely ignored the handful of 
veterans who, after a church service, walked through town to lay flowers at 
the Freedom monument in downtown Rīga. In the fraught atmosphere of 
March 1998, the event provided additional ammunition to those in Russia 
disposed to see Latvia not only as an oppressor of their countrymen, but as 
a country reviving the mantle of the Nazi regime which had caused so much 
suffering in the Soviet Union.
 21 Public poll carried out on 22 April 1998 by the fund “Obshchestvennoe mnenie,” 
available at http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/frontier/countries/latviya/t8034924.
 22 http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/frontier/countries/latviya/t8034923
 23 Public poll held on 22 April 1998 by the fund “Obshchestvennoe mnenie,” available 
at bd.fom.ru/report/cat/frontier/countries/latviya/t8034922.
 24 Public poll held on 21 March 1998 by the fund “Obshchestvennoe mnenie,” available 
at bd.om.ru/report/cat/frontier/countries/latviya/of19981404.
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While Latvia was a convenient target for Russian official and public 
enmity in the late 1990s, it is interesting to note that Lithuania was also 
regularly considered by the Russian public one of the least friendly coun-
tries. This is despite the lack of a significant Russian minority or symbolic 
events such as Latvia’s March 16 processions. In hindsight, it is clear that 
Lithuania’s relations with Russia were not significantly better than Latvia’s 
or Estonia’s. It should be added that Lithuania was the first former Soviet 
Union republic that signed a border agreement with Russia, in October 
1997.25 However, the absence of controversy around local Russian-speakers 
and the ability to reach early agreement on the border issue has not been 
reflected in any more positive attitudes in Russia towards Lithuania. This 
suggests that the common Western foreign policy course of the three Baltic 
States and their common challenge to Russian founding myths trumped lo-
cal minority issues in importance in affecting Russian perceptions of the 
three Baltic countries.
NATO Enlargement
From the mid to the latter part of the 1990s some authors predicted a 
serious worsening of relations between Russia and the West if NATO expan-
sion would include the Baltic States.26 However, no notable change for the 
worse occurred before and immediately after NATO enlargement. Moreover, 
survey results belied the assumption that the Russian public perceived 
NATO membership of the Baltic States in an unambiguously negative man-
ner. A survey conducted approximately a year before the Baltic States joined 
NATO demonstrated that more than half of the respondents did not perceive 
any threat from such an alliance and only 13% regarded it as a major threat 
(see graph below).
According to another survey conducted shortly after NATO enlarge-
ment, 11% of Russians viewed NATO with the Baltic as members positively, 
 25 Aivars Stranga, “Baltic-Russian Relations: 1997,” in The First Round Enlargements – 
Implications for Baltic Security, 2(19)/3(20), University of Latvia, 1999, 162.
 26 See, e.g., Trenin, Baltic Chance, 10.
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 27 The Public Opinion Foundation Database, Nation-wide home interviews conducted 
April 10-11 2004 in 100 residencies in 44 regions with a sample size of 1500 
respondents.
 28 August 2006 was an exception – only 17% were positive and 69% said it was difficult 
to say.
while 36% were indifferent and 40% were negative.27 However, the varying 
formulation of the questions in these surveys makes it difficult to make 
direct comparisons and draw definitive conclusions.
Russian attitudes to the European Union have traditionally been more 
positive than towards NATO. According to the results of opinion polls con-
ducted between January 2003 and June 2007, the share of those with posi-
tive attitudes towards the EU generally hovered in the 60-70% range.28 The 
attitude of Russians toward the integration of the Baltic States into the EU 
has always been more positive in comparison to membership in NATO. As 
can be seen in the table below, this more positive stance was probably linked 
to benefits Russians themselves hoped to receive – being able to buy more 
European goods and to work in European countries. Thus, one can surmise 
that negative attitudes towards both NATO and EU expansion were not 
so much a concern of the average Russian, but rather an issue for Russia’s 
political elite.
Trends in Russian Public Opinion towards Latvia
While the Russian public has generally harboured positive attitudes 
towards the United States, Western Europe and the European Union, 
these positive views have not been extended to include Latvia and the 
other Baltic States. A poll conducted by the Levada Centre in 2000 showed 
that 48% of respondents thought that partnership with the countries of 
Western Europe was in their interest, while 39% thought the same regard-
ing the USA. However, only 9% of the respondents thought that partner-
ship with the Baltic States corresponded to their interests. The New Russia 
Barometer of 2003 showed that Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia take the 
last position in the list of countries with which Russian respondents want 
closer ties.
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What is more, since the early to mid-1990s, Latvia has been seen as 
one of the least friendly countries by the Russian public. In the mid-1990s, 
Estonia and Latvia interchanged positions a few times as the main ‘enemies’. 
For example, in 1996 after the Latvian parliament adopted a declaration 
concerning the occupation of Latvia in 1940 and a statement of support for 
Chechnya, Estonia gave up its leading position to Latvia as the key enemy 
in surveys.29 Traditionally, a more negative attitude toward Latvia can be 
observed among people of older generations, particularly pensioners, while 
students and young people with a higher education tend to have a neutral or 
more positive attitude.
Latvia’s position has improved since 2005, when the border agreement 
failed. On the other hand, the president of Latvia was the only leader from the 
Baltic States to attend the 60th anniversary of the end of the WWII, which 
is without an exaggeration a ‘holy’ day in Russia. Thus, 61% of respondents 
assessed negatively the refusal of the Lithuanian and Estonian presidents 
to take part in the celebration.30 But Latvian participation did not help to 
improve Latvia’s image in the eyes of Russian respondents – 49% of them 
still named Latvia as the main enemy of Russia, with Lithuania in second 
place with 42%, followed by Georgia with 38% and Estonia with 32%.
The situation changed somewhat in 2006 after Russia’s conflict with 
Georgia, and again in spring 2007 with the events in Estonia. While 28% 
of Russian respondents named Estonia as the main enemy in 2006, in May 
2007 the figure had risen to 60%! Latvia is no longer the primary enemy, but 
it still ranks in the top 10. In May 2007 Latvia was named by 36% as the least 
friendly – 10% less than a year before. Now, Latvia is grouped together with 
countries such as Georgia (46%), Lithuania (32%), Ukraine (23%), Poland, 
the United States, Iran and Afghanistan.
Generally there is more negativism towards Latvia and bilateral rela-
tions among the Russian population than there is among the population in 
Latvia. A survey carried out in May 2005 in both Russia and Latvia showed 
that only 16% of Russia’s respondents have positive emotions about Latvia, 
while 41% harbour negative ones. In Latvia the situation is quite different, 
where 50% of respondents had positive emotions when asked about Russia 
and only 20% negative. While 41% of respondents in Latvia believed in the 
possibility of positive changes in bilateral relations, only 13% of respondents 
in Russia shared this optimism. Negative prospects were foreseen by 14% in 
Latvia and 27% in Russia. It is worth noting here that respondents in both 
countries think that they are more interested in improving relations than 
the other side.31
 29 Stranga, “Baltic-Russian Relations: 1995-beginning of 1997,” Small States in a 
Turbulent Environment, 201.
 30 “Rossiya i Latviya: rossiyane luchshe otsenivayut proshloye nashikh otnosheniy, 
zhiteli Latviyi – nastoyashchee i budushcheye,” Press-vypusk Nr.202, May 3, 2005, 
Vserossisky tsentr izucheniya obshchestvennogo mneniya, wciom.ru/tematicheskii-
arkhiv/single/1234.html.
 31 Ibid.
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In addition to the portrayal of Latvia by Russian politicians and me-
dia, one explanation for the persistence of negative attitudes towards the 
Baltic States is the lack of direct ties of family or friends between Russians 
in Russia with the population in the Baltic States. Only 7% have relatives 
or friends in Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania, which is almost the same as in 
Western Europe (6%), whereas 32% have relatives or friends living in the 
CIS countries.32
Conclusions
The foregoing points to the following major interrelated conclusions:
1. The negative attitude to Latvia has been predominantly shaped during 
the very first years of independence as the country took a foreign policy 
course away from integration with Russia. This is supported by the fact 
that the attitude towards Lithuania has been very similar despite the 
absence of ostensible ‘irritants,’ such as a significant Russian-speaking 
minority and policy towards it.
2. This leads to the second conclusion, namely that all three Baltic States 
are generally a single unit in the perception of Russians and the level of 
awareness about conditions and policies in the Baltic States is too low to 
form an informed opinion.
3. In forming their opinion, Russian respondents are more oriented towards 
the past than the present and the future in assessing relations with 
former Soviet republics. A core dimension involves the general distance 
that has emerged over the preceding decade and a half.
4. The attitude towards NATO is still quite reserved, if not hostile, in Russia 
and the perception of the public to a large extent follows the official line. 
As a result, the image of Latvia (and that of the other Baltic States) is 
shaped by the desire to join NATO as early as the mid 1990s (less by the 
desire to join the EU) instead of aligning with Russia in some sort of 
institutionalised cooperative arrangement.
5. The issue of the Russian-speaking minority and official portrayals of its 
“plight” have affected the tenor of Latvian-Russian relations since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. At the same time, it is only in conjunction 
with other factors that the minority issue became a contributing factor 
towards negative public attitudes towards Latvia.
 32 New Russia Barometer IX, 12-26 June 2003.
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The Editorial Policy of Russia’s Media 
and Journalists in Latvia
Dmitrijs Petrenko and Solvita Denis
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the editorial policy of Russia’s 
media, the authors conducted in-depth interviews with seven journalists who 
create reports for Russia’s media, including the largest TV stations, newspa-
pers and the largest news agency ITAR-TASS.1 Most of these journalists are 
permanent residents of Latvia and Latvian citizens; their primary link to 
Russia is working for a Russian media outlet. Each of the interviewed jour-
nalists regularly creates material for Russia’s media, ranging from several 
reports a month to more than 20 per month.
The interviewed journalists perceive their work in the Russian media as a 
business. Some of them are regular journalists, for example, representing the 
Latvian or Baltic office of a media outlet (Baltic First Channel, RTR). Others 
produce reports on an ad hoc basis or work as independent producers selling 
their materials to several Russian media outlets (e.g., the TV company Alter-
A). Regardless of the form of cooperation, almost all the journalists stress 
that they have an interest in getting as many orders as possible for preparing 
materials about Latvia. For some, this is an issue of earnings, for others – the 
justification for the long-term existence of a branch office in the region:
It is our earnings. We are ready for any newsworthy occasion to send 
materials to Moscow. (J1)
I know that I need to send as many clips as possible! It is not like at 
ORT, where there was a permanent correspondent – if they approved the 
topic, fine, if not – even better, you can go have a smoke. I need to sell. 
That is why I send, for example, five topics – two weak ones, so that they 
definitely take the rest. (J2)
Almost all the journalists stress the importance of informal contacts. Relations 
with employers are friendly, permitting “better understanding” at work:
With some, relations are no more than business-like, but with others they 
are rather friendly. (J3)
 1 The journalists are Natālija Ābola (Television Company Alter-A, which has 
produced clips for the First Baltic Channel, NTV, Ren TV, TVC, and TVS), Danuta 
Dembovska (Vremya novostei), Igor Dmitreyev (production of clips for NTV, Ren 
TV, TVC, TVS), Abik Elkin (Moskovsky komsomolets), Nil Ushakov (ITAR-TASS, 
also radio reports), Natal’ya Vasil’yeva (First Baltic Channel), and Ekaterina 
Zorina (RTR). In the text, the journalists have been made anonymous and are 
referred to merely as J1 to J7, which does not accord with their alphabetical order. 
They were all interviewed in December 2007.
latvkriev-medijos-A.indd   37 2008.07.16.   16:31:59
38
Relations develop simply – we exchange e-mails, call each other. We got 
to know each other personally only a year or two after I started working, 
when I went to Moscow. (J4)
Relations with the editors have always been very good. We go to them to 
Moscow, talk, have a drink, and play billiards. (J2)
With the editors from the internal correspondents’ net we have already 
got drunk and sung together. As a result, they order significantly more 
materials from us. (J1)
Certain journalists also speak of “patriotism” with regard to their media:
A certain patriotism exists with regard to one’s channel. You are proud 
that you work there, try to stress it in every possible way. (J 2)
Cooperation with Russia’s media develops in line with similar princi-
ples. Based as they are in Latvia, the journalists follow events and inform 
their editors in Moscow. The journalists stress that, most of the time, the 
offer to create a report comes at their initiative. They offer topics for mate-
rials on average two to three times a week. There are also cases when the 
editors themselves call to Rīga and order a report. However, most journal-
ists are already accustomed to the demand for topics, which is why they 
stress that they are ready to follow events in a timely fashion and “antici-
pate demand”:
There are topics which come from above. But knowing the turf, you can 
even plan such materials in advance. (J2)
For example, I know what might interest my employer; moreover, I often 
try to act in such a way that my proposition “anticipates demand.” (J4)
Russians in Latvia – that is an eternal topic. But that is natural. For 
them, Latvia is also Russian land in some sense. That means that for 
people in Russia it is more interesting to find out about the life of their 
compatriots in small countries. (J5)
In general, the journalists say that they do not perceive any patterns 
determining the intensity of demand. Most believe that it is dependent only 
on the course of events that the media must reflect. Another consideration 
is the international context, when events in other countries push Latvia off 
the agenda of Russia’s media.
With regard to the thematic supply, the journalists acknowledge that 
there are certain themes about which they have always been more inter-
ested. First of all, journalists mention the problems of Russian-speakers in 
Latvia. The popularity of this subject can be explained in a variety of ways. 
Some think that this topic is part of Russian domestic policy:
I suppose that the topic of the violation of the rights of the Russian-speak-
ing minority was made a top topic in Russia and was used for domestic 
political needs by the efforts of television. Newspapers were also forced to 
satisfy demand for this topic. However, it should be recognised that the 
impression in Russia of what is going in Latvia in this sphere is rather 
confused. (J4)
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A negative perception of Latvia predominates in Russia. Still the general 
number of materials with a negative evaluation is more… That is the 
government’s policy in Russia, to play this card. Always it is necessary 
to show one’s co-citizens that things are bad elsewhere as well. After all, 
the scale of problems in Latvia is nowhere near that in Russia. So many 
complaints from Russia at the European Court, it is of an order greater 
than in Latvia, it is calmer to live here. (J1)
Interest in the life of compatriots... Before the elections in Latvia, many 
Russian politicians came to make political PR for themselves against the 
backdrop of compatriots. (J6)
The popularity of this topic is also linked with Russian foreign policy 
and not only in relation to the Baltic States:
The policy of Russia is to support her “co-tribe”[soplemmeniki]. Of 
course! Co-citizens. As they say, compatriots abroad. Of course! That is 
in the interest of the government of Russia – that is understood! (J1)
Russia is most interested in herself and her interests. Theoretically, I 
suppose that Russian-Latvian relations can be seen as a kind of litmus 
test for relations with the EU and the USA. At least, “geopolitical” rela-
tions. (J4)
In accordance with the experience of the journalists, among the topics 
in the greatest demand are all manner of negative information about the 
representatives of the Latvian state, as well as certain novelties in politics or 
economic life that Russia is planning to implement, but Latvia has already 
implemented.
The journalists claim that in preparing materials for Russia’s media, 
they have become accustomed not only to the topics in demand, but also to 
the orientation of the content. One requirement the journalists mention is 
that the story be scandalous:
The publication itself is yellow. A mass, scandalous publication. With an 
orientation towards the most varied inmates’ [obyvatel’skie] news, scan-
dalous, for example, the paedophile scandal, fights. They try to find the 
yellow tinge in everything. Political scandals as well, for example, the 
love exploits of some deputy. (J7)
They have little interest in political events in Latvia, in the parliament, 
unless they did not end up fighting, in a drunken debauchery and so 
forth. Insofar as fights are rare in Latvia… Most often, they take scandal-
ous topics linked with violet [non-citizens] passports. It is an understand-
able thing that Russians have heard about non-citizens, but they don’t 
understand what kind of documents they have, what kind of rights. (J7)
NTV and TVS are channels that have chosen a non-standard style, for 
them, the main thing was to have something unusual – scandals, a little 
yellowness, but based on facts. (J2)
I think that the First Channel and RTR have more specific demands. 
Because I see – I really like how Katya Zorina works, but I see the pres-
entation, which the editors clearly demand of her – it moves you to tears. 
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That can be understood, it is a state channel. The state has its interests. 
But in any case, the material must be sharp – but artificial demands 
from the channels are not fewer! (J1)
Another demand mentioned by the journalists is that the event has a 
global nature. If the event is too local, it can be difficult to understand for a 
Russian audience or without clear consequences.
One of the most important phases in the creation of media materials is 
a discussion with the editor about the possible content of the material. All 
the journalists interviewed acknowledged that, before they create a report 
(an article, a TV clip), they agree with the editor, who usually is based in 
Moscow, on the theme, but also on the possible content. But the respondents 
were not very willing to reveal the degree of detail which is agreed with 
editors:
Discussion of the material takes place, but it mostly concerns the quality 
of the clips – that there should be as few bureaucrats as possible, and defi-
nitely the hero of the clip himself. We practically do not discuss sources, 
insofar as Moscow cannot orient well in local sources. (J6)
The materials are discussed until the filming. Not whom to interview, 
but how to make the clip more interesting. (J3)
The material was created by me. Sometimes they called and gave some 
advice. Said what they wanted to see, some kinds of emphases. But in 
general they do not know the local situation. (J7)
Usually, they arrange in advance the necessity of expert or politician’s 
commentary inside the text. If I plan on doing a big interview, we discuss 
the questions. (J4)
However, some also admit that editors request an emphasis on problems:
Most often they correct the style, the language. Sometimes they ask to 
explain the situation or individual terms that Russians might not un-
derstand. If the text is agreed upon, ready, the edited clip can still be 
shortened. What is more, they cut without thinking. Thus, sometimes 
after they have shortened a clip, the whole idea behind it was practically 
lost! Sometimes we send an unedited clip when we have no time. They 
put it together in Moscow themselves – then strange things happen. Once, 
for example, they put in a small picture – in general it was not Latvia, 
though the story was on Latvia. (J6)
In the first place they look at the chronometer. And also at how sharply 
the problem is highlighted. (J3)
The text of the clip is also sent “for agreement.” Basically, they do lexi-
cal editing. It happens that the conclusion of the clips is not done the 
way we wrote it – sometimes they make it sharper – that happened with 
ORT. (J1)
One of the journalists interviewed asserted that the editor in Moscow does 
not correct the text from an ideological point of view. However, in discussing 
the technical side of creating a clip, the journalist mentioned the contrary:
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Sometimes in Moscow they redo the sound on the clip done in Rīga, but 
only out of consideration of the bad quality of the recording. Not out of 
ideology. Ideology can be corrected in the process of writing the text. (J2)
Journalists disagree on requirements or interference in determining the 
tone and mood of the reports. On the one hand, they assert that a concrete 
stance in the report “is not demanded.” At the same time, some link this 
issue with the policy of the media outlet in question:
It is not said in hints, but in a completely direct text – we are not inter-
ested in the fate of a legionnaire. We simply will not consider such a posi-
tion! Even the word “occupation” – we already use this term sometimes, 
even if in inverted commas. But this always evokes in Moscow editors a 
dumbfounded reaction – what occupation? What’s going on with you, are 
you crazy! (J2)
If it is a clip on protests in Russian schools, the context is always under-
stood! (J7)
Definitely, there needs to be some kind of “pepper,” something negative. It 
is a scandal sheet. (J7)
The channel is Russian, Russian-speaking. And it is understood that 
I.. not that I am on the side of the left… But it is understood that I … 
who is going to be placed in a less advantageous light! It depends on, 
the left – they are our guys, for the channel, for Russia and for Russians 
living there. And I am also a correspondent that is sent by them. And if I 
take the position of “Tēvzemei un brīvībai” [the nationalist right party], 
about whom one can find not a few things that are not bad! But I cannot 
illuminate this, because they will not take it and they will not understand 
it. You can develop a large clip on why all Russians should leave Latvia, 
and even if the clip has a logical basis, they will never take it! You could 
say that that is not politics. (J2)
Journalists also indicate that the stance of the report may not correspond 
to their own stance:
For example, legionnaire’s day. From a human point of view, you can 
understand anyone. People who were young, they burned their whole 
farm down, shot their family… And he ran off and joined the legion, 
and not the Red Army, which is logical, and went to fight the Russians. 
From that point of view, you can understand it. It would be interesting 
to make such a story, which Latvian media outlets do. And right they 
are to do so. But, naturally, Russian channels are not interested in any 
live fate, the fate of a person who was a legionnaire. No condescension. 
Serve it up concretely – in a black light, make fun of them. But there can 
be no empathy! (J2)
Some journalists explain the political orientation of reports with reference 
to Russian foreign policy in general:
If you remember the portrayal of the struggle against the education re-
form, then I harbour no illusions about the kind of reactions this topic 
evokes in the Russian [rossiskoi] milieu. In that case, the negative context 
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was given not so much by me, but by the natural and expected reaction of 
Russia to events in Latvia. I think that a Latvian politician who would 
tell about the benefits of the education reform on the pages of the Russian 
press, he could be crucified, for a Russian auditorium he would still be 
a negative hero. (J4)
Concerning NATO, the leitmotiv was the following – NATO is the image 
of evil and approaching the borders of Russia. And that was a topic. And 
flowing from that you had to present it, that NATO was evil and organis-
ing parties on our very doorstep!(J2)
In the opinion of Russians, Latvia is an enemy of Russia. That is the policy 
and my task is to illuminate that policy, not change it. If the policy changes, 
so will the selection of topics to be covered. For example, the warming up of 
Russian-Latvian relations now is gradually squeezing out the topic of the 
violation of the rights of the Russian-speaking population. (J4)
Some explain the political orientation of the reports with their own stance, 
which often coincides with the editorial line:
In principle we are in the opposition with our editorial policy and our 
convictions. We are in opposition to the ruling parties and to ethnic policy. 
That is self-understood! Though I think that at RTR there is a surplus 
of that. We don’t have such requirements – it rather coincides with our 
oppositional position… About non-citizens, that is an eternal topic. And 
we make the clips absolutely honestly. (J1)
Journalists explain that their job requires them to simplify matters, thereby 
creating a clear context:
For understandable reasons, on Russian television a clip lasts a maxi-
mum of three minutes. What can be said in this time? You can’t even in 
general terms tell about what people are protesting against. You can say: 
against the closing of Russian schools, although they are not closing the 
schools. (J7)
With regard to the positions of the journalists and the political orientation 
of stories, several of the interviewed journalists saw it as their mission to 
not only inform inhabitants of Russia about events in Latvia, but to defend 
Russian-speaking inhabitants of Latvia by telling Russia about their life 
in Latvia:
Of course, one of our functions is to defend Russians in Latvia. (J6)
For me, it is rather the defence of the interests of Russian-speakers and 
a demonstration of an oppositional attitude. After all, there is always 
something you can criticise… In this regard, we have in Latvia a certain 
lawlessness – not so much as in Russia, of course. But by conviction, I 
am in the opposition. And the main task is to show the authorities that 
they have to reckon with us! In general – to teach them democratic prin-
ciples... That is a normal position for a person – to defend those who are 
being wronged. (J1)
Certain journalists assert that they have no mission and see their job as a 
business and their goal is to sell their materials:
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In general I see no mission and do not want to speak about any mission! 
Because I earn money with this and that’s all! I don’t want to enlighten 
anyone, convince anyone, if you like it, watch it, if not – don’t! (J2)
Notwithstanding the fact that the journalists think they can affect Latvian-
Russian relations, they indicate that journalism is not primarily a political 
instrument. While journalists mention their role in creating the image of 
the state, they note that they more often reflect this image, than create it 
themselves. One of the journalists also notes that affecting policy (also with 
regard to Russian-speakers) through the media is almost impossible:
To defend the rights of Russian-speakers in Latvia by preparing publica-
tions for Russia is impossible. You can only bring to attention [aktual-
izirovat’] one topic or another. How this is used by politicians – Russian, 
Latvian or European – we cannot know, nor whether it benefits Russians 
in Latvia. (J4)
At the same time, the journalists are convinced that in making orders for 
reports on Latvia, Russian media are oriented only towards an audience in 
Russia, even if television from Russia is popular in Latvia as well. They note 
that the Latvian audience is too small for the Russian media to consider it 
a target audience.
The journalists noticed that the Russian media has recently taken less 
interest in issues pertaining to Latvia’s Russian-speakers (the interviews 
took place in December 2008). Some explain this with reference to fatigue 
about traditional topics on the part of the Russian media:
They took the Occupation Museum with hurrahs in the first years. They 
said, oh my God, how could such a name even exist. And then they said – 
get out of here with your Occupation Museum! We are sick of it! (J2)
Others link the flagging interest to changes in Latvia’s ethnic policy:
Lately there is less interest in the situation of the Russian-speaking mi-
nority in Latvia – if you compare it with 2004. By the way, in Latvia itself 
the temperature of ethnic tension has also fallen, and that is an objective 
fact. (J4)
They took my clips because I know how to sell them. Now many have 
a problem – they don’t want any materials. That is because they don’t 
know how to sell them! In Russia, you can repackage many clips, but the 
problem is we don’t know how to sell them! (J2)
Latvia is a small country. It is very difficult to sell interesting materials 
from here. For Russia many of them seem petty and unimportant. (J5)
The journalists generally agree that interest in Latvia is waning. They 
explain this with reference to the fact that “more painful” issues, such as 
Belarus and Ukraine, are becoming more topical. Thus, indirectly, the jour-
nalists confirm that communication policy in relation to Latvia is dependent 
on Russia’s foreign policy.
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How Does the Russian Community 
Live in Latvia?
Dmitrijs Petrenko
Introduction
When covering events in Latvia, the Russian media often examine the 
situation of Russians in Latvia. Consumers of the media in Russia receive 
not only information on the life of Russians in Latvia, but also on their 
relations with the authorities in Latvia and with Latvians, the role Russians 
play in political life and the broader society, as well as the role of Russia in 
the life of Latvian Russians. Journalists address all these issues directly or 
indirectly in their reporting.
To understand how the Russian media treat these issues and craft the 
image of Latvia, several core themes were selected for analysis, and the 
analysis was divided chronologically by year. The first major theme is the 
increase in Latvian language instruction in minority schools in Latvia, a 
topic that entered media discourse under the labels of “Education reform” 
or “Reform-2004.” This was the single topic Russian journalists discussed 
most actively, as can be seen by the number of materials devoted to various 
aspects of the topic by month, which is shown in parentheses.
2003
• Preparation of protests against the reform and acts of protest (February – 
18, April – 18, May – 20, June – 12, August – 22, September – 32, Octo-
ber – 18)
• Creation of the Headquarters for the Defence of Russian Schools 
(April – 30)
• Letter of schoolboy Yaroslav Karpelyuk to Vladimir Putin (July – 24)
• Acts of protest in Latvia and a picket in Strasbourg (September – 19)
• The visit of schoolchildren from Latvia to Vladimir Putin (October – 20)
2004
• Preparation of the reform and acts of protest (January – 12, February – 
17, March – 14, June – 27, August – 45, September – 52)
• Discussion of the Law on Education in the Latvian parliament 
(January – 18)
• Russia expects a reaction from the European Union (March – 23)
• Signature campaign against the reform (June – 19)
• Schoolchildren from Latvia protesting in Strasbourg (June – 28)
• Hunger strike in protest against the reform (July – 25, August – 22)
• Discussion of the “results” of the reform (December – 28)
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2005
• Preparation of new acts of protest (January – 15, February – 7, March – 
13, August – 26, September – 21)
• The Constitutional court assesses the Law on Education (April – 10)
• Russian schoolchildren go to Tallinn (April – 15)
A second major theme was court proceedings against former Soviet 
military or KGB veterans and, in deportation cases, their families. This 
topic also occasioned extensive description of the life of Russians in Latvia. 
Journalists often generalised from these cases, claiming that the state’s 
treatment of the person in question was representative of its treatment of 
Russians in Latvia overall. For the analysis, the following reports were se-
lected:
2002
• The case “Slivenko against Latvia” (January – 18)
• The release of Mikhail Farbtukh (March – 15)
• The case of Podkolzina in the European Court of Human Rights (April – 
20)
• The review of Kononov’s case (May – 27)
• Larionov’s case (September – 22, December – 29)
• The case “Sisoyevs against Latvia” (September – 38)
2003
• The sentencing of Kononov (September – 20, October – 29)
• The renewal of Larionov’s case (September – 15)
• The case “Slivenko against Latvia” (October – 26, December – 30)
• The case “Vikulovs against Latvia” (October – 15)
• Nikolay Tess’s case (November – 13)
• Farbtukh’s case (December – 19)
2004
• Kononov’s case (January – 18, May – 24, October – 22)
• The case “Vikulovs against Latvia” in the European Court of Human 
Rights (January – 12, March – 18)
• The case “Slivenko against Latvia” in the European Court of Human 
Rights (May – 27, July – 22, August – 30)
• Farbtukh’s case in the European Court of Human Rights (December – 
25)
2005
• The case “Sisoyevs against Latvia” (September – 13, November – 17)
A third major theme involves various reports concerning alleged dis-
crimination against Russians in Latvia. These include official Russian 
statements about Latvia and the adoption of various laws in Latvia actively 
discussed by Russian journalists.
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2002
• Closure of “Russian radio” (March – 12)
• Examination of discrimination towards Russians in Latvia in Russia’s 
State Duma (March – 18)
• Elections in Latvia (October – 27)
• The case of the eviction of the Shirshin family from their apartment 
(December – 23)
2003
• The days of Russian education are celebrated in Latvia (January – 8)
• The visit of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Rolf 
Ekeus (May – 22)
• Russia’s statement on discrimination against Russians in Latvia (July – 
20)
2004
• The Russian Patriarch declines to visit Latvia (March – 9)
• Latvia does not want to ratify the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (April – 18, May – 12)
• Russia’s statement on the discrimination of Russians in Latvia (May – 
15, November – 17)
• Russia’s statement on the revival of Nazism in Latvia (July – 6)
• The creation of the United Congress of Russian Communities of Latvia 
(September – 25)
• The visit of the OSCE Commissioner on National Minorities Rolf Ekeus 
(October – 23)
2005
• Municipal elections in Latvia (March – 32)
• Russia’s statement on the abuse of human rights in Latvia (April – 9)
• Latvian Security Police interrogate journalists from the newspaper 
“Chas”(April – 6)
• During the EU-Russia summit human rights in the Baltic States are 
discussed (May – 10)
• The Latvian parliament ratifies the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (May – 21, June – 19)
• Discussion on EU policy towards human rights issues in Latvia (June – 
12)
• Restrictions on receiving citizenship (August – 10, November – 7, 
December – 7)
• Inspections of the State Language Centre (December – 12)
In analysing Russian media discourse about Russians in Latvia, the nar-
rative below seeks to address three main questions: 1) how do the Russian 
mass media construct the status of Russians in Latvia through events in 
Latvia? 2) What impression of the life of Russians in Latvia is created by the 
Russian mass media? 3) What role do journalists allocate to Russia in the 
life of Latvia’s Russians?
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“A Dishonourable Status”: Constructing the Russian 
Community
In analysing discourse on the Russian community in Latvia, it is first 
necessary to address several questions. How do the mass media construct 
this community? Which semiotic and discursive methods are used? What are 
the frames and borders of this community and its relations with the Latvian 
authorities and Latvians? Discourse on the community can provisionally 
be divided into three groups: 1) direct statements asserting the existence 
of a single, consolidated Russian community in Latvia; 2) claims about the 
uniqueness of the status of the community and its identity; and 3) construc-
tion of this community’s power relations with the authorities.
The Unity of the Community
In the discussions in the Russian mass media that refer to Russians in 
Latvia, journalists posit the existence of a united Russian community. The 
journalists perceive this community in terms of its ethnic origin, as well as 
its connection with Russia as an ethnic homeland. The journalists use vari-
ous labels in designating this community – “Russian,” “Russian-speaking,” 
“Russian citizens (Rossiyane) in Latvia” and “our compatriots.” As a rule, 
journalists refer to the fact that Russians are a national minority in Latvia, 
albeit quite a sizeable minority:
To be serious, the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia is almost half of 
the population.1
The role of ethnic origin in this discourse is not only to mark the bor-
ders of the community, but also to connect this community with Russia. 
Journalists often emphasise the importance of this connection:
Mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov took part in the opening ceremony of the 
forum. He emphasised that Russia will support its compatriots world-
wide, paying particular attention to their situation in Latvia.2
Sometimes this connection is formed both on the semiotic level (for 
example the representatives of the Russian community are designated 
“Rossiyane,” “our former compatriots” or Russian minority schools are 
called “Rossiskie”). However more often this connection is supported 
through the creation of some common world where the perspectives and 
values of Russians in Latvia and in Russia are portrayed as identical. In 
this discourse we frequently see reference to the Soviet Union (for example, 
the label “Russian-speaking populace of the former Union”) that carries the 
symbol of a common historical past and shared memories.
The unity and homogeneity of the Russian community is attained not 
only through delineating its ethnic borders or maintaining the importance 
 1 M. Leontev, “Odnako,” Telekanal “1 kanal,” 19.05.2004.
 2 V. Biryukov, “Vmeste c Rossiyey,” Trud, 17.10.2003., p. 3.
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of the bond with Russia, but also through reference to the practices that 
characterise Russians in Latvia as a community with clear ethnic bounda-
ries. Allegations of discrimination against Russians are widespread. Such 
reports stress the psychological discomfort of life in Latvia:
Financial problems and a decreasing social status led to the emergence 
of an inferiority complex among our former compatriots.3
Now there are approximately 40% Russian-speaking [people] in the re-
public. They have already survived the most difficult period – when in 
the heat of rallying passions they were forced out of Latvia (“Suitcase-
station-Russia”), when they were forced to take Latvian language exams, 
when a special commission could come to the enterprise any day with the 
language inspection and fire or fine people for insufficient knowledge of 
the state language.4
As a rule, in the discourse of the Russian media, Russians in Latvia are 
portrayed as acting in a united fashion.
Thus, for example, in describing the events surrounding the shift in 
minority schools to increased instruction in the Latvian language, the 
Russian mass media pay considerable attention not so much to the peda-
gogical side of the reform, but to the acts of protest which demonstrate 
the unity of the community. First of all, this unity concerns perceptions 
regarding the illegitimacy of the reform: the Russian media form their dis-
course in such a way that Latvia’s Russian community gets representation 
through the protesters. In other words, all of Latvia’s Russians are seen as 
protesting:
This year September 1 in Latvia was not just the Day of Knowledge, but 
a Day of Struggle for the rights of the large Russian-speaking community 
of the republic.5
Latvia intentionally ignores the interests of half of its populace.6
The Russian inhabitants of Latvia regarded governmental school reform 
as directed not towards improving knowledge of the Latvian language, 
but towards decreasing the competitiveness of Russian schools.7
The same conclusion obtains regarding the description of other acts 
of protest, in which protesters are generalised to the level of the Russian 
community:
 3 A. Fokin, “Nochnoe vremya,”Telekanal “1 kanal,” 09.10.2003.
 4 A. Lebedev and S. Popova, “Veliky i bessil’nyi,” Izvestiya, 10.06.2002., p. 4.
 5 E. Polyguyeva, “Geometriya so slovarem,”Sovetskaya Rossiya, 26.08.2004., p. 7.
 6 A. Borzenko, “Sobytiya,” Telekanal “TV Tsentr,” 05.02.2004.
 7 I. Pavlov, “Seim Latvii prikusil yazyk,” Kommersant’, 06.02.2004., p. 11.
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Russian-speaking Rīgans in Latvia fully support the demands of the 
picketers.8
Secondly, this unity is expressed in a series of social and political prac-
tices common to all Russians in Latvia. According to most commentators in 
Russia’s media, precisely this provided the opportunity to create the United 
Congress of Russian Communities in Latvia, henceforth designated by its 
Russian acronym OKROL. This is another event that gave journalists the 
opportunity to portray the unity of the Russian community through the rep-
resentation of practices inherent only in this community:
As a member of the committee Mikhail Tyasin states, this organisation 
is not created by a narrow circle of people, this is created, so to speak, by 
the whole parish.9
The creation of OKROL is described as a forced reaction of the whole 
Russian community to discrimination by the Latvian authorities. In the 
articles devoted to the creation of OKROL (as well as in other themes), jour-
nalists talk about common Russian practices without showing the life of 
the representatives of the community through their individual beliefs and 
values. Pupils protesting against the education reform, their parents, rep-
resentatives of the left-wing political opposition – all are inscribed in the 
discourse as one homogeneous object when discussing the protests and at-
tempts to influence governmental decisions; all are one subject when jour-
nalists demonstrate that authorities take decisions without considering the 
opinion of the community (in this discourse, the passive tense is used: the 
“reform is imposed,” “rights are decreased,” etc.).
A Unique Status
Another particularity in the construction of the community is the 
representation of the uniqueness of its status and identity. The category of 
“non-citizens” is actively used by the Russian mass media to indicate not 
only the difference in legal status of many Russians in Latvia, but also to 
demonstrate the absurdity of that status:
The rights of people who have this status, mostly ethnic Russians, are 
limited to the maximum extent. They are forbidden to take part in the 
political life of the country, to buy real estate, to take a loan for acquiring 
an apartment, to claim a new residence… Only citizens of Latvia have 
the guaranteed help of the state abroad.10
Beyond the fact that these people are deprived of the right to vote, the 
laws forbid them from working in many professions. Socially they are 
less protected, but the years they worked outside the Republic of Latvia 
are eliminated from their official working life.11
 8 A. Andreyev, “24,” Telekanal REN-TV, 26.09.2005.
 9 N. Ushakov, “Novosti,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak,” 12.09.2004.
 10 V. Nesterov, “Sobytiya,” Telekanal TVTs, 21.05.2004.
 11 E. Kachayeva, “Novosti,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak,” 15.10.2003.
latvkriev-medijos-A.indd   50 2008.07.16.   16:32:00
51
There is a unique category of inhabitants in Latvia, the analogue of 
which exists only in neighbouring Estonia.12
Through the category of “non-citizens,” journalists demonstrate the 
marginal position of the Russian community in Latvia, which is attributed 
not to the characteristics or behaviour of the community as such, but to the 
policies of the authorities. Ethnic or social integration as a notion is gener-
ally not mentioned in Russian media analysis, but problems of integration 
are communicated only through the topic of discrimination.
In reports on non-citizens, the portrayal of government stances stresses 
the discriminatory nature of government policy. The category of non-citizens 
as such is used to demonstrate the unjust attitude towards Russians (in 
other words, the status of non-citizen is unjust). Journalists state that the 
creation of the status of non-citizens is a defect of democracy in Latvia, oc-
casioning the use of the word “democracy” in quotation marks. Journalists 
also regularly quote those who support this idea in Latvia, such as politi-
cians or activists of Russian origin:
450 thousand Russians or Russian-speaking inhabitants of Latvia that 
have the status of non-citizens, which is shameful for contemporary Eu-
rope...13
Yes, of course, they have the status of second class people.”14
It is important to note that the Russian mass media do not accept the 
status “non-citizen” as a legitimate category of inhabitants from either the 
legal or moral point of view. On the contrary, journalists frequently express 
their negative attitude to the existence of such a category in Latvia – the word 
non-citizens is put into quotation marks or prefixed by the words “so-called.” 
Journalists often exhibit irony: for example, Latvia is called an “amazing 
country,” non-citizens are called “negroes,” an appellation Latvians them-
selves have never used with regard to non-citizens:
The abbreviation NEGR, non-citizens, supplemented the lexicon of socio-
political life.15
By using irony, journalists construct the Russian community at large 
as one with lower status. Regarding the notion of “non-citizen,” journalists 
often refer to the events of 1991:
Exactly 12 years ago the decision was taken regarding the restoration of 
citizen’s rights in Latvia, and this law divided the people of the country 
into two categories – citizens and non-citizens. A quarter of the population 
 12 D. Dembovskaya, “V Latvii opyat’ ushchemili byvshikh sovetskikh,” Vremya 
novostei, 21.05.2004., p. 5.
 13 I. Ratiani, E. Shesterina, “V Latvii russkikh ne schitayut natsmen’shinstvom,” 
Izvestiya, 26.05.2005., p. 2.
 14 B. Zasul’sky, “”Krupnym planom,” Radiostanstiya “Govorit Moskva,” 01.09.2005.
 15 E. Kachayeva, “Novosti,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak,” 15.10.2003.
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was deprived of political rights and since then, the discrimination of this 
part of the populace began.16
Journalists ignore the legal or historical context and explain the divi-
sion of citizens and non-citizens in exclusively political terms. The media use 
this context to assert the uniqueness of the status of the Russian commu-
nity. The category “non-citizen” gains symbolic meaning, connoting politi-
cal and social alienation and political victimisation. Many metaphors used 
by journalists only strengthen this attitude:
Those who have gathered commemorate, as they say, the black anniver-
sary of a political act of betrayal.17
In discussing the situation of non-citizens, the Russian media also 
frame the possibility of receiving citizenship through naturalisation as dif-
ficult and humiliating. They rarely analyse the causes why inhabitants in 
Latvia have not naturalised, limiting themselves to formulations such as 
“well, they could not receive citizenship of Latvia” or “they lost the chance 
to become lawful citizens of Latvia.”
Russians and the Authorities
Another feature of the discourse is demonstrating the existence of ten-
sion between the Russian community and the authorities in Latvia. The 
juxtaposition of the community to authority takes place at both the semiotic 
level and the level of constructing socio-cultural identity and relations.
First of all, it should be noted that spokespersons for the Russian com-
munity use semiotics to separate their own group from all others (for exam-
ple, “we are many here,” etc.). The same attitude is supported by journalists 
defining the group as “our compatriots,” “Russian non-citizens,” “Russian-
speaking,” and sometimes using status-related definitions, such as “arriv-
als,” “migrants against their own will” and so on.
At the same time the authorities in Latvia are described through notions 
such as the “systematic abuse of human rights,” “unwillingness to solve the 
problems of Russian-speakers,” and “avoidance of negotiations.” In such re-
ports journalists frequently call the representatives of Latvia’s political elite 
“nationalists” and “radicals,” “the aggressively nationalistic majority in the 
parliament,” “Latvian national-radicals ruling the country”:
The authorities do not want to compromise. National-radicals are fully 
on their side.18
A significant part of Latvia’s political establishment has very clearly ex-
pressed nationalistic views. 19
 16 I. Vasilyeva, “Vechernye novosti,” Telekanal “1 kanal,” 15.10.2003.
 17 Ibid.
 18 N. Lashkevich, “Uchit’ po-russki,” Parlamentskaya gazeta, 01.09.2005., pp. 1, 16.
 19 A. Kokoshkin in an interview with Andrei Baturin, “Nochnoe vremya,” 09.10.2003.
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Such a juxtaposition on the semiotic level is supported with more radi-
cal quotations from Latvia’s politicians that are then elevated to the level of 
the official position of Latvia.
Many events described in the Russian media are employed for build-
ing relations in which the Russian community is not just contrasted to the 
authorities, its relations are frequently illustrated in quite emotional terms 
with the notions of struggle and hostility. Thus, for example, in the reports 
about protests against the education reform, the latter is called “forced,” “a 
human tragedy”, but the parents of the pupils “hope for victory”:
Education reform in Latvia was implemented to do away with rival 
Russian-speaking children.20
All present on the square came to the conclusion that a spiritual Beslan 
is taking place in Latvia.21
Even now Latvia is afraid of a part of its own people.22
However, one should not simplify these texts to the level of a semiotic di-
chotomy. It is important to note where the vectors of discourses are directed. 
If the activities of the government are directed against the Russian commu-
nity in general (including not only human rights, but culture as well), then 
the community itself demonstrates that it is trying to become a part of the 
political nation, and rhetoric is directed exclusively against certain activities 
of the government. Thus, for example, journalists frequently underline that 
non-citizens are “tax-payers just like everybody else,” but the pupils protest-
ing against the education reform are struggling not against the Latvian 
language, but for their rights to receive education in their mother tongue:
Command of the state language is not in doubt. It is necessary to look for 
more civilised ways of teaching it.23
Absolutely all our children know the Latvian language. A simple ex-
ample – of our activists at the Headquarters for the Defence of Russian 
Schools who finished school, two girls have entered the University of 
Latvia and are studying in Latvian in the department of political science 
[...] They all know the Latvian language.24
At the same time Latvians are practically absent from the discourse 
and their opinions are conflated with those of the government:
 20 P. Garin, “Novosti,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak – 24,” 29.08.2005.
 21 Aleksandr Kazakov in an interview by I. Zhiznevsky, “Krupnym planom,” 
Radiostantsiya “Govorit Moskva,” 01.09.2005.
 22 Editor, “Seichas,” Radiostantsiya “Govorit Moskva,” 06.05.2004.
 23 A. Yablochkina, M. Alikbasarov, “Sobytiya,” Telekanal TV-Tsentr, 12.04.2005.
 24 A. Kazakov in an interview by I. Zhiznevsky, “Krupnym planom,” Radiostantsiya 
“Govorit Moskva,” 01.09.2005.
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In a few days after the congress demonstrators will again come out on 
the streets, but the autumn will start with an open-ended school strike. 
Only Latvians in no way understand what a victorious finish means for 
Russians.25
Overall, however, the discourse of dichotomies is built not within the 
framework “Russians versus Latvians,” but “Russians versus Latvia’s au-
thorities.” Journalists often emphasise this:
– the point is, how to say this to you, that these Latvians… I am not 
talking about all Latvians of course…
– We are talking about the authorities…
– Yes, we are talking about the government (dialogue of the host of the 
programme with Dmitry Rogozin)26
– The movement does not aspire to national self-isolation. There are also 
young people from Latvian families in the delegation (about the protests 
of schoolchildren in Strasbourg).27
The contradistinction “Russians versus the authorities” is also sup-
ported in reports about elections in Latvia. First, journalists pay particular 
attention to the left wing parties (during the 2002 parliament elections – For 
Human Rights in a United Latvia, during the local elections in 2005 – For 
Human Rights in United Latvia, the Party of National Concord, New Centre, 
and Motherland). Journalists call these the “parties protecting the interests 
of the Russian-speaking populace,” but any electoral success they achieve 
is a “political sensation.” Reports on the elections are built on the contrast 
between Russian parties and the rest of the parties, marked as “Latvian 
parties.”
However, it is important to note that this discourse is not constructed in 
the framework “Russians versus Latvians,” as Latvian parties are shown as 
“the authorities,” as parties in favour of continuing policies that are already 
being implemented by the government on the national level, that is why 
they are often called “right nationalists” (“their programmatic documents 
take into account only the interests of the titular nation, the Latvians”28). 
Journalists portray the “Russian parties” as the only opportunity for the 
Russian community to implement its interests:
In Rīga Russian-speaking politicians hope that power in the city […] 
will stay with the left parties. In this case, the interests of the Russian-
speaking populace will be better defended.29
 25 V. Takmenev, “Namedny,” Telekanl “NTV,” 07.03.2004.
 26 Yadviga Yuferova, “Yazyk i veto,” Rossiskaya gazeta, 09.02.2004., p. 3.
 27 D. Khavin, “Segodnya,” Telekanal “NTV,” 21.07.2004.
 28 N. Myshinky, “Latviya popravela,”Tribuna, 15.03.2005., p. 7.
 29 N. Ushakov, “Novosti,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak,” 12.03.2005.
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Secondly, through the participation of Russians in elections, the unity 
of the Russian community is demonstrated (the media do not doubt that 
“Russians vote for Russian parties”). Political participation is illustrated as 
a collective reaction of Russians to the discrimination of the authorities. The 
situation with non-citizens also enters into this discourse: practically every 
report on elections mentions that non-citizens do not have the right to vote:
The conversion of forty percent of the population into the category of non-
citizens, who are forbidden to take part in the political life of the country, 
created greenhouse conditions for right wing parties.30
The situation is rather strange, insofar as foreigners who are citizens of 
the European Union and permanently reside in Latvia can freely partici-
pate in voting.31
A quarter of the population is deprived of the right to vote. [...] In point of 
fact there is discrimination on the basis of ethnicity in Latvia.32
Ironically, by suggesting that more and more people are voting for 
Russian parties, journalists themselves suggest that the Russian commu-
nity in Latvia is pluralistic:
Rīga has been Russian for a long time, right, therefore now, sooner or 
later what will happen is what has to happen. If the city is Russian, then 
the administration must belong to Russians. There should be a Russian 
mayor – this is absolutely normal.33
The left For Human Rights in United Latvia is celebrating success. Be-
sides this is exactly the party of Russian-speaking toilers, not business-
men. Though big business in Rīga still speaks in Russian overall.34
Thus, one can state that Russian media discourse creates the impres-
sion of the existence of a homogeneous, united Russian community united 
by common socio-political problems and a unique inferior status vis-à-vis 
Latvians. Russian collective identity is shaped by the notion of discrimina-
tion in an emotional context of struggle and psychological humiliation. These 
statements, along with a certain portrayal of the stance of the Latvian au-
thorities, substantiate the necessity of Russia’s connection with the Russian 
community in Latvia.
 30 N. Myshinky, “Latviya popravela,”Tribuna, 15.03.2005., p. 7.
 31 V. Kriskevich, “Vechernye novosti,” Telekanal “1 kanal,” 12.03.2005.
 32 V. Taranov, “Provomerny ly takie vybory?”, Parlamentskaya gazeta 05.10.2002., 
p. 7.
 33 M. Tyasin in an interview with V. Kriskevich, “Vechernye novosti,” Telekanal “1 
kanal,” 12.03.2005.
 34 A. Ivanitsky, Noviye izvestiya, 08.10.2002., p. 3.
latvkriev-medijos-A.indd   55 2008.07.16.   16:32:00
56
The Threat to the Language Community
Russian journalists posit that Russians in Latvia face a threat aimed 
at the community as a whole and its culture. The perception of a threat is 
constructed by use of the following strategies: 1) assertion of the existence of 
a threat for individual members of the group (community); 2) the portrayal 
of a link between individuals and the group as a whole; and 3) demonstration 
of the consequences of the threat.
Constructing the Threat
First of all, journalists demonstrate the existence of the threat to sepa-
rate representatives of the group. In the context of the education reform, 
these are Russian pupils and their parents. Journalists report in detail 
about practically every event with any connection to the reform, with par-
ticularly emotional coverage devoted to protests by pupils and their parents. 
Although the attitude of the Russian media to the reform is generally nega-
tive and does not change over time, the emotional tenor does. It is instructive 
to review how the various participants and events are described, including 
the pupils (and their parents), the state authorities, the reform itself, and 
acts of protest.
The Russian media talk most often about pupils in the context of the 
protests. According to the media, pupils are the initiators of the protests. 
At the same time, the attitude of journalists to the pupils does not change 
because of that: most often, journalists call pupils “chaps” and “kids” 
(“friendly boys,” “the kids are forced to learn,” “the children are subjected 
to discrimination”), but their parents are “mothers and fathers,” demon-
strating against coercion and a lack of protection of the pupils from the deci-
sions of the government:
The kids were saying that the first half a year of the education reform 
confirmed their worst expectations. Academic results have worsened; 
it is difficult for teachers to explain and for pupils to absorb the pos-
tulates of physics and chemistry in the Latvian language. Russian 
pupils came to the parliament, but the majority of the deputies did not 
hear them.35
Journalists emphasise the fact that Latvia’s authorities ignore school-
children or do not take them seriously, but “impose” the reform, thereby 
mistreating children. In one of the interviews a schoolgirl discloses that the 
minister of education Ina Druviete, who came out to the protesters, did not 
want to speak to them:
We wanted a dialogue. We were ready for a dialogue. But it looked more 
like her monologue. She did not even speak a word with us in Russian. 
Practically all high ranking officials do that.36
 35 E. Andreyeva, “Vremya,” Telekanal “1 kanal,”10.02.2005.
 36 E. Zorina, “Vesti,” Telekanal “Rossiya,” 10.02.2005.
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Journalists treat pupils as children abused by the authorities, often ex-
pressing pity, but sometimes even admiration:
The children arrived in France by bus. They took along some cheap food 
and tents. The trip was supported by sponsors and parents. Part of the 
cost was borne by the European parliament. (on the protests near the 
European parliament)37
An awareness raising Special Forces unit of 40 of Latvia’s senior pupils 
got off near the walls of the European parliament.38
At the same time, journalists do not hide their negative attitude to Latvia 
in their reports about the education reform. Journalists call the government 
“nationalistically minded,” “radicals,” “ideologists of the reform,” and assert 
that the authorities “remained deaf,” “do not want to hear,” “do not want to 
engage in dialogue,” etc. Often, journalists emphasise that the authorities 
try to prevent protests, and thereby, the mobilisation of the community:
Yesterday the Latvian authorities declared the intention of punishing 
severely participants in the recent protest.39
On the eve of the protests, the administration of secondary education in-
stitutions was warned that if pupils of any school are noticed among the 
protesters, the headmasters of the schools and the directors of studies 
will be fired. Therefore it is not surprising that the officials of the special 
services are intensively filming on video cameras the pupils who are par-
ticipants in the protest march. 40
The Russian media reacted very bitterly to the decision of the Latvian 
authorities to organise a festive concert on September 1, 2004 – the day a 
large protest had been called. Journalists stated that the authorities deliber-
ately wanted to distract the attention of Russian pupils from participating in 
the protest. They called the concert “propagandistic” and criticised Russian 
musician Ilya Lagutenko of the group “Mumy Troll” for his participation:
The main “troll” Ilya Lagutenko has a business in Rīga: in April he 
became a board member of “Lisa Baltiya,” Ltd. Besides, for a long time 
Lagutenko has filmed his music clips in Latvia. As disclosed by reliable 
sources, Ilya has a young girlfriend in Rīga. Therefore why should the 
“troll” spoil relations with the local authorities?41
 37 N. Sorokina, “Latyshkie detu dobralis’ do Strasburga,” Rossiskaya gazeta, 
22.07.2004., pp. 1-2.
 38 E. Zorina, “Vesti,” Telekanal “Rossiya,” 17.07.2005.
 39 Pavel Samarin, “Latviskuyu politsiyu otpravili za yazykom,” Kommersant’, 
27.01.2004., p. 7.
 40 Elena Kachaeva, “Novosti,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak,” 23.01.2004.
 41 K. Markaryan, “Mumy Troll’”protiv russkikh shkol’nikov,” Komsomol’skaya 
pravda, 01.09.2004., p. 6.
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One should note that the negative attitude to the education reform in 
the Russian media during all four years of the period under review did not 
change. However, in terms of how the reform and protests are described, 
one can track changes on a semiotic level, provisionally dividing the period 
in review into two parts:
Reform
2002 – 2003
Reform
2004 – 2005
Protests
2002 – 2003
Protests
2004 – 2005
Gradual 
transition to 
education in 
the state lan-
guage;
Abuse of hu-
man rights;
Poorly 
prepared 
reform.
Reform is a deformity;
Reform is an experiment 
(children= rabbits);
Atrocities;
Last drop in the cup of 
patience;
Reform has split society;
Our Stalingrad;
Dismantling of the 
system of of secondary 
education;
Annihilation of Russian 
mentality;
Complete elimination of 
education in Russian;
Threat to Russian com-
munity. 
Acts of pro-
test;
Rally for 
the right of 
free choice of 
instruction 
language;
Consecutive 
protest rally;
Demand the 
abrogation of 
the law;
School strike;
Condemna-
tion of the 
reform;
Very large 
action.
Russian Latvia is sim-
mering;
Youth revolution;
Largest protests in
the history of the coun-
try;
Actions are gearing up;
Strike that embraced...
Wave of protest beyond 
the power of the govern-
ment to stop;
Escalation of national 
tensions;
Largest mass rally in the 
history of Latvia;
Hope for victory;
Unprecedented protest. 
If one compares how journalists describe the education reform and the 
protests, it is evident that in 2004-2005 journalists used more negative and 
aggressive characterisations. Furthermore, this conclusion is applicable not 
just at the semiotic level. Journalists formed a more critical attitude to the 
reform after 2004 on the level of argumentation, as well. Before this pe-
riod, journalists tended to explain the essence of the reform, mentioning the 
arguments of opponents of the reform, as well as those of the authorities. 
Moreover, journalists noted that some preparation for the reform had taken 
place beforehand and some subjects (mostly the simplest subjects, according 
to journalists) were to be taught in the state language:
Preparation for the reform 2004 is already taking place. Now non-Latvi-
an schools are to teach part of the subjects in the state [language] – his-
tory, singing, labour classes. 42
Before 2004 journalists also mentioned that the reform applied only to 
secondary schools and that education in state institutions of higher educa-
tion had shifted to the state language a long time ago:
The reform will affect only the oldest classes – from 10th to 12th. Accord-
ing to statistics, the overwhelming majority of graduates of secondary 
 42 D. Zhdanova, “V Latvii zakryvayut russkie shkoly,” Moskovskie novosti, 
29.04.2003., p. 13.
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schools enter institutions of higher education. But in state higher educa-
tion instruction takes place exclusively in the Latvian language.43
In the Baltic States, unlike in neighbouring Belarus, everything is in 
order with freedom of speech, particularly now, on the eve of joining the 
European Union. It is difficult, but the Balts have to make concessions to 
the Russian-speaking populace, broadening the possibilities of teaching 
in the mother tongue.44
In reports for 2004-2005 journalists note the abruptness and unex-
pected nature of the reform, claiming that “schools could not prepare for 
the transition to instruction in the state language.” In addition, journalists 
create the impression that the reform applies not only to secondary educa-
tion, but to Russian schools in general. The opinions of the opponents of the 
reform became clearly dominant in the discourse of the Russian media, and 
opinions became more aggressive:
My mother’s friend finished school during the German occupation. And 
she brought her diploma – her diploma was in two languages – in Ger-
man and Russian. [...] These are fascists, true occupants and we know 
perfectly well what they were doing, how they shot down the Jews and so 
on – but they did not change the languages at schools.45
Another essential difference is that during the first two years of the 
period in review, journalists provided background information on how the 
shift to more instruction in the state language would take place. After 2004, 
reports noted that schools would have to implement a “full transfer to the 
state language.”
Another particularity was that in 2004-2005, journalists more often 
used irony when describing the education reform:
The oldest pupils in Russian schools will be able […] to learn how to play 
the balalaika in Russian or to take gym classes in Russian.46
One can learn the Russian language, the history of Russian literature 
and the culture of the Russian State with the same success, for exam-
ple, at schools in Zimbabwe, New Zealand or Easter Island. But there, 
hardly a single Russian class can be put together. But Latvia deliberately 
ignores the interests of half of its population.47
Journalists speak ironically not only of the reform, but also of the 
Latvian authorities:
 43 A. Novitskaya, “Reformy boyatsya – v shkolu ne khodit’,” Vremya MN, 06.08.2003., 
p. 3.
 44 S. Kucher, “Sobytiya,” Telekanal “TV-Tsentr,” 03.08.2003.
 45 V. Kuz’min, “Segodnya,” Telekanal “NTV,” 01.09.2004.
 46 I. Vasil’yeva, “Vremya,” Telekanal “1 kanal,” 23.01.2004.
 47 N. Borzenko, “Sobytiya,” Telekanal “TV-Tsentr,” 05.02.2004.
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[Latvian Minister of Education] Kārlis Šadurskis [...]sits at his desk day 
and night and finishes writing the Reform. It will be aimed at schools 
exactly the day of joining the European Union.48
The State President, who has signed the law on the new reform, received 
a script with marks. The highest mark of 10 points was for genocide.49
Through a sharply negative attitude to the reform, a description of the 
acts of protests, as well as opposing pupils and authorities (both at the semi-
otic and discursive levels), the Russian media clearly constructs the exist-
ence of a threat to the Russian community.
Another group depicted by the Russian media to demonstrate the exist-
ence of a threat are military and KGB veterans and their families residing 
in Latvia. Journalists actively report on all court proceedings in which these 
people are involved. Some faced legal proceedings for crimes against human-
ity for their actions during and immediately after World War II, while others 
fought deportation to Russia for having a questionable right to residency in 
Latvia. Despite the vast difference in the nature of the various cases, the 
stories in the Russian media are constructed quite similarly.
First, journalists invariably remind the reader that the veterans and 
their families are “our compatriots,” “Latvia’s Russians,” or Russians. 
Journalists frequently emphasise their link to Russia. Here are some exam-
ples used by journalists to construct the participants at the semiotic level:
Families of 
Slivenko, 
Sisoyev,
Vikulov
Family of Russian military, Russian officers, Soviet officer, 
pensioner of the Armed Forces, simple people, they have elderly 
parents, our compatriot, act of heroism, victory, hunt for the 
members of the family, fight for their rights, mother is struck 
blind, father has cancer
Farbtukh, 
Kononov,
Larionov 
He is now 81 years old, an 82 year-old veteran, a cavalier of the 
order of Lenin, was regarded in Latvia as a legendary commander 
of a partisan unit, on his account more than one destroyed German 
transport echelon with logistics and armament of the German 
army, schoolchildren were told stories about his acts of heroism, 
disabled person who is not able to get around himself, he was just 
obeying orders, he suffers from progressive diabetes mellitus and 
cerebral atherosclerosis, he was a hero-partisan and veteran of 
the Great Patriotic War, he has a difficult destiny, legs refused to 
function because of injuries sustained at the front 
Analysing the labels used by journalists in relation to the participants 
in the court proceedings, it becomes evident that the media not only are 
allied with them, but also seek to exonerate them. Thus, for example, in 
the case of families struggling for the right to live in Latvia, journalists 
 48 V. Takmenev, “Namedni,” Telekanal “NTV,” 07.03.2004.
 49 I. Vasil’yeva, “Vremya,” Telekanal “1 kanal,” 06.03.2004.
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do not emphasise the legal aspects of the issue, but the humanitarian side, 
emotionally describing the person’s life in Latvia as unstable and insecure. 
Their plight is often demonstrated as absurd:
In 1999 Soviet officer Nikolay Slivenko and his family were deported 
from the country on the ground that none of them resided in Latvia be-
fore 1940. As a result he and his wife Tatyana and daughter Karina were 
forced to move to Kursk. 50
The misfortune of Tatyana and her daughter, born in Latvia, is that the 
head of their family is a veteran.51
Journalists frequently show details of “the perils that [the participants 
of the proceedings] are forced to endure”:
Searches and arrests, a wooden plank bed in a cell, a sealed apartment 
and an order to leave the country within a period of seven days. All this 
happened to the Slivenko family in Latvia.52
Secondly, the discourse stresses the inhumanity of the authorities:
A real hunt for the members of the family has started: twice they were de-
tained and taken to the detention centre for illegal migrants. People are 
kept there in prison-like conditions for up to six months, in cells without 
windows, without ventilation, with a wooden bed without a mattress and 
pillows.53 (on the Slivenko family)
This story was not without aspects that came almost from a detective 
story. Tatyana and Karina were detained twice and thrown into short-
term confinement, apparently in the hope of frightening the women in 
such a way that they did not think to appeal where “one should not,” in 
other words, to the European Court.54 (on the Slivenko case)
Journalists state that the activities of authorities are dictated “not by 
common sense and obeying human rights,” but by an “absurd ideology”:
He is an occupier. That means one can treat him accordingly. For example, 
to be thrown out of his own house, put behind bars together with his wife 
and son, forcibly deported from the country where they lived for decades, 
denied elementary human rights.55 (on the case of the Vikulov family)
 50 M. Glebov, R. Kirillov, “Tatyane Slivenko dadut vid na zhitel’stvo v Latvii, no zhit’ 
yey budet negde,” Izvestiya, 08.07.2004., p. 5.
 51 I. Vasil’yeva, “Nochnoe vremya,” Telekanal “1 kanal,” 09.10.2003.
 52 Ibid.
 53 E. Zapodinskaya, “Evropeisky sud uschemil prava russkikh,” Kommersant’, 
24.01.2002., p. 9.
 54 V. Dymarsky, “Tatyanin den’,” Rossiskaya gazeta, 10.10.2003., pp. 1, 3.
 55 V. Dolganov, “Demokratiya po-latyshki,” Parlamentskaya gazeta, 21.01.2004., p. 7.
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All these cases are constructed so as to create an image of the Latvian 
authorities acting against the Russian populace of the country. If the former 
are described as unjust, cruel, sometimes absurd, then the latter are repre-
sented as heroes both in historical terms (by reference to military themes, 
World War II, service in the Russian army) and presently (the contrast with 
Latvia’s authorities makes them heroes). This tone is sustained through 
military terminology and in the discourse of the participants and journal-
ists:
Everything leads to victory. We will go to the Senate [of the High Court] 
as well. And not only to the Senate. We will take it somewhere else as 
well. I would like to say that the battle does not stop. 56
But meanwhile the coming celebration of Victory Day is the most impor-
tant thing for a veteran.57
Thus, for example, in reporting on the Kononov case, journalists call 
the court proceedings political and directly assert Kononov’s innocence. The 
prosecution’s point of view is either not presented at all or is reformulated in 
such a way as to be insufficient:
The court considered a war crime a partisan operation which resulted in 
the destruction of a German support point.58
In this case, the massacre of civilians claimed by the prosecution is 
reformulated as the “destruction of a German support point.” In other cases, 
journalists include the phrase “civilians” in quotation marks, thereby deny-
ing the prosecution’s claims.
The argumentation of the prosecution in other court proceedings is con-
structed in a similar way. For example, in the case of Farbtukh the journal-
ists emphasise that he is not responsible for war crimes:
Mr. Farbtukh himself did not deny this fact [the deportation of 31 families 
from Latvia to Siberia], however he affirmed that he was just a soldier 
who was obeying orders.59
When the Sisoyev family is accused of providing false information, jour-
nalists quote the defence, which responded by accusing the Latvian authori-
ties:
This was a forced means connected with the policy implemented in rela-
tion to Russians and Russian-speakers in Latvia.60
 56 V. Kononov in an interview with R. Voskoboinikov, “Novosti,” Radiostantsiya 
“Mayak”, 30.04.2004.
 57 N. Ushakov, “Novosti,” Radiostanstiya “Mayak,” 30.04.2004.
 58 M. Antonov, “Vesti,” Telekanal “Rossiya,” 30.04.2004.
 59 A. Ushakov, Kommersant’, 14.03.2002., p. 11.
 60 O. Shommer, “Vechernie novosti,” Telekanal “ORT,” 19.09.2002.
latvkriev-medijos-A.indd   62 2008.07.16.   16:32:01
63
Journalists seek to demonstrate the absurdity of the actions of the 
Latvian authorities by underlining the age of the accused (both Kononov 
and Farbtukh were more than 80 years old at the time of court proceed-
ings), as well as their poor health. Sometimes journalists speak ironically 
about the actions of authorities, for example, affirming that “Farbtukh is 
not able to tie his laces, but the authorities of Latvia found him to be dan-
gerous to society.”61
The Threat Affects All Russians in Latvia
The next step in constructing a threat perception is to establish a link 
between the representatives of the group and the group as a whole. The me-
dia use this strategy in an attempt to demonstrate that the stance towards 
individual representatives of the group is the stance towards the group as 
a whole.
Thus, in the context of the school reform, journalists use the ex-
ample of pupils of Russian schools to depict the condition of the whole 
Russian community in Latvia. Journalists construct relations between 
the community and the state through the attitude of the authorities to 
the pupils.
The Russian community in Latvia appears to be starting systemic activ-
ity in Europe: the trip to Strasbourg is one of the links in this chain.62
Today the inhabitants of Latvia try to influence the decision of their par-
liament from the inside. Near the Saeima building a protest will take 
place today in which thousands of schoolchildren will take part.63
This year 1 September in Latvia is not just the Day of Knowledge, but 
also a day of struggle for the rights of the large Russian-speaking com-
munity of the republic.64
Journalists describe the reform as a distinctive example of the attitude 
of authorities towards Russians. In such reports, pupils are described not 
only as wronged children, but also as politically active citizens able to stand 
in opposition to the authorities:
Their slogans suggest that their intentions are serious enough. You can 
hear these people chanting “No to the reform!” […] Their intentions are 
rather serious!65
 61 D. Zhdanova, “V. Latvii osvobodili “krasnogo strelka,”” Moskovskie novosti, 
19.03.2002., p. 13.
 62 Editor, “Novosti,”Radiostantsiya “Ekho Moskvy,” 21.07.2004.
 63 D. Dembovskaya, “Russkie shkolniki mogut pokhoronit’ pravitel’stvo,” Vremya 
novostei 05.02.2004., p. 4.
 64 E. Polyguyeva, “Gemoetriya so slovarem,” Sovetskaya Rossiya, 26.08.2004., p. 7.
 65 I. Vasil’yeva, “Vremya,” Telekanal “1 kanal,” 04.09.2004.
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One of the news reports even has the title “Russian pupils can bury the 
government.”66 
The Russian media suggest that the reform is not a discrete problem 
that should be resolved, but a symptom of the behaviour of Latvia’s authori-
ties towards the Russian community; here, the reform only serves as proof 
of a general attitude towards the community:
The threat of the elimination of secondary education in the Russian lan-
guage in Latvia – this is a threat to the whole language community.67
After mass protests by students the President of Latvia, Vaira Vīķe-
Freiberga, scolded deputies for deceiving Russians.68
The media speak ironically about Russian schoolchildren, teachers and 
parents who support the education reform or simply do not participate in 
the protests:
One managed to include in this choir even some teachers and headmas-
ters of Russian schools who, afraid of being fired, turned into “Russians 
on call”. One can also find “conscientious” pupils and parents who are 
fed by the authorities.69
Journalists do not acknowledge that differences in opinion on the re-
form can exist within the Russian community, as alternative opinions are 
not reflected.
KGB and military veterans and their families are also used to create 
the perception of a threat to the entire Russian community. Journalists gen-
eralise disparate, individual cases to the level of the community as a whole, 
claiming that these are not exceptions, but reflect the consistent attitude of 
the authorities towards the Russian community. In talking about one par-
ticular case, journalists often mention that “this case is not the only one.” 
In the context of war crimes, journalists create the impression of Latvian 
authorities engaged in the “systematic pursuit of veterans”:
Soon new court proceedings against veterans will follow.70
The trial of Larionov is already the tenth criminal case featuring veter-
ans of the Great Patriotic War.71
 66 D. Dembovskaya, “Russkie shkolniki mogut pokhoronit’ pravitel’stvo,” Vremya 
novostei, 05.02.2004., p. 4.
 67 Yu. Petropavlovsky interviewed by A. Makarov, “Vsled za novostyami,” 
Radiostantsiya “Mayak,” 19.01.2004.
 68 D. Dembovskaya, “Russkie shkolniki mogut pokhoronit’ pravitel’stvo,” Vremya 
novostei, 05.02.2004., p. 4.
 69 S. Kramnik, “Russkie shkoly – nash Stalingrad,” Tribuna, 02.09.2004. p. 7.
 70 Editor, “V latvii prigovorili eshche odnogo pensionera,” Kommersant’, 27.09.2003., 
p. 4.
 71 A. Frolov, “Vesti,” Telekanal “Rossiya,” 26.09.2003.
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Former officials of the KGB of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Repub-
lic 88-year-old Ilya Mashonkin and 87- year-old Trofim Yakushonok, 
82-year-old Nikolay Tess and, the youngest of those accused of genocide, 
75-year-old Janis Kirshteins are expecting the sentence of Latvia’s Fem-
ida. Vasily Kirsanov did not live to see the court proceedings, having 
passed away soon after arrest. Former minister of state security of the 
Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic Alfons Noviks was sentenced to life 
imprisonment and died in prison.72
Journalists depict a link between each particular case and the life of the 
Russian community as a whole. The reports suggest that any representative 
of the community can end up in a similar situation:
The story of this family is rather typical for post-Soviet Latvia. 73 (on the 
Slivenko family)
Hundreds of families are in a similar situation.74 (on the Slivenko 
family)
There are thousands of similar complaints in the republic. 75 (on the 
Sisoyev family)
The claims are traditional for non-citizens of this republic. 76 (on the Sis-
oyev family)
An attempt by the authorities to create a precedent and to punish a person 
who was fighting fascism is too obvious [...]77 (on Kononov’s case)
In these reports, journalists emphasise the importance of the court pro-
ceedings for each representative of the Russian community:
What will happen in a few hours in Strasbourg can once and for all time 
solve the problem of Russian-speaking citizens in the Baltic States. 78 (on 
the case of the Slivenko family)
Thousands of people in the Baltic States are following the destiny of 
Tatyana Slivenko, who is separated from her immediate family.79
 72 N. Glebov, R. Kirillov, “Obyknovennyi partizan,” Izvestiya, 04.10.2003., p. 10.
 73 V. Dymarsky, “Russkoyazychnoe delo,” Rossiskaya gazeta, 24.01.2002., p. 1.
 74 I. Vasil’yeva, O. Shommer, “Vremya,” Telekanal “ORT,” 24.01.2002.
 75 Yu. Dolinsky, “Isk k gosudarstvu,” Trud, 19.09.2002., p. 5.
 76 Ibid.
 77 A. Lyashchenko, Krasnaya zvezda, 22.05.2002., p. 3.
 78 A. Sukhanov, “Segodnya,” Telekanal “NTV,” 09.10.2003.
 79 I. Vasil’yeva, O. Shommer, “Vremya,” Telekanal “ORT,” 24.01.2002.
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This discourse becomes common for the whole Russian community 
because journalists argue that the cause of the troubles faced by representa-
tives of the community is exclusively ideological.
It is important to note that this idea is underlined through the whole 
period of analysis. Already in 2002 Russian journalists pay particular at-
tention to the problem of the denationalisation of apartments. This topic 
is formulated in the frame of the discourse “the authorities in Latvia are 
against Russians.” First, the Russian media portray the cruelty aimed at 
tenants:
Dramatic events were developing today in Rīga. In front of the whole 
street the policemen were throwing out the residents, their furniture and 
clothes from the apartments.80
Journalists describe these events emotionally, calling them “unprec-
edented,” “dramatic” “social conflicts.” Journalists portray this attitude on 
the part of the Latvian authorities as a norm:
Eviction from the apartments takes place in Rīga. This is a usual situ-
ation for the capital of Latvia. The usual eviction of residents from a 
house in the very centre of Rīga today turned into an extraordinary situ-
ation.81
Latvia itself in this regard is portrayed as a unique case:
Events are taking place in Latvia the parallel of which have not oc-
curred on the territory of the USSR. Residents are being expelled from 
apartments.82
These events are generalised to the level of the whole community: the au-
thorities are restoring their understanding of historical justice. Journalists 
stress that the understanding of justice in Latvia is built on taking away the 
rights of Russians to their places of residence in the country (“historic injus-
tice towards a people is eliminated at the expense of others”83). Journalists 
emphasise that one speaks only about Russian families, but in the reports 
where the ethnic context is not directly mentioned, the context suggests that 
the events derive from the attitude of the authorities to those families that 
arrived in Latvia after 1940, that is, non-Latvian families.
The Consequences of the Threat
The media form the perception that the threat to the Russian com-
munity can lead to serious consequences, ranging from social problems to 
the elimination of Russian culture in Latvia altogether. For example, in 
 80 I. Vasil’yeva, “Vremya,” Telekanal “ORT,” 16.10.2002.
 81 Ibid.
 82 I. Dmiriev, “Novosti,” Telekanal “TVS,” 16.10.2002.
 83 V. Smirnova, “Vesti,” Telekanal “RTR,” 16.10.2002.
latvkriev-medijos-A.indd   66 2008.07.16.   16:32:01
67
the context of education reform journalists make predictions that a “third 
of the children will not be able to finish school.”84 Moreover, journalists 
assert that:
The reform is perceived by the minority as a display of hostility and scorn 
of the ruling elite towards its culture and national peculiarity.85
It is important to note that, in quoting similar opinions, journalists 
often refer to the politicians of the left opposition in Latvia. Claims of as-
similation are made more carefully:
The participants of the protest meeting consider the reform now being 
launched by the government to be, at the least, poorly prepared. Local 
politicians go even further and are harsher in their statements: they say 
that this scarcely resembles the integration of society; this is an attempt 
at the assimilation of society – so say the left politicians who took the 
floor here at the meeting.86
Subsequently, journalists paint the expected consequences of the educa-
tion reform in even more emotional terms:
The authorities want to implement a programme of forceful assimila-
tion. The kids have already sensed this in their own experience.”87
The fate of Russian education should be decided today in the Saeima.”88
In fact, here we have both an international problem and a kind of human 
tragedy and arbitrariness on the part of officials. The way the Russian 
language in Latvia is being pushed out, I believe, goes beyond any law.89
Fear is another notion that is actively used by journalists to communi-
cate the importance of the consequences of this threat:
Of course teachers are afraid. Afraid of all this. We are afraid of losing 
our teaching positions in our school, the headmaster is afraid of los-
ing his administrative position. But we will fight, nothing will stop us. 
Even this.90 
 84 E. Taranov, “V Seime pobedili natsionalisty,” Parlamentskaya gazeta, 24.04.2003., 
p. 7.
 85 O. Ganyushkina, “Za Russky – na barrikady,” Rodnaya gazeta, 29.08.2003., pp. 1, 8.
 86 A. Medvedev, “Vesti,” Telekanal “Rossiya,” 04.09.2003.
 87 Editor’s interview with T. Zhdanok, “Novosti,” Radiostantsiya “Ekho Moskvy,” 
21.07.2004.
 88 T. Shkel’, “Avtograzhdanka ne poshla na popravku – duma,”Rossiskaya gazeta, 
05.02.2004., p. 74.
 89 Viktor Loshak in an interview with M. Ganapol’sky, “Personal’no vash,” 
Radiostantsiya “Ekho Moskvy,” 05.02.2004.
 90 A. Prosikov in an interview with I. Vasil’yeva “Vremya,” Telekanal “1 kanal,” 
06.03.2004.
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According to the Russian media, teachers are also a group that faces 
serious consequences. “Russian teachers will end up without a job” is a 
statement often used to illustrate the “fearful consequences of the reform.” 
Journalists support such statements not only by referring to language policy 
in education, but by referring to a never implemented proposal to require 
Latvian citizenship of teachers and headmasters:
Bureaucrats in the field of education carry out the idea which is already 
directed against the teaching staff and the headmasters. They all must 
have Latvian citizenship.91
If this decision is taken then, for example, every fifth teacher in the capi-
tal of Latvia will be left without a job.92
The seriousness of the threat is also illustrated in reports about a hun-
ger strike of several representatives of the Headquarters for the Defence of 
Russian Schools, in which journalists label the hunger strikers “parents,” 
“mama,” “papa,” “grandfather,” “father of two schoolchildren,” “journal-
ists,” “Old-Believers.” Journalists report that “the number of those on hun-
ger strike is constantly growing,” regularly informing the public about the 
details of life of the people on hunger strike: “Cheerful people: they sing, take 
part in the meetings of the Headquarters for the Defence of Russian Schools. 
To date everything is going normally.”93 However, the media keeps silent 
about the end of the hunger strike.
KGB and military veterans and their families are represented in the 
context of another threat – Latvia’s alleged reassessment of history in gen-
eral and of the role of the Russian community in Latvian history. Journalists 
interpret accusations of war crimes as a “struggle with the antifascists,” 
calling these cases “rewriting history” and asserting that Latvia wants to 
assault all those who fought Nazism. The theme of historical memory is 
very important since journalists regularly note the solid historical founda-
tion and role of the Russian community in Latvia (see also Solvita Denis’ 
chapter). Alternative interpretations of history evoke statements about the 
rebirth of Nazism:
The Russian MFA assessed accusations against Vasily Kononov as a ‘chal-
lenge to all who respect the heroism of the fighters against Nazism’.94
The same applies to the families of veterans who are presented by the 
Russian media as victims of ideology:
Arkady Sisoyev retired from the army in 1989. But the family was re-
garded as occupants.95
 91 E. Kachayeva, “Kommentaryi,”Radiostantsiya “Mayak – 24,” 22.01.2004.
 92 Editor, “Novosti,” Radiostantisya “Mayak – 24,” 22.01.2004.
 93 S. Kishkina, “Novosti,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak – 24,” 26.08.2004.
 94 Yu. Dolinsky, “V Rige snova sudyat partizana,” Trud, 21.05.2002., p. 1.
 95 A. Koplev, “Vesti,” Telekanal “RTR,” 19.09.2002.
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The fact that the media mark these families as “military families” 
increases the importance of the topic, as in Russian media discourse, this 
category traditionally enjoyed immunity from all criticism. Journalists 
talk about the participants as heroes, while the Latvian authorities not 
only challenge this heroism, but also reformulate the role of “antifascists” 
in history.
Journalists employ these examples (the “attitude of the state to anti-
fascists,” the “humiliation of veterans”) to show that the state is trying to 
create a mono-ethnic state, “to clear the country of non-citizens.”96 In other 
words, the activities of the authorities are directed towards expelling the 
Russian community from Latvia.
The consequences of the threat are also demonstrated through other 
events, such as Latvia’s ratification of the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities. First, journalists emphasise the impor-
tance of culture, particularly the ability to use the native language in com-
munication with the authorities. That is why journalists criticise Latvia’s 
decision to adopt a declaration to this article of the Convention. A report 
entitled “Music European, Words Latvian” notes:
Latvia’s Saeima decided to slightly modify international legislation and 
ratified its own version of the European Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities.97
In accordance with a tradition that has become a trademark of Latvia’s 
Saeima, the deputies did not refrain from the adoption of another clari-
fying declaration.98
Second, journalists interpret the adoption of declarations not only as a 
unique international practice (examples of other countries adopting declara-
tions are not mentioned), but also as evidence of official prejudice against 
Russian culture.
The most important issues for the Russian media in the context of the 
Convention are the status of Russian language and the possibility to acquire 
an education in the native language. However, journalists often speak ironi-
cally about the “wish of Latvia’s authorities not to allow the development of 
Russian culture.” For example, in one of the reports on the ratification of the 
Convention, a journalist arrives at this conclusion:
It can get ridiculous. The authorities limit the commerce of Russian 
dolls, and for singing Russian folk songs one can end up at the police. 
In the spring the biggest Russian-speaking newspaper “Chas” was 
closed and now Russians do not have their print media.99
 96 I. Vasil’yeava, O. Shommer, “Vremya,” Telekanal “ORT,” 24.01.2002.
 97 N. Myshinky, “Muzyka Evropeiskaya, slova Latviskie,” Tribuna, 28.08.2005., p. 6.
 98 N. Drobyshevsky, “Latviskie deputaty “ogovorili” russkikh grazhdan,” 
Parlamentskaya gazeta, 01.06.2005., p. 5.
 99 Editor, Moskovsky komsomolets, 28.05.2005., p. 2.
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This passage demonstrates that the construction of a threat is fre-
quently based on inaccurate generalisations, unverified gossip and the ex-
trapolation of individual opinions to alleged political decisions.
“Granny, Let’s Write to President Putin!”: Russia in Latvia’s 
Events
Russia not only follows events in Latvia, it is also a participant. 
Sometimes, Russia participates directly, but more often it participates on 
the level of discourse through the comments and assessments of Russia’s 
officials, politicians and journalists. Russia’s role in the life of Latvia’s 
Russians is portrayed with the assistance of two main strategies: 1) assert-
ing the political superiority of Russia, as well as demonstrating that Russia 
is an advocate of Russians in Latvia; and 2) stressing the high importance 
of the political and emotional link of the Russian community in Latvia with 
Russia.
Russia is an Influential Country
Russian opinion on events in Latvia is presented in most media reports 
to show Russian influence and the ability of Russia to change for the better 
the life of the Russian community in Latvia. News reports often start with 
the exposition of Russia’s position on the issue. In reports on the education 
reform in Latvia, this aspect becomes one of the most essential:
Russia again drew the attention of the OSCE to the situation of the Rus-
sian language in Latvia.100
The Russian State Duma has adopted an appeal to Latvia’s Saeima in 
connection with the possible ban on receiving an education in the Rus-
sian language in the republic.101
Journalists emphasise not only the negative attitude of Russia to the 
education reform, but also demonstrate that Russia acts to defend its posi-
tion. Journalists employ not only standard diplomatic lexicon, for example, 
“Russia criticises,” “bitter criticism,” “addresses the Saeima,” “does not 
agree,” “considers unacceptable,” “expresses concern.” Journalists also use 
rather emotional notions as well: “Russia is shocked,” “considers it a profa-
nation,” “will fight” and so on.
In their reports on Latvia, journalists often elevate Russia and portray 
it as a politically and economically successful country compared to Latvia. 
The image of a successful Russia is contrasted not only with that of Latvia, 
but also with the European Union as a whole. This construction exists in 
two types of discourse: criticism of Latvia addressed to Europe and criticism 
of Europe itself. In the first instance, Russia’s media give the opportunity to 
 100 Zh. Agalakova, “Vechernie novosti,” Telekanal “1 kanal,” 29.01.2004.
 101 I. Rodin, “Deputatov otseldyat po mikrochipam,”Nezavisimaya gazeta, 05.02.2004., 
p. 2.
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Russia’s politicians to criticise Latvian democracy against the background 
of the rest of Europe:
Latvia has joined the EU with the heavy burden of unsolved humanitar-
ian problems. […] The situation of pseudo-democracy has been created, 
and discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity and language is taking 
place.102
Russian journalists construct the conclusion that Europe must inter-
vene. Thus, in the reports on the education reform the Russian media dis-
cuss the trip of Russian schoolchildren to Strasbourg:
They were not heard in Latvia by the authorities of their country. Now 
they try to obtain the defence of their rights to instruction in the Russian 
language at the leadership of the European parliament.103
One must stop this political senselessness and I believe that the problem 
can be solved on the European level.104
The position that “Europe must solve the problems of Latvia” is sup-
ported in other reports as well. Statements of Russian politicians on the 
abuse of human rights in Latvia cited by the Russian media often include 
direct or indirect appeals to the European Union:
The Latvian authorities are under pressure from the EU and will be 
forced to allow the Russian-speaking non-citizens of the country to take 
part in voting.105
The presence in Europe of states that “do not comply with generally ac-
cepted norms of democracy and human rights, is perceived by Russia as 
a threat,” stated the minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federa-
tion Sergey Lavrov. 106 (Latvia and Estonia are mentioned further in 
the text)
According to Latvia’s experts, the assistance of Moscow in the form of 
harsh statements from the Russian MFA often leads to the opposite reac-
tion. The solution is to act through international organisations.107
 102 V. Makarchev, “Etot den’: sobytiya i mneniya,” Radiostantsiya “Radio Rossii,” 
21.07.2004.
 103 I. Sorokina, “Latyshkie deti dobralis’ do Strasburga,”Rossiskaya gazeta, 
22.07.2004., pp. 1, 2.
 104 V. Taranov, “Latviskaya molodezh’ govorit s Evrosoyuzom,” Parlamentskaya 
gazeta, 21.07.2004., p. 5.
 105 G. Kotov in an interview with E. Shestakov, “Russkie idut,” Rossiskaya gazeta, 
14.03.2005., p. 2.
 106 A. Lyashchenko, “Baltiskaya ugroza, Krasnaya zvezda, 16.07.2004.
 107 I. Sekste, “Pristup politicheskoi allergii snyat,” Vremya MN, 20.06.2002., p. 7.
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However, subsequently the Russian media reformulated this discourse, 
concluding that Europe “does not want” to or “cannot” solve the “problems 
of democracy” in Latvia:
Moscow has objections towards Europe in connection with compliance to 
its obligations [on the issue of securing the rights of the Russian-speak-
ing minority]. However the position of the EU is not changing much for 
the moment.108
Mr. Ekeus himself [OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities] 
likes to emphasise: his mandate does not include the protection of con-
crete national minorities. [...] This, by the way, apparently should cool 
down the hopes of the Russian side on the participation of Rolf Ekeus 
in solving the problems of the Russian-speaking population of the Baltic 
States.109
The actions of Latvia with regard to our compatriots, accompanied by 
silence on the part of the leadership of the Council of Europe and its Par-
liamentary Assembly, are the starkest example of the double standards 
prevailing in Strasbourg.110
The Russian media construct the attitude to Europe in the same ambig-
uous way in the context of court proceedings against KGB and military vet-
erans and their families. Journalists emphasise that Europe (the European 
Court of Human Rights) must “restore justice” with regard to Russian in-
habitants of Latvia, who require “rescue from an unjust state” (Latvia). At 
the same time, journalists stress the role of Russia in the proceedings. In 
other words, cases won in Strasbourg attest not only to the legal influence 
of Europe, but first of all to Russia’s political clout. Thus, for example, in 
the cases of Vikulov and Slivenko, Russia’s participation as a third party is 
portrayed as having a decisive role in the outcome:
Russia was not a bystander, but participated as a third party that gave 
weight to the appeal itself and provided the plaintiffs with additional 
arguments.111
The case of Slivenko assumed a particular tone. Usually there are two 
sides in Strasbourg proceedings. [...] In this case there is also a third 
participant – the Russian Federation supports the claim.112
 108 A. Lyashchenko, “Novaya osnova sotrudnichestva,”Krasnaya zvezda, 12.05.2005., 
p. 3.
 109 I Sorokina, A. Shapovalov, “Stavka na verkhovnogo,” Rossiskaya gazeta, EV 
10.03.2004.
 110 V. Dolganov, “Demokratiya po-latyshsky,” Parlamentskaya gazeta, 21.01.2004., p 7. 
 111 V. Dymarsky, “Tatyanin den’, “ Rossiskaya gazeta, 10.10.2003., pp. 1, 3.
 112 L. Sokol’nikov, “Segodnya,” Telekanal “NTV,” 09.10.2003.
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Journalists not only assert the importance of Russia’s support, but also 
claim that the cases represent something special. The special nature of these 
cases, in the portrayal of Russia’s media, is confirmed by the involvement of 
Russian President Vladimir Putin:
The relevant request to President Putin has already been sent, and if 
he gives his approval, the participation of the Russian state in the court 
proceedings will undoubtedly give an additional chance for a successful 
outcome.113
Here, journalists highlight the political meaning of the court proceed-
ings, suggesting that the issue concerns more than the particular legal 
problems of individual families, but a broader struggle between Latvia and 
Russia for political and historical justice. Both in cases concerning military 
families and in those of veterans, the Russian media revert to a historical 
discourse where the plaintiffs are portrayed as victims of ideology. According 
to Russian journalists, the problems started after the collapse of the USSR 
because the Latvian authorities sought to rewrite history, because of the 
new Latvian political order, because of discrimination of non-citizens and 
so forth. Thus, the struggle between Latvia and Russia is presented as a 
struggle between two ideologies.
Why Russians Need Russia
The presence of Russia in the discourse on Latvia is strengthened by 
one more strategy – demonstrating the importance of the link between 
Russians in Latvia and Russia as the land of their ethnic origin. The 
Russian media do not hide that this link is necessary for justifying Russia’s 
political influence.
In the context of the education reform, the Russian media talk about 
the “Latvianisation” of Russian children. Journalists see this not only as 
the desire of Latvia’s authorities to deny Russians their culture, but as a 
strategy “to do away with the influence of Russia.” The media assert that if 
Russian culture does not remain in Latvia, Russia will lose the opportunity 
to influence Latvia. At the same time, journalists add that the aim of that 
influence is to defend the interests of Russians:
When the last Russian in Latvia dies out or is “Latvianised” to un-
consciousness, Russia will lose the most reliable lever of influence and 
formal right to intervene in the arbitrariness wrought on a part of its 
co-citizens.114
While reporting on the education reform, Russian journalists also re-
late how Russia helps Russian schoolchildren and teachers through schol-
arships and teacher training seminars. Journalists frequently use very 
emotional stories to prove the necessity for Russians in Latvia to sense a 
link with Russia.
 113 V. Dymarsky, “Russkoyazychnoe delo,” Rossiskaya gazeta, 24.01.2002., p. 1.
 114 O. Ivanova, “Slushai, Esplanada!”, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 31.05.2003., p. 6.
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For example, journalists report widely about a trip of Russian pupils 
from Latvia to meet Russian President Putin in 2003. The reports relate 
the story of how one schoolchild, 10-year-old Yaroslav Karpelyuk, wrote a 
letter to the president, who then invited the whole class for a meeting in 
the Kremlin. Some important aspects of the story merit mention. First, 
this story is constructed through the prism of Latvian-Russian relations: 
Latvia “insults” Russian children and they are forced “to complain” to 
Putin.
Granny, let’s write to the President of Russia how they are going to de-
prive us of our mother tongue. He is Russian, he will help us!115
The childish language suggests that there is no ambiguity regard-
ing the presence of a serious political threat to the Russian community in 
Latvia. Some journalists conclude that Yaroslav’s activism is a reaction to 
systematic injustice:
His whole family did not receive citizenship of Latvia, as they were prom-
ised. Yaroslav was the most unlucky. Latvia’s officials […] denied him 
privatisation vouchers. […] Maybe it was precisely this that bred the seeds 
of the quest for fairness in the soul of the boy.116
Secondly, journalists emphasise how much Russians in Latvia need sup-
port from Russia and their emotional bond with the country: “to see for him-
self the Kremlin, about which granny had told him so much.”117 According 
to Russia’s media, seeing the Kremlin is a dream of all Russian children, 
so when the invitation arrived from the Russian president, “there were no 
limits to the children’s joy.”118 When discussing the trip to Moscow, journal-
ists depict the children’s admiration: “All the signs are in Russian! “I like it 
here!” Such comments underscore the important role of Russian culture, as 
well as the role of Russia in the life of Latvia’s Russians.
The same conclusion pertains to reports about court proceedings in-
volving KGB and military veterans and their families. Journalists stress not 
only Russia’s political and legal participation, but its emotional involvement 
as well. Journalists present Russian politicians and attorneys as under-
standing and cooperative:
The Slivenko family […] accepted greetings from Strasbourg. First they 
were phoned by the plenipotentiary representative of the Russian Federa-
tion at the European Court Pavel Laptev: “Tatyana Fyodorovna, every-
thing is all right!” – he said already with certainty. Next were [Russian] 
attorneys.119
 115 E. Vostrukhov, “Ty ne odinok, Yaroslav!,” Gudok, 23.07.2003., p. 1.
 116 N. Myshinsky, “Slava Karpelyuk pishet dyade Vove Putinu,” Tribuna, 25.07.2003., 
pp. 1 – 2.
 117 N. Myshinsky, “Vot by ruku Putinu pozhat’...”, Tribuna, 02.10.2003., p. 1.
 118 Ibid.
 119 V. Dymarsky, “Tatyanin den’,” Rossiskaya gazeta, 10.10.2003., pp. 1, 3.
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Russia and its representatives are portrayed as human, while the 
European Court is “complicated,” “bureaucratic” and “messy.” Moreover, 
the joy of the Russian attorneys about the victorious case is contrasted to 
the stance of those representing Latvia:
But Latvia’s journalists could not be seen. For Rīga yesterday’s event was 
among those that are extremely unpleasant.120
Sometimes the link with Russia is stated directly: “they hope for Russia’s 
assistance to get protection from discrimination on the basis of ethnicity” 
or “the participation of Russia inspired Russians in Latvia – the number 
of petitions has increased.” More often, the link is illustrated through the 
example of concrete people:
Vasily Kononov says: “I count very much on the support of Russia’s presi-
dent, government and most important – the people of Russia”.121
In the Kononov case, journalists pay particular attention to the fact 
that he gave up Latvian for Russian citizenship, a step that Russia’s media 
claim helped Kononov.
Journalists seldom hide their position and take the side of the plaintiffs 
in the court proceedings:
Tatyana is in a live broadcast of our programme. Tatyana, our congratu-
lations! You have won! Are you glad?122(a journalist talks in the broad-
cast with Tatjana Slivenko after the announcement of the judgement of 
the European Court of Human Rights)
Having congratulated the Slivenko family, I invited Tatyana and Nikolay 
to “Rossiskaya gazeta”. They will pass through Moscow on Sunday en 
route from Rīga to their home in Kursk and will spend these several 
hours in our editorial office.123
The Russian media not only seek to demonstrate the importance of 
Russia in the daily life of Latvia’s Russians, but also try to become direct 
mediators of this emotional bond.
Conclusion
In analysing the media reports on the life of the Russian community in 
Latvia, one notes that all are characterised by a certain inter-discursivity. 
The discourses studied here are all largely linked to each other, thus, broader 
conclusions can only be drawn by analysing them in their mutual context. 
 120 Ibid.
 121 N. Ushakov, “Novosti,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak,” 30.04.2004.
 122 Zh. Agallakova, “Vechernie novosti,” Telekanal “1 kanal,” 09.10.2003.
 123 V. Dymarksy, “Tatyanin den’,” Rossiskaya gazeta, 10.10.2003., pp. 1, 3.
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In initiating the topic of Russian life in Latvia, the media introduce their 
audience to a wider discourse about relations within the Russian commu-
nity, with the authorities and with Russia. These discourses also are largely 
characterised by inter-textuality. The texts created by journalists are often 
a reaction to the texts created by other journalists or to concrete events in 
Latvian-Russian relations. However, it is not the aim of this chapter to study 
in greater detail the mutual relations between these texts.
In speaking about Russians in Latvia, Russia’s media speak about a 
united community, about people who think in a similar way and have simi-
lar value orientations. The boundaries of the community are clearly ethnic. 
The media also create the view that a certain link with Russia is one of the 
most serious questions on the agenda of this community. Several events (e.g., 
the minority education reform) are used to demonstrate how united, but at 
the same time, alienated Russians are from Latvians. These events are also 
used to demonstrate how necessary Russia’s support is for this community. 
The Russian media not only consistently perceive a discriminatory attitude 
towards the Russian community in Latvia, this attitude characterises the 
life of the community, unites the community, and justifies Russia’s media 
and public interest about certain events in Latvia.
In constructing the status of the Russian inhabitant of Latvia, the me-
dia take a stand against the category of “non-citizen.” In describing this sta-
tus, the journalists have a tone of negative irony and even sarcasm, thereby 
rendering this category discursively illegitimate.
In reporting on various events, the media employ as a context the rela-
tions of the Russian community with the authorities. These stories construct 
a discourse of separation in which the authorities are granted a negative role 
(the authorities threaten, are against Russians, adopt radical decisions), but 
the community receives a “label of submission.” However, it is important to 
understand that in the media discourse, the Russian community seeks to 
become a participant in a wider civic culture, but the authorities deny it this 
opportunity. At the same time, the journalists suggest that in the construct-
ed conflict, they are speaking about the authorities and not Latvians in gen-
eral (“the authorities against Russians” not “Latvians against Russians”). 
Latvians scarcely merit mention in this discourse.
The Russian media assert that the Russian community lives in social 
and psychological discomfort. The journalists demonstrate that Russians are 
under threat. In the widely discussed topic of the education reform, journal-
ists reinforce the impression that the authorities take decisions ignoring the 
opinions of minorities. Journalists frequently stress that the victims in this 
situation became children. Moreover, in stories about Russian war veterans 
and former soldiers the media suggest that individual trials against veter-
ans do not involve only the concrete individuals, but represent a settling of 
accounts by the Latvian authorities against Russian inhabitants in general. 
Journalists illustrate these stories of a community under threat with very 
concrete consequences (e.g., children are denied the opportunity to study 
in the native language  they cannot finish school  the child is socially 
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excluded; a Russian military veteran is denied residency rights in Latvia  
his family is split  any Russian in Latvia could end up in this situation, 
etc.). In relating individual stories, journalists generalise the circumstances 
to the entire community.
In creating stories about Russians in Latvia, Russia’s media create a 
certain image of Russia as well. Russia is portrayed as an influential country 
which can often resolve the problems of the Russian community, particularly 
when Latvia is not able or willing to do so. Representatives of the commu-
nity are allowed to speak and they thank Russia or the president of Russia 
personally. Journalists allow Russia to look like a socially and politically 
successful country. After Latvia’s accession to the European Union, journal-
ists create the image of a successful Russia not only against the backdrop 
of Latvia, but against the backdrop of the entire European Union, if only 
because the Russian media think that the EU cannot solve the problems of 
the Russian community.
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The Story with History
Solvita Denis
“Vodka, voblas, and folk songs”
“Dead donkey ears”
“Our MIGs will land in Rīga”
Introduction
This chapter examines the special context of “the past” as an instru-
ment of constructing Latvia’s image. Thousands of pages of written items 
and hours of broadcasts were devoted to the theme “Latvia in 20th Century 
History” during the period in review. It should be mentioned at the out-
set that the number of reports on this aspect of Latvia saw an exponential 
increase in 2004-2005 in comparison with 2003-2004. The Russian media 
often single out Latvia as having a “separate story with history.”
The analysis investigates the historical “subtext” through two differ-
ent temporal frames of reference. The first concerns the whole of the 20th 
century, which provides a historical context to which Latvia is invariably 
linked. One can also detect “missing years” and periods. The second point 
of specific interest for this study concerns “peak” years where a kind of ritu-
alisation of news takes place. The material analysed in the latter context is 
structured according to dates that provide an opportunity to see the media’s 
agenda at that particular point in time. These two temporal tracks set the 
backdrop against which certain events converge and diverge in time and 
space.
The first historical period of interest can provisionally be labelled the 
“Latvian riflemen” and covers events at the beginning of the 20th century, 
the rise of Soviet Russia and the emergence of Latvia as a nation state. 
Curiously, Latvia as an independent state between the two world wars 
is practically ignored by Russia’s media during the period in review. The 
next period is the annexation of Latvia by the Soviet Union (1940) and the 
beginning of the “Great Patriotic War.” Few authors refer to Soviet Latvian 
history outside the context of the Great Patriotic War, for example, by 
describing the Brezhnev years. Relatively few news items are devoted to 
Latvia’s struggle for independence and role in the dissolution of the USSR. 
The Russian media mention the independence struggle predominantly in 
connection with the trials of former OMON soldiers in Latvia.
During the period under review, Latvian historical themes received 
almost daily mention in the Russian media, particularly during 2004 and 
2005. The events of January 1991, when Latvian independence activists 
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constructed barricades and became the targets of attacks by Soviet Special 
Forces OMON troops, generated media attention. Though coverage of these 
historical dates is recurrent, it does not receive as much attention as other 
dates. Here, the Russian media mention Latvia in the context of the com-
mon struggle within the USSR, as well as in the context of trials.
Some Latvian veterans and many Latvian extremists regularly com-
memorate March 16 with processions and other activities. This day symbol-
ises a World War II battle in which two divisions of the Latvian Legion fought 
side by side on the eastern front against the Red Army. This is the most 
stable theme within the whole period of research. Regardless of whether 
or not a procession was planned in Latvia, articles regarding March 16 be-
gan to appear like clockwork at the end of February and continued through 
March. The Russian media demonstrated little interest in the topic in 2002-
2003, but devoted a large number of publications, TV talk shows and radio 
reports in 2004 and 2005. This theme also exists distinctly separate from 
the calendar, and commemoration of these soldiers in general became an 
independent topic.
May 9, celebrated in the Soviet Union and contemporary Russia as 
Victory Day, was a date of great interest for Russian commentators report-
ing on Latvia, particularly in 2004 and 2005. The most popular ancillary 
topic in this discourse is comparison of the status of veterans in Russia and 
Latvia. The month of October regularly saw reporting on the “liberation” 
of Rīga and Latvia from Nazi Germany. The media saw no need to provide 
a rationale for having news stories on the issue. Federal television channels 
broadcast images of people laying flowers and presented brief discourses on 
the topics of veterans, occupation and liberation, etc.
From year to year, these events consistently enter into the discourse of 
Russia’s electronic and print media. A difference in the approach of written 
and broadcast media can be discerned. The former repeat the stories con-
nected to the events of the 20th century, while the latter build up the story 
leading up to the dates and render the story “contemporary.” For example, 
around May 9, the veterans issue and the status of legionnaires might be 
portrayed as current and relevant, while the context may offer new or mod-
ern lines of interpretation.
Clarification vs. Rewriting History
The theme of clarifying versus rewriting history can be defined as a 
cross-cutting theme that enters practically every news item examined within 
this analysis. The climax for this theme came in May 2005, the 60th anni-
versary of Victory Day, when diverse interpretation of ‘facts’ emerged as the 
main topic. Another example is issues related to territorial claims, alleged 
plans to deport Russians and other issues added on to the common themes of 
a “revival of fascism,” the “abuse of the rights of Russian-speakers,” etc.
Russian media discourse grants the active role to Latvia (communica-
tor) and the passive role to Russia (recipient). The Russian media inter-
pret every action in Russia as feedback or counteraction, which in turn, 
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initiates a special defence of history. The Russian media support this cycle 
of action and reaction by treating Russia’s own historical context as axi-
omatic, while denying the arguments of the Latvian side. Russian media 
discourse about Latvian history is black and white with no grey tones. 
The major climaxes of Russian media activity are intimately connected 
with the introduction of new positions by the Latvian side challenging the 
existence of “historical axioms.”
Leading Latvian politicians are deemed to be communicators in two 
main arenas: internally (through laws, permitting or banning various 
actions, etc.) and at the international level (through official statements, 
the unilateral declaration attached to the border agreement, diplomatic 
notes). The appearance of Latvian politicians at a European level marked a 
new level of “interpretation of history”: the activity of Latvian politicians 
after EU and NATO accession was portrayed as an appeal to European 
leaders not to go to Moscow on 9 May 2005. Here, one should mark the 
appearance of other countries in the narrative, not only Lithuania and 
Estonia, but also Poland and Finland. Before joining the EU and NATO, 
the Russian media constructed the image of “Europe” as a restraining 
factor on Latvia that helped to explain a ban on the procession of legion-
naires in 2003.
Opposition politicians in Latvia often appear in the role of experts in 
the Russian media, though not as participants in the events. Sometimes 
they receive the opportunity to approach a Russian audience directly. Thus, 
Latvian opposition politician Viktors Kalnbērzs appeals:
It is necessary to do something urgently. Common soldiers must not leave 
for the other world prematurely with a wounded feeling in their hearts. 
Our duty is not just to help them to survive physically, they should learn 
to smile again and realise, while their faith in Russia and its President 
is still alive, that they did not fight for the Motherland in vain.1
The Russian media thought the publication of the book History of Latvia 
in the 20th Century was scandalous:
This creation is something between a history textbook and an anti-Soviet 
propaganda booklet. A furious reaction from the Russian side was 
evoked by the caption under a photograph of the concentration camp in 
Salaspils – “an instructional-labour camp.” And this, taking into ac-
count that during WWII about a hundred thousand people were killed 
there by fascists!2
Our diplomats were upset by the book of the President of Latvia Vīķe-
Freiberga in which, to their mind, facts, gossip and falsifications are 
merged together. In Moscow they are astonished that the president of 
 1 Viktor Kalnbērzs, cited in Gudok, 5 October 2004.
 2 Mikhail Tyapkov, “Poshchechina veteranam,” Kuranty, 9 February 2005.
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Latvia found it appropriate to distribute this book during mourning 
events in the former death camp at Auschwitz.3
Though the book dealt with the entire 20th century, one caption about 
a camp in Salaspils received the greatest attention in the Russian media. 
That it was a “death camp” instead of a “labour camp” was a “commonly 
known fact”:
But the concentration camp Salaspils that used to be called the Baltic 
Auschwitz is intelligently called “an expanded police type prison and 
instructional-labour camp.” Not a single word is said about the fact that 
next to Salaspils there was a camp of Soviet prisoners of war who lived 
and died under the open sky.4
Here, the Russian media not only cast doubt on the description of 
Salaspils, but on the whole book and indeed history as presented by Latvia. 
The media also attack and discredit the author of the book, historian and 
adviser to the President:
The author of the chapter on Salaspils is the adviser to the President of 
Latvia on issues of history Antonijs Zunda. This book has already been 
presented to the President of Russia and the President of Latvia. One 
should check not only the teeth of such gift horses, but also every single 
hair of the mane.5
The concentration camp that is also referred to as the Baltic Auschwitz is 
called “an expanded police type prison and instructional-labour camp.” 
It is precisely this kind of formulation that was used by the ideologists of 
fascism who claimed that death camps did not exist at all, but there were 
only “correction camps.”6
Somebody proves that the scale of death of prisoners in concentration 
camps is highly exaggerated and in general, those were merely labour 
correctional institutions, not factories of death and suffering. What are 
these political speculations built upon?7
It is good that at least that they are not called “rehabilitative” [camps]. 
Here, blood – up to 500 grams a day – was taken from underage pris-
oners for injured German fighters. It was even pumped from infants, 
thereby sending the children to their deaths. Nazi “doctors” conducted 
 3 “Novosti,” Radiostantsiya “Radio-popsa,” 2 February 2005, 15:00.
 4 Ivan Demidov, “Russky vzglyad,” Telekanal “3 kanal,” 30 January 2005, 15:25.
 5 Ibid.
 6 Boris Markov, “Holokaust ili prosto trud?”, Komsomolskaya pravda, 2 February 
2005, p. 4
 7 Vitaly Tseplyaev, “Fabrika smerti ne daet pokaya zhivym,” Argumenti i fakti, 
No. 5, 2 February 2005, p. 37.
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atrocious experiments on the children, adding poisons to food in tests. 
Altogether, through “instruction and labour” more than one hundred 
thousand prisoners were exterminated in the camp. That was the kind of 
instruction – under the rear sight of machine-gunner on the turrets and 
with a background of two gallows in the middle of the camp.8
Some articles included explanations by diplomats of the Russian 
Embassy in Latvia that the caption rendered the official camp’s name given 
by the German occupation authorities, but this information was lost in the 
narrative.
Occupation vs. Liberation
The theme of occupation versus liberation in the Russian media was 
commonly portrayed in the context of “Latvia rewriting history.” Russian 
commentators tried to discern what Latvia had to gain by rewriting his-
tory and offered various reasons, including justification through accusation, 
revanchism, and pressing material and territorial claims.
The image of Latvia as a country on the offensive is cultivated by stress-
ing that it denies the fact of “Liberation” and “Victory,” but substitutes the 
notion of a “Second Occupation.” The Russian media are selectively silent 
about the annexation of Latvia to the USSR, and there are woefully few 
articles about the beginning of World War II (not the Great Patriotic War) 
in comparison to those covering the outcome of the war. Russian media dis-
course on Latvia stressed the significance of victory not only for Latvia, 
Russia, and the former USSR, but for the world as a whole.
Latvia is portrayed as elevating SS soldiers to the rank of national he-
roes, and the Russian media responds by seeking to educate its audience, 
ignoring the fact that many legionnaires were conscripted:
But Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians collaborated not out of fear, 
but served their new masters in good conscience for the right to join the 
“master race” in the future, for the right to become new slaveholders.9
Here, one should note the activity of some Latvian opposition par-
ties, and their timing in raising bills in the parliament. Thus, for example, 
around the 60th anniversary of the battle for Rīga, these parties sought to 
grant special privileges to veterans of the Soviet Army, a proposal rejected 
by the majority. As a result, this is presented along with news on how Soviet 
veterans wear their medals in a semi-legal way, while legionnaires receive 
special honours and benefits.
 8 Leonid Lipnyakov, “Latvijya: istoricheskie “zagoguliny” po ofitsial’nomy zakazu,” 
Parlamenstkaya gazeta, 1 February 2005, N18(1635), p. 5.
 9 Andrei Raizfeld, “Osvobozhdenie Pribaltiki,” Sovetskaya Rossiya, 23 September 
2004.
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The Russian media and political response follows, and alongside the 
historical discourse appears commentary on Latvia’s minority policy, non-
citizens, and the education reform:
My counter-thesis: if one puts the issue this way, then it is necessary to 
recognise the same right of Russians in relation to Latvians. My compa-
triots have something to say both about the punitive actions of Latvian 
SS soldiers and about reducing the rights and about reducing Russians 
to the level of second class people in modern Latvia.10
For two years already they have been broadly celebrating this date in 
LATVIA and veterans of the legion demonstratively march in the streets 
of RIGA. The only thing that makes the Nazis temper their enthusiasm is 
European public opinion.11
This sort of “assault” opens new pages of history that are thought to be 
very dangerous for Latvia.
The Russian media create the image of a “vengeful” Latvia that seeks 
to compensate past perceived injuries by turning against Russian-speakers 
and contemporary Russia. Instances of vandalism in graveyards in 
Latvia, trials of KGB and military veterans are portrayed as a Latvian 
“pay back.”
At the same time, in Moscow they are convinced that the “existing differ-
ences in the approaches and evaluations of the events that took place in 
the Baltic States in the 1930s and 1940s should not be drawn into the 
spectrum of current political relations and be used to justify the discrimi-
nation of a significant part of the permanent residents of the country, as 
it is done in Estonia and Latvia”.12
The Western origin of the Latvian elite is also repeatedly stressed as 
contributing to Latvia’s revanchism:
The Latvian type of apartheid towards Russian-speakers and the offi-
cial anti-Russian complex, apparently, can partially be explained by the 
imported character of the top power holders (Vīķe-Freiberga is from a 
family of emigrants and arrived to Latvia from Canada), partially by the 
nationalistic blindness of the Latvian elite that prevents it from seeing 
the real national interests of the republic which do not run counter to 
building close, friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the East-
ern neighbour. There is also a desire to please anti-Russian circles in a 
united Europe in the hope of gaining material help and political support. 
 10 Mikhail Demurin, “Pokayanie. Primerenie. Otsvetsvennost’ – chestnyi podkhod 
ili politicheskie spekulyatsii?” Izvestiya, 15 September 2004.
 11 Sergey Lukovnikov, “Sobytiya,” Telekanal “TV-Tsentr,” 16 March 2002, 14:00.
 12 “Ofitsial’noe mnenie po materialam ITAR-TASS i “Interfaksa,”” Kommersant’, 
29 December 2004, p. 10.
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Let’s take as our point of departure that time is the best healer. And the 
fog of provincial chauvinism will disperse.13
Here one should mention that both journalists and those interviewed 
in reports often use metaphors borrowed from Krilov’s fable “The Elephant 
and the Little Dog”:
Semyon Shurtakov, writer, participant in the Great Patriotic War:
– Barking at an elephant, to recall our Ivan Andreyevich Krilov, is not a 
laudable thing, but neither is inaction, as some people think. Rather it is 
even advantageous. First, it is completely safe, as the elephant may not 
notice and pay attention to some puny nothing. Second, there might be 
somebody who will hear the barking (who knows, maybe they will even 
hear it in The Hague!) and think: look, albeit he is tiny at first glance, at 
the same time, what a brave, fearless example! He is probably very strong, 
if he is ready to take on an elephant...14
The fable serves to remove strain by portraying the situation in a less 
serious way. At the same time, the “rival” is downgraded, while Russia is 
elevated.
Another line of argumentation emphasised by the Russian media is that 
Latvia insists not only on moral recognition of the Soviet occupation in the 
form of an apology, but also seeks material claims:
The President of Latvia Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga has convoked lawyers and 
historians “to sum up the evidence on the damage inflicted on Latvia by 
communist terror,” in order to obtain compensation from Russia through 
an international court.15
The Russian media consider raising such historical accounts an 
“unfriendly attitude,” though the image of Latvia as a whole is not em-
phasised and Latvia’s claims are portrayed as coming from the “political 
elite”.16 Herein a mirror image is fully applied, as Russia is also making 
its calculations:
Recently the Accounts Chamber of Russia declared that it had identi-
fied financial and material claims to the Baltic States exceeding USD 
3 billion. These claims emerged in connection with the disintegration 
of the USSR, and are being specified by the information and public re-
lations service of the Accounts Chamber. According to the auditors, in 
 13 Elena Shesterina, “Pribaltiskie strany budut dobivatsya ot Moskvy “kompensatsiy 
za okupatsiyu” cherez Evrosoyuz,” 22 October 2004.
 14 N.A., “Kakoi otvazhnyi ekzemplyar!”Literaturnaya gazeta, No. 5, 9 February 
2005, p. 1.
 15 “Latviya podast v sud na Rossiyu,” Ekho Moskvy, 14 October 2004; Izvestiya, 
15 October 2004.
 16 Gennady Leonov, “Rossiya – baltiya: kto komu dolzhen i skol’ko,” Parlamentskaya 
gazeta, 13 October 2004.
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the intergovernmental agreements signed between the RSFSR and the 
Baltic States, the legal status of property that belongs to one party, but 
is situated on the territory of the other is not defined. Besides, issues of 
mutual recognition of property rights and receiving of compensation by 
Russia for the property of the USSR that remained on the territory of 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are not solved. 17
Over three billion dollars. The auditors of the Accounts Chamber named 
this amount after examining issues of debt of the Baltic States. For the 
first time after the Baltic States left the Soviet Union, Russia has tried 
to calculate the money that the state has lost as a result of the partition 
of the USSR.18
The Russian press offers another counterargument by citing public 
opinion polls. According to the Russian media, while speaking of “occupa-
tion” and calculating losses for the Soviet era, the inhabitants of Latvia al-
legedly believe that life during the Soviet era was better. Here, the ruling 
elites, who are making claims on Russia, are divorced from the people, who 
recall the Soviet era with nostalgia. Even the article is entitled “It is time for 
Latvians to sing: “How good it was to live in the Soviet state.”19
Territorial Claims
In 2005, a first attempt at reaching agreement on a Latvian-Russian 
border treaty was unsuccessful when Latvia sought to adopt a unilateral 
interpretive declaration referring to the 1920 Peace Treaty between Latvia 
and Soviet Russia. Insofar as Latvia lost territory to Russia since the 1920 
peace treaty, the Russian media portrayed Latvia’s attempts to invoke the 
1920 agreement as an attempt by Latvia to preserve the possibility of rais-
ing territorial or financial claims in the future:
Trying to appease Moscow Prime Minister Aigars Kalvitis stated that 
Latvia “does not even hint at territorial claims.” But these words do not 
seem to convince Russians. Kalvitis explains the position of Russia as an 
“inferiority complex.” “Russia is resentful of the foreign policy successes 
of Latvia, as our country is in the centre of international attention.”20
The theme of possible territorial claims evokes Russian journalistic sar-
casm and even mention of possible military action by Latvia. However, the 
most expressive phrase used during the debate belongs to Russian President 
Vladimir Putin, who noted:
 17 Aleksei Lyashchenko, “Kak osvoboditelei sdelali okkupantami,” Krasnaya zvezda, 
14 October 2004, p. 3.
 18 Aleksei Malkov, “Chrezvychainoe proisshestvie,” NTV, 3 November 2004.
 19 Elena Morozova, “Latysham pora pet’: kak khorosho v stranoi sovetskoi bylo zhit’,” 
Pravda, 21 September 2004.
 20 Ibid.
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We will not negotiate on the platform of any territorial claims. They will 
get not Pitalovo district, but dead donkey ears.21
This phrase caused a new wave of discussions in Latvia which were 
later reflected in the Russian media as well.
Victory Day vs. Second Occupation
Victory day is holy.22
It is possible to track how Russian media attention towards Latvia 
and the images used by the media evolved in the context of coverage of 
Victory Day. Victory Day received far more attention in 2005 than in the 
previous several years. In 2002-2004, the Russian media did not devote 
much coverage to the issue and often merely noted that Victory Day is 
not officially celebrated in Latvia. Thus, in 2002 only one brief story in 
RTR TV noted how Victory Day was marked in Latvia, recounting a meet-
ing in defence of veterans’ rights without even mentioning the number 
of participants. The report even remarked on the positive attitude of the 
Latvian authorities, who permitted veterans free public transportation 
for the day.
In 2003 again only one story was devoted to Latvia on radio station 
“Mayak,” which noted that despite the official Latvian interpretation of his-
tory, some inhabitants of Latvia continued to consider May 9 a holiday. Here, 
the report noted that the majority of those considering it a holiday were 
Russian-speakers and stressed the broad scope of the celebrations, which 
are portrayed as expanding every year:
Many have war medals on their chests, some are in Soviet Army uni-
forms. And though 9 May is a working day in Latvia, this festive day is 
celebrated by thousands of people there.23
In the list of events and concerts, the report highlighted several core 
actors: the Russian-oriented opposition party For Human Rights in a United 
Latvia, the Latvian-Russian association and the Embassy of the Russian 
Federation in Latvia.
2004 saw an increase in the number of reports, which touched on a 
broader array of topics, including citizenship, education reform, the “aban-
donment” of veterans, and the rewriting of history:
Every year on 9 May children from the local school come to the cemetery 
with flowers, every year one can hear the words of gratitude of survi-
vors near the soldiers’ tombs. People promise that despite the border 
 21 Mikhail Maksimov, “Prezident pozdravil “Komsomolku,” Tribuna, 24 May 2005, 
No. 89, p. 1.
 22 Vyacheslav Tetekin, “Razve nevedomo verkovnomu?” Sovetskaya Rossiya, No. 
60-61, 8 May 2004, p. 2.
 23 Elena Kachaeva, “Novosti,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak,” 9 May 2003, 20:00.
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that divided us, no politicians will succeed in erasing from the people’s 
memory the names of Soviet warriors who fell on Latvian soil.24
In 2002-2004 occasional reports also appeared on vandalism in cem-
eteries in Latvia as well. However, Russian media interest in Latvia regard-
ing Victory Day grew remarkably in 2005 and was not limited to the period 
around May, but stretched for months. Due to this increased attention, cov-
erage in 2005 is treated separately.
Victory Day in 2005
For Russia, victory in the “Great Patriotic War” marked not only the 
end of war, but the liberation of people in Russia and elsewhere. The Latvian 
authorities deny this axiom, which evokes Russian journalistic attempts to 
refute Latvian interpretations of events. Victory Day in Latvia emerges as 
a Russian media topic long before May, and many of the main “news” items 
are connected to differences in the perception of history. By 2005 a number 
of topics related to Victory Day crystallised in the media.
The first topic, actively discussed in December 2004 and January 2005, 
concerned the visit of the President of Latvia to Victory Day celebrations 
in Moscow. While the presidents of Lithuania and Estonia opted not to 
attend, the president of Latvia decided to participate and simultaneously 
inform Western partners about Latvian history and the Latvian perception 
of the end of World War II. A second topic concerns “declarations,” of which 
several attracted the attention of the Russian media simultaneously. The 
President of Latvia made one declaration clarifying that May 9 is not a day 
to be celebrated in Latvia. The Latvian parliament adopted a declaration 
condemning the Soviet occupation and interpreting May 9 as a victory of 
the occupation army. Moreover, as noted above, the Latvian government 
adopted a unilateral declaration to the Latvian-Russian border agreement. 
The border agreement is a third topic, which was accompanied by the in-
terpretation that Latvia sought to press territorial claims for the Abrene/
Pitalovo district in Russia. Finally, the term “occupation” became a topic, 
especially in the context of U.S. President George W. Bush’s visit to Rīga on 
the eve of May 9, 2005.
Let us now turn to the way in which “Victory” is constructed in the 
Russian media. Victory itself is often called “holy,” this is an axiom that does 
not require proof, and any re-examination of the facts or reinterpretation is 
impermissible. When discussing Latvian attempts to put forth alternative 
facts or interpretations in various declarations, the Russian media employs 
a strategy of refutation by either ignoring Latvian arguments altogether or 
casting doubt on them through the use of irony and phrases such as “as if,” 
“a sort of,” ”every bit as” (yakoby, vrode kak, slovno). The construction of 
denial can be reduced to several lines of argumentation, only some of which 
 24 Nikolay Myshinsky, “Lezhat v zemle chuzhoi... Geroi voiny do kontsa ostalsya 
veren pavshim tovarishcham,” Tribuna, 8 May 2004, p. 6.
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are directly connected to history. The primary strategies include direct or 
indirect mention of the Nazi plan “Ost” and the threat to Latvia posed by 
the victory of the German side, accusing Latvia of facilitating the rebirth 
of fascism, and accusing Latvia of lacking democracy (e.g., the education 
reform, citizenship, etc.).
The Russian media use the whole spectrum of discursive techniques and 
strategies of argumentation during this period to define “them.” The prima-
ry embodiment of this process is Latvian President Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga:
Why doesn’t Mrs. Freiberga put on a uniform of a “Waffen SS” soldier 
during her visit to Moscow? After all, according to her, this is the uni-
form of people who simply defended Latvia from Russians. She will not 
look bad with a swastika on her sleeve with a background of, for example, 
the presidents of Germany, Israel, and Russia.25
Here, exaggeration is applied as a strategy of argumentation. One 
culmination of Russian media coverage concerning Victory Day in Latvia 
came when excerpts from Vīķe-Freiberga’s interview to the Latvian televi-
sion channel LNT were relayed to a Russian audience. The coverage of the 
Russian television station RTR merits detailed citation and analysis:
Moderator: Today the parliament of Latvia confirmed the foreign policy 
course of the country. A resolution supported the efforts of Vaira Vīķe-
Freiberga to attain recognition from the world community of the occupa-
tion of Latvia in 1940. At the same time, deputies of the Latvian Saeima 
indirectly also signed onto the subsequent statements of Vīķe-Freiberga, 
which shocked the entire Russian-speaking population of the country. 
The topic is continued by Ekaterina Zorina.
Reporting by Ekaterina Zorina
Correspondent: The statement of the President of Latvia Vaira Vīķe-
Freiberga, made in a broadcast on one of the largest television stations 
in the country, has had the effect of a bomb explosion. The discussion in 
the studio concerned Russian-Latvian relations. The Latvian president 
decided to give her own evaluation of the events of World War II.
Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, the President of Latvia: “Of course we will neither 
convince, nor change the consciousness of those aging Russians who on 
May 9 will put a vobla [dried fish] on a newspaper, drink vodka and sing 
chastushki [folk songs], as well as recall how they heroically conquered 
the Baltic.”
Correspondent: Evidently, wanting to underline to whom she was speak-
ing, Mrs. Vīķe-Freiberga said the words “vodka,” “chastushki,” and 
 25 Andrei Dobrov, “Glavnaya tema,” Telekanal “3 kanal,” 28 April 2005, 19:30.
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“vobla” in Russian. Veterans of the Great Patriotic War who liberated 
Latvia from fascists considered such a statement by the head of state to 
be insulting, to say the least.
Vladimir Tarnovsky, veteran of the Great Patriotic War: You see what 
was said in our regard? That we conquered the Baltic. We did not con-
quer, but liberated the Baltic people from elimination and slavery.
Correspondent: The President of Latvia, who is planning to come to Mos-
cow on May 9, made such an openly anti-Russian expression. In contrast 
to the heads of Estonia and Lithuania, the head of Latvia has already 
announced that she will take part in the events planned for the 60th anni-
versary of the victory, but has also made clear why. She plans to explain 
to world leaders that in the Latvian interpretation May 1945 became the 
beginning of the Soviet occupation. The details are laid out in the book 
“The History of Latvia: the 20th Century.” The publication was present-
ed by a circle of official representatives. For example, the authors claim 
that the concentration camp at Salaspils, where the Nazis carried out 
experiments on children, and more than 100,000 people were tortured to 
death, was only an expanded police prison.
Tatyana Zhdanok, deputy of the European Parliament: The Chancellor 
of Germany is in the first row of anti-fascist demonstrations, but here, 
during 15 years of independence, not a single official has been to the 
Salaspils concentration camp, to the place where the concentration camp 
was, but where there is now a memorial. Not once on the 8th or 9th of 
May were they at the monument to the liberators from fascism.
Correspondent: The Russian Foreign Ministry commented on the state-
ments of Latvian politicians thus (quotation): “We are led to conclude 
that the trend towards historical revanchism, as before, is actively sup-
ported in Latvia, including at a high governmental level.” Latvian depu-
ties supported the activities of their president. Today the parliament has 
adopted a resolution in support of the external policy carried out by Vaira 
Vīķe-Freiberga.26
The narrative uses military terminology in comparing the impact of the 
president’s statement with a bomb explosion. The narrative identifies who 
was shocked by the phrase and implies that many in Latvia were not. The 
division between “us” and “them” is drawn according to linguistic criteria, 
as “we” Russian-speakers are shocked and “they,” those speaking in the 
Latvian language, are not. “They” are first and foremost the Latvian parlia-
ment together with the president, and thus, the “authorities.” The narrative 
 26 Mikhail Antonov, “Vesti,” Telekanal “Rossiya,” 3 February 2005, 20:00, 23:00.
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progresses from the reporter’s assessment of the president to that of the 
state. This report demonstrates how one phrase is chosen and becomes a 
central part of the portrayal of Latvia as trying to prove the occupation of 
the country in 1940.
The counterargument used by the veteran stresses the “black and 
white” nature of the issue, denying occupation and reiterating liberation 
and the struggle against fascism. The expression of the president itself is 
called anti-Russian, as being aimed against the people of Russia (rossiyane). 
In the end the opinion of the Russian side is provided, strengthened by the 
repetition of the text of the studio correspondent, who identifies the parlia-
mentary decision supporting the president with support for the two lines 
of argumentation suggested in the narrative – the impossibility of chang-
ing the behaviour of veterans (vodka, vobla, chastushki) – a new scandal, 
and reference to an earlier scandal, the book History of Latvia in the 20th 
Century.
March 16 or the “Revival of Fascism”
March 16 is the day of remembrance in the republic of Latvian soldiers 
when people unofficially celebrate the anniversary of the first combat of 
the voluntary Latvian “Waffen SS” legion.27
The “nostalgic” march of collaborationists of fascism, the fascist show.28
 27 Vladislav Andreyev, “Segodnya,” Telekanal “NTV,” 16 March 2002, 16:00.
 28 N.A., “Melkie radosti latviskoi nevsty,” Moskovsky komsomolets, 16 March 2005, p. 3.
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The theme of Latvia commemorating March 16 can only partially be 
connected to the calendar. This label includes events connected to “rewrit-
ing history,” “interpretation of the past,” “revival of fascism,” and “neo-
fascism,” the ideology of the new state. The Russian media discuss the 
commemorations not only during the month of March., but throughout the 
entire year.
Several groups are constructed in media reports. These groups are con-
nected not only with the Legion, but with the representation of this theme in 
newspapers and broadcasts. The diagram demonstrates the division of the 
major “actors” that feature in these materials.
Three main poles are portrayed – Latvia, Russia, and international 
structures. The Russian position is presented as homogeneous, without 
any internal contradictions, conflict, or debate. Official opinion (e.g., the 
statements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) completely matches the rep-
resentation of the opinions of various unofficial groups (e.g., actions near the 
embassies, open letters to the newspapers), and the only difference is how 
the same opinion is expressed or argued. Street actions reject logical argu-
ments and offer “argumentation from a position of strength.”
MFA of the Russian Federation Actions (In Russia)
Former SS soldiers say that they were fight-
ing for the independence of Latvia. But the 
Russian MFA reminds that the activities of 
the Latvian SS legion were recognised as 
criminal during the Nuremberg trial.29
Nevertheless, the Russian authorities con-
tinue to insist on the unacceptability of 
such activities. The deputies of the State 
Duma have already stated today that they 
will approach the leadership of European 
organisations on this issue.30
Traditionally, the MFA of the Russian 
Federation reacts harshly to “the heroisa-
tion of fascism in Latvia and its supporters 
among the local population.”31
On Wednesday under the windows 
of the Latvian embassy in Moscow 
one could hear shouts of “Our 
MiGs will land in Rīga” and “You 
will see a new Nuremberg.” In 
this way, members of the youth or-
ganisation “For the Motherland!” 
expressed their protest against the 
procession of Latvian SS legion-
naires taking place at the same 
time in Rīga and Liepaja. Young 
“Rogozinites” came to the protest 
in Soviet-era military uniforms 
with party flags and banners say-
ing “Fascism will not be tolerated” 
in their hands. 32
The Russian media reproduce discourse from the Latvian media on pos-
sible provocations, which are expected every year. Information is transmit-
ted on the level of gossip or myth. This image appears to be beneficial for 
Russia and appears in several publications at once, as well as is widespread 
in many TV channels:
 29 Danuta Dembovskaya, “Bez kommentariev,”Vremya novostei, 17 March 2004, p. 5.
 30 Ol’ga Kokorekina, “Vechernie novosti,”Telekanal “1 kanal,” 16 March 2004, 18:00.
 31 Polina Elksne, Kirill Reznik-Martov, “Legionery SS ulozhatsya v polchasa,” 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, No. 50, 16 March 2005, p. 3.
 32 N.A., “Nashi MIGi syadut v Rige,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, No. 51, 17 March 2005, 
p. 2.
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Long before March 16 rumours started to spread in Rīga that provoca-
tions might be organised on this day. In particular, the Latvian news-
paper “Vakara Zinas”[Evening News] reported that Russian National-
Bolsheviks are recruiting young people in Moscow and St. Petersburg for 
a free trip to Latvia where the boys and girls will have the chance to spill 
paint and throw rotten eggs at the legionnaires.33
Chairman of the Association of National Partisans of Latvia Nikolay 
Romanovskis said in an interview to the newspaper “MK”: “March 16 
is a holy day for everybody who cherishes the memory of their fathers, 
brothers and fallen combat comrades. However, in order to avoid provo-
cations from forces hostile to Latvia, the Association of National Parti-
sans took a decision not to participate in the organised procession, but 
to pay tribute to the legionnaires in church services and at the memorial 
in Lestene.”34
“Latvian politicians were not able to explain objectively the history of the 
legionnaires. Therefore we are perceived as SS soldiers.” Besides “Rus-
sian special services would definitely use the procession for their own 
purposes,” he added.35
Similar discussions about “provocations” took place in 2002, 2003, 
2004, while real clashes take place in only 2005. These clashes will be exam-
ined further in greater detail.
The Russian media portray international structures as being hetero-
geneous, with the three main stances represented by the European Union, 
NATO and the European Court of Human Rights. However, here it is worth 
specifying the mythical meaning of the term “the West” in Russia’s media, 
which is often thought to have influence on Latvia. Among the designations 
used are “Europe” and the “international community”:
Under the pressure of international public opinion the Latvian Saeima 
was recently forced to exclude March 16 from the list of official state dates.36
One can discern two roles of international structures – passive and ac-
tive. The passive role of international structures consists of indirectly influ-
encing Latvia. For example, in 2002 the procession was banned and NATO 
is portrayed as the restraining force. Bizarre as it may seem, here, NATO 
assumes the role of defending Russia from “assaults from Latvia”:
 33 Ol’ga Denisova, “Legionery SS otmarshirovali svoe na kladbishche,”Kommersant’, 
17 March 2004, p. 11, “Vesti,” Telekanal “Rossiya,” 16 March 2004, 20:00, “Vesti,” 
Radiostantsiya “Radio Rossii,” 16 March 2004, 22:00, “Sobytiya,” Telekanal “TV-
Tsentr,” 16 March 2004, 22:00.
 34 Abik Elkin, “Marsh-Brosok na ES,”Moskovsky komsomolets, 17 March 2004, p. 3.
 35 Vladimir Vodo, “Fashizm v Latvii ne proidet,” Kommersant’, 2 March 2002, p. 3.
 36 Evgeny Vostrukhov, “Yubileinye pominki,”Rossiskaya gazeta, 17 March 2003, EV.
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To avoid international embarrassment, they decided not to hold the pro-
cession of legionnaires in the capital of Latvia this year: politicians are 
worried that it might cause a stir before the NATO summit where the fate 
of Latvia will be decided – entry into the North Atlantic Alliance.37
Not only in Russia, but also in Europe people are against carrying out 
processions in honour of Nazi units. And the city authorities of Rīga 
have banned public actions this year. Nevertheless several hundred peo-
ple came out on the streets. Incidents could not be avoided. 38
All the measures which were carried out before by the Latvian legion-
naires, particularly the street procession and laying flowers at the monu-
ment to the Motherland and Freedom in the centre of Rīga, have always 
created a considerable stir both in Latvia and in the world. Despite the 
frantic attempts of former legionnaires to explain that legally they were 
not soldiers in the Waffen SS, they are considered SS soldiers. Here 
reference is made to a declaration published in the USA in 1950. The 
declaration says the “the Baltic legions of the SS should be considered 
special units” and they should not be considered entities hostile to the US 
government. However, the Secretary General of NATO George Robertson 
and the head of the US delegation to the North Atlantic Alliance Nicho-
las Burns both recently visited Rīga and clearly indicated the impossibil-
ity of meeting the veterans of the Latvian legion.”39
Such a harsh pursuit of Nazis in Latvia will continue right up to No-
vember, when the NATO Prague summit takes place. There the issue 
of the next enlargement of the alliance will be decided. In Rīga they 
recognise that at this historic moment Latvia should have the image 
of a decent democratic state, but piety towards the EU is so great that 
they even started talking in the Saeima about the possibility of elect-
ing to parliament even such beasts of burden as graduates of Russian 
schools.40
The Russian media also foresee an active role for international organi-
sations, often suggesting that certain action MUST take place with regard 
to Latvia. Often, however, the desired “action” is unspecified.
The most difficult of the three poles to construct is Latvia. Russian 
media find an internal conflict, a chasm in Latvian society between two 
groups, and take the side of one particular group. Two of the groups 
marked in the diagram – the “opposition” and the “anti-fascists” – are 
 37 Natal’ya Vasilyeva, “Novosti,” Telekanal “ORT,” 16.03.2002, 15:00.
 38 Sergey Brilev, “Protiv provedeniya shestvii v chest’ natsistskikh chastei vystupayut 
ne tol’ko v Rossii, no v Evrope,” Telekanal “RTR,” 16 March 2002, 20:00.
 39 Vladimir Vodo, “Fashizm v Latvii ne proidet,” Kommersant’, 2 March 2002, p. 3.
 40 Sergey Lukovnikova, “Sobytiya,” Telekanal “TV-Tsentr,” 16 March 2002, 14:00.
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growing closer in Russian media portrayals, and it is often difficult to 
define clear borders between the groups. Along with the actors in Russia, 
these groups in Latvia are portrayed as “US.” “THEY” are the SS legion-
naires who participate in the processions, church services, visit graveyards 
and engage in other activities, as well as those who support them, and the 
Latvian ruling elite:
Among official representatives, only deputies of the national union 
“For Fatherland and Freedom” could be noticed at the event. Member 
of parliament Juris Dobelis stated to journalists that Latvians should 
“not be ashamed” of remembrance day of the legionnaires, but repre-
sentative of the party Aigars Kimenis said that legionnaires are the 
“honour of the people.”41
Table 1
Semiotic construction of the group marked “THEY”
Legionnaires Supporters of Legionnaires
Veterans of the Latvian SS legion
Former SS combatants
Combatants of the Hitler legion
Surviving legionnaires of the voluntary 
Latvian SS legion
Latvian association of national soldiers
Nationalists
Former collaborators of the Nazis, 
currently ordinary pensioners
Young supporters of legionnaires 
from radical Latvian 
organisations
Young “Nazis” (natsiki)
Members of parliament from 
right wing parties
Ideological successors to the 
Nazis
Legionnaire sympathisers 
The Latvian authorities acquired the most striking characteristics in 
media portrayal in 2005, when the style of presentation of events and sub-
themes became sharper and marked by numerous metaphors. For example, 
 41 Aleksandr Ushakov, “Latyshkie legionery otkazalis’ ot marsha,” Kommersant’, 18 
March 2002, p. 8.
Table 2
The Position of 
Official Latvia
The Position 
of Official Russia
Official Rīga simply pater-
nally takes care of former 
SS combatants and “par-
tisans” who, according to 
recently adopted amend-
ments to labour legislation, 
will receive a considerable 
increase in pensions.
Russia, of course, does not maintain silence. Also 
now, during the session of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights in Geneva, we raised the issue of the 
unacceptability of praising Nazi collaborators’ in the 
Baltic States and the discrimination of the non-titu-
lar population. However, how many messages, state-
ments, and notes there have been from our side! An 
end to this “war of words” is not in sight.
latvkriev-medijos-A.indd   95 2008.07.16.   16:32:03
96
the situation of legionnaires and the official position of “Rīga” and “Moscow” 
are described in one of the articles (see Table 2).42
It is now appropriate to examine portrayal of the events in 2005 in 
greater detail. In most cases, the events are viewed through the discourse 
of the “60th Anniversary of Victory.” That year Latvia saw both a proces-
sion of people commemorating the legion, and a counter-protest by people 
in striped prisoners’ uniforms obstruct the path of those walking to the 
Freedom monument. Rossiskaya gazeta describes the fray that ensued:
Participants of the procession in honour of the Latvian “Waffen SS” le-
gion and people dressed in the attire of prisoners of Nazi camps. A fight 
started when the opponents of the Nazis stood in the way of the proces-
sion of about two hundred SS combatants shouting “Fascism will not go 
through!” and “Death to fascists!”43
Table 3
Portrayal of the Events of March 16, 2005 in Latvia
Permitted Meeting Banned Meeting
Gang (sborische) of fascists
Afterwards SS veterans 
were replaced by their de-
scendants 
Anti-fascists
“Motherland” Association, member of the Unit-
ed Congress of Russian Communities of Latvia.
About 30 people were detained, among them 
many active members of the Headquarters for 
the Defence of Russian Schools
- I am a survivor of the siege of Leningrad, so I have my own accounts 
to settle. My ancestors died in Leningrad, but these guys, who not quite 
exterminated, were fighting on the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts. There-
fore we Leningraders have a particular attitude towards them.
Correspondent: Many youth who are on holiday now lent the event a par-
ticular heat.
- They destroyed our relatives, all these fascists. And we must answer 
before our great grandfathers.44
The Russian media use military terminology and metaphors, comparing 
the controversy to a battlefield with trenches, and current disagreements 
add to those of the past. Physical and verbal aggression is the order of the 
day, and the stance of the Russian MFA also becomes more militant:
The MFA of the Russian Federation has characterised the procession 
in Rīga of former SS combatants [esesovtsev] and representatives of 
 42 Nikolay Erofeev, “Yubileinoe vozvrashchenie “Vaffen SS,”” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 
No. 50, 16 March 2005, p. 5.
 43 Nadezhda Sorokina, “Nazad v proshloe – skandal,” Rossiskaya gazeta, No. 52, 17 
March 2005, EV.
 44 Natal’ya Vasilyeva, “Vremya,”Telekanal “1 kanal,” 16 March 2005, 21:00.
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nationalist radical organisations as “immoral and unacceptable.” “This 
is particularly cynical as it takes place with the consent of the authorities, 
who, on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the great victory, are seeking 
support in European capitals for Rīga’s course on the reconsideration of 
the results of the WWII and the judgment of the Nuremberg tribunal that 
declared the SS a criminal organisation,” they believe in the Russian 
MFA. “Only through perverse logic can one explain a situation in which 
the legionnaires march in the centre of the Latvian capital, but the police 
use force against anti-fascists.”45
It should be noted that the number of reports on the 16 March events 
increased significantly in 2005 and only a part thereof were devoted to ei-
ther activities near the Freedom monument or this day’s events in Rīga. The 
reports also elaborate on the state of relations between Latvia and Russia, 
which are characterised as being in a “Cold phase,”46 a term reminiscent of 
the Cold War. It should also be noted that Estonia and Lithuania are often 
lumped together with Latvia regarding the celebrations in honour of Victory 
Day in Moscow.
To some extent, provocations are connected to Latvia’s EU and NATO 
accession:
Several years in a row the day of remembrance of the Latvian legion 
was celebrated in Latvia at an official level. The world community was 
shocked. When it was still preparing to join the European Union, the 
leadership of Latvia became afraid about the image of the state and 16 
March was crossed from the list of remembrance dates, but they did not 
stop celebrating it. Today the procession takes place with the permis-
sion of Rīga’s authorities and on the territory of a united Europe. Pro-
tests of veterans who fought alongside the anti-Hitler coalition were not 
heard.47
Comparisons between the status of Soviet veterans and former legion-
naires in present day Latvia are also a constant topic. This theme, which 
falls outside of the historical chronology, will be examined below.
Trials against Veterans
During the period under investigation several trials took place in Latvia 
that were broadly reflected in the Russian media. Often, the whole chronol-
ogy of cases was mentioned, thereby creating a sort of spiral. Newspapers, 
radio, and TV linked all the cases and connected them with Latvia’s “re-
writing of history.”
 45 Vladimir Vodo, “Fashizm proshel,” Kommersant’, 17 March 2005, p. 11.
 46 Vladimir Semiryaga, “Kholodnuyu voinu ne predlagat’,” Rossiya, No. 9, 17 March 
2005, p. 10.
 47 Ekaterina Zorina, “Novosti,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak,” 16 March 2005, 18:00.
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The Russian media constructed the image of veterans in Latvia with 
precision, and that image remained constant with regard to the “main he-
roes” of the reports and the imagined community of Soviet army veterans. 
Reports covered not only financial problems, but also “moral” concerns:
… the bitter life of war veterans in a strange land among those who just 
recently were compatriots, but now are indifferent, cruel neighbours who 
call them occupants, war criminals, “non-persons” [nelyudi] not only be-
hind their backs, but directly in their faces.48
While there were several cases against “party activists,” let us examine 
portrayal of the Kononov case.
The Kononov Case
Portrayal of this theme is characterised by the language of war and 
military actions, as well as the use of figurative language. Moreover, the 
composition of the reports is standard and is repeated over and over, leading 
to the same outcome.
A 79-year-old first category disabled person who reached Rezekne with 
difficulty and with his own money announced to journalists before the 
start of the session: “I am not guilty of anything. If the case is considered 
and analysed in a legally objective manner, it will be my victory. But from 
a political point of view, anything can happen. But I am ready for a long 
struggle.”49
Kononov adopted Russian citizenship and gave up Latvian citizenship 
two years ago, but is not hurrying to move to Russia, although the Rus-
sian embassy has proposed this several times. That is a last resort, says 
the former partisan. While I have my strength and the opportunity, I 
have to fight. In my own land.50
In an interview Kononov himself calls his battle a struggle for histori-
cal truth. These quotations appear in all the reports, and he claims himself 
that “All legal, political, and historical truth is on my side.”51 At the same 
time, the actions of the Latvian side are portrayed as being “politically mo-
tivated.”52 Latvia, it is claimed, is on the war path, and the whole case is 
represented as completely political, an “invention of the authorities.”53
 48 Viktor Alksnis, “Stol’ko slov o lyubvi k veteranam,” Rossiskaya gazeta, 19 January 
2002, p. 3
 49 Evgeny Vostrukhov, “Mertvyi protsess,” Rossiskaya gazeta, 23 May 2002, p. 2.
 50 Andrey Medvedev, “V Latvii prodolzhaetsya sud nad latviskim partizanom V. 
Kononovym,” Telekanal “RTR,” 2 June 2002, 20:00.
 51 Natal’ya Vasilyeva, “Vechernie Novosti,”Telekanal “1 kanal,” 26 April 2004.
 52 Lora Stadnitskaya, “Novosti,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak,” 24 April 2004.
 53 Nikolay Golikov, “Bespredel’noe pravosudie,”Voenno-promyshlennyi kur’er, No. 18, 
19 May 2004.
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Reporting on such cases portrays two opposing sides, two hostile groups, 
each with a clear monolithic point of view:
Diagram 2
The attacking side is represented by the Latvian authorities, the 
Prosecutor General’s Office, and other state institutions. The attacking side 
is impersonal and personification is practically absent. In the reports, jour-
nalists portray two Latvias: an official Latvia, a state apparatus that cre-
ates and implements the ideology, and an unofficial Latvia, represented by 
the residents of Latvia, some of whom sympathise with victims, while others 
support the ruling elite. Here, various sub-topics rather frequently appear 
about developments in Latvia, such as extermination of culture (through the 
language and history) and destruction of education (through language).
The image of Russia as the defender is constructed with reference to the 
Great Patriotic War. In the media reports, it was not Russia that chose the 
time and place for this battle, just as in the Great Patriotic War, as Russia 
was a victim. A discourse of victimhood is strengthened by the fact that 
Kononov adopted Russian citizenship. While Russia often “requests,” these 
“requests” often shade into “demands”:
The main human rights official of the Russian Federation Oleg Mironov 
applied to the President of Latvia Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga with a request 
to “transfer under the jurisdiction of Russia the former partisan Vasily 
Kononov,” who is repeatedly accused by the Latvia General Prosecutor 
of war crimes.54
Russia as the defender is often portrayed as the “future” or “potential” 
defender, which creates an image of Russia as stable and reliable:
Our compatriots who live abroad must be sure that Russia is ready to 
come to their assistance.55
 54 Yuri Krok, “Mironov prosit za Kononova,” Inostranets, 28 May 2002, p. 6.
 55 Ivan Poddubnyi, ““Demokraticheskaya” Latviya prodolzhaet presledovat’ Vasiliya 
Kononova,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28 May 2002, p. 7.
ASSAILANT
LATVIA
– Revision/distortion 
of history
– Extermination 
of culture
– Destruction 
of education
DEFENDER
RUSSIA
– European Court 
of Human Rights
– Defence of memory
– Defence of veterans
– Defence of identity
Victims
KONONOV
LARIONOV
TESS
FARBTUH
latvkriev-medijos-A.indd   99 2008.07.16.   16:32:03
100
Russia’s passivity when its assistance is needed is a source of conflict 
within Russia, generating discussions about how it should react:
We asked the governor of Kemerov province Aman Tuleyev, who has sev-
eral times spoken in defence of the old partisan, to comment on the situ-
ation. Here are his words:
“This is a real swinishness. No, this is swinishness squared! How long 
can they torture an old man who gave his youth to the struggle against 
fascism?! Rīga shamelessly tries to revise the results of Nuremberg. But 
Russia, one of the participants in those proceedings, keeps silent. Have 
we forgotten the heroes of the past war, the fact that with our blood we 
have richly fertilised the soil of the countries of Western Europe for their 
freedom?!”56
Occasionally, journalists voice a rather critical attitude to the help of 
Russia. In some media reports, the populism of the authorities is construct-
ed. This is used for the voice of internal opposition:
Studio correspondent: I stress that, according to the veteran himself, Rus-
sia has not even paid for Kononov’s attorney and this attorney was hired 
not by our side, but the Latvian side. Here, one can of course recall the 
words of Putin about helping our compatriots abroad, about the budget 
allocated for this purpose, but what is the sense of that. Apparently, all 
the money was spent on Pal Palich (Pavel Pavlovich) Borodin. There is 
no money left for other compatriots. Today, when we reached Kononov 
by phone, he confirmed in tears that now he has money neither for medi-
cine, nor for an attorney. Probably the only thing that one can do in this 
situation is simply to collect money and send it to Rīga. That is what the 
employees of our TV Company did and we invite everybody who does not 
count too much on our MFA to do the same. In the immediate future we 
will open an account in the name of Vasily Kononov and everybody who 
wishes will be able to help him personally.57
However, several months later, the Russian authorities are taking a 
more active position. The President of Russia supports Kononov and this 
advocacy is expressed through presents and personal telegrams, of which 
the text is published for the whole country to read.
A Present from the President
The Russian embassy in Latvia arranged a reception in honour of 
Kononov, and “all of Russia” celebrated his birthday with presents from the 
President himself. For several days in a row, Kononov appeared in the broad-
casts of nation-wide TV channels in Russia before receiving the presents, 
receiving the presents, after receiving the presents:
 56 Ibid.
 57 Sergey Nadezhdin, “V sude nebol’shogo Latviiskogo gorodka Elgava prodolzhaetsya 
rassmotrenie dela byvshego sotrudnika MGB Nikolaya Larionova,” Telekanal “3 
kanal,” 10 September 2002, 19:10.
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Vladimir Putin congratulated Vasily Kononov, the resident of Latvia, 
citizen of Russia, and veteran-antifascist who is being pursued by Latvi-
an law enforcement, on his 80th birthday. “Your selfless struggle against 
the violation of human rights in Latvia and attempts to rewrite history 
evoke sincere support in Russian society,” it is noted in the greeting of the 
head of state. 58
A dialogue between Putin and Kononov is conducted through the me-
dia. In an ORT report, Kononov replies to Putin:
Vladimir Vladimirovich, first of all – thank you. Secondly, I wish that 
all is well with his health. I wish that all goes well in his big and re-
sponsible work.59
Vasily Kononov plans to continue his combat, which has lasted for more 
than 60 years, without arms, only through legal methods. And, of course, 
he very much counts on Russia’s help.60
In parallel to these relations within Russia and between Russia and 
Latvia, the reports construct another relationship – that between Russia 
and the West:
Something else is surprising: there is no reaction from the West, which 
is preparing to open widely its embrace to a country which pursues 
veterans-liberators and whitewashes the accessories of executioners. 
But maybe in satiated and graceful Europe they have also forgotten 
Oradur, Buchenwald, Sachsenhausen, Bergen-Belsen?! Or were the 
acts of heroism of the soldiers of the countries-liberators – the USSR, 
England, the USA – just ancient history? Or do the parades of former 
SS combatants from the Latvian legion seem to them to be theatrical 
processions that can be ignored?61
“Europe” and the “West” are portrayed here as defenders, which are 
passive. These remarks can be considered accusations. Thus, for example, 
the discourse of Europe is bolstered by mentioning Latvia’s forthcoming ac-
cession to the EU, which is referred to by both journalists and representatives 
of the Russian MFA. Here, the violation of veterans’ rights, decolonisation, 
and occupation is also discussed. But veterans are portrayed as combatants 
who “were fighting for the destiny of every European.”62
Here, portrayal of the actions of the Russian youth movement Nashi 
merits attention. Nashi members gathered near the building of the Latvian 
embassy to engage in “defensive action”:
 58 Maksim Mironov, “Pozdravlenie cherez granitsu,”Trud, 4 January 2003, p. 4.
 59 Natal’ya Vasilyeva, “Vechernie novosti,” Telekanal “ORT,” 4 January 2003, 18:00.
 60 Vera Kuzmyna, “Sobytiya,”Telekanal “TV-Tsentr,” 30 April 2004.
 61 Aman Tuleyev cited in Ibid.
 62 Lora Stadnytskaya, “Novosti,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak,” 24 April 2004.
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Ambiguous phrases could be heard that “we are peaceful people, but our 
armoured train is parked on a sidetrack,” but Latvia is “little country 
that one can hardly see on a globe.”63
The same article noted that not all methods of struggle are good:
A symbolic “present” was given to the Latvian authorities – a ball of wire 
with the fascist cross inside. But nothing was said about the fact that the 
veteran Kononov was invited to reside in a country where unruly fascistic 
[fashistvuyushchie] youngsters, ignored by the attention of the “Idush-
chie” (Marching Together), destroy everything in their way. 64
Such a view, however, cannot be considered the prevailing one. The ma-
jority of national TV channels that reported on this event gave it a positive 
twist. In the context of this research, the most interesting comment came 
from one of the youngsters who explained his participation in the action:
Correspondent: The organisers of the action are absolutely convinced 
that Vasily Makarovich is not guilty of anything.
Olga Sidorova, member of the organization MARCHING TOGETHER: 
a sufficient number of us watch news and in general know a lot about 
history. Therefore I can say with full confidence that he is not guilty.
Pavel Tarakanov: I believe that it [Kononov’s trial] was organised by 
people who sympathise with Hitler, by those with a pro-fascist orienta-
tion. Because other people are not capable of organising a trial against a 
person who was fighting against fascism.
Correspondent: Despite the loud slogans and solemn speeches in support 
of the veteran, it looks like the majority of people present understood little 
about what was going on and played the role solely of masses. 65
Creating the Image of Victims
Hitler would have liked such a sentence, Ella Panfilova has also stated.66
In addition to reports on trials, stories about Latvia “honouring” SS 
combatants are presented, and these stories are generally about concrete 
individuals. The stories generally pay much attention to various military ar-
tefacts. Thus, Latvia is portrayed as honouring the uniform of the SS, while 
outlawing that of veterans of the Soviet Army. This stance is reinforced by 
the regular portrayal of various trials in the media. The most notable cases, 
apart from that of Kononov, are depicted in Table 4.
 63 Natal’ya Galimova, “”Idushchie” naekhali na posol’stvo, Moskovsky komsomolets, 
14 June 2002, p. 2.
 64 Ibid.
 65 Yana Zotova, “24,” Telekanal “REN TV,” 13 June 2002, 14:30.
 66 Danuta Dembovskaya, Vremya novostei, 6 May 2004.
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Table 4
The Image of Victims
The Nikolay 
Tess Case
The Mikhail 
Farbtukh Case
The Nikolay 
Larionov Case
Journalists discuss the crimi-
nal charges of genocide against 
Tess. Links are drawn be-
tween the Tess, Larionov 
and Farbtukh cases. As back-
ground to the cases, Sergey 
Yastrbzhemsky and Konstan-
tin Kosachev comment on the 
situation of Russians in the 
Baltic states.67 Strasbourg is a 
solution to the problem, repre-
sents hope. Russian politicians 
lay the blame on European of-
ficials who are indifferent to 
rights violations:
The Russian MFA accused the 
Latvian authorities of violating 
international norms and try-
ing innocent people for politi-
cal gain. The reason for such 
a sharp statement became the 
case of a former official of the 
Ministry of State Security of 
the USSR Nikolay Tess, whom 
Latvian authorities intend to 
judge on charges of genocide.68
State Secretary of the Latvian 
MFA Maris Riekstins stated in 
response that he considers the 
reproaches of Russia on the vi-
olation of international norms 
by Latvia for pursing innocent 
people for political gain anoth-
er attempt by Russia to “impose 
on the world its distorted un-
derstanding” and to interfere 
in the internal affairs of Latvia. 
“This is another attempt to 
‘heat up old soup.’ We have al-
ready repeatedly said that in 
Latvia the court system is depo-
liticised and all sentences are 
based on evidence and facts,” 
announced Mr. Riekstins. Ac-
cording to him, the Latvian 
court system is equally strict to-
wards any crime and particu-
larly towards crimes without a 
Statute of limitations.69
In the case of Farbtukh 
against Latvia, the Eu-
ropean Court of Human 
Rights finds Latvia guilty 
of inhumane treatment. 
The case is presented as 
a precedent, as the be-
ginning. This “victory” 
is portrayed as Russia’s 
victory. Farbtukh himself 
notes:
It is just the beginning 
and finally this arbitrar-
iness must be put to an 
end.70
The sentence of the Latvi-
an court was not con-
sidered in the European 
courts, and this is report-
ed in Russia:
Former militia official of 
the Ministry of State Se-
curity of Latvia Mikhail 
Farbtukh was convicted 
for allegedly participat-
ing in the deportations of 
1949.71
Today in the European 
Court of Human Rights 
they expect the review of 
several similar cases. Vet-
erans believe that this is 
the only way they will be 
able to stop arbitrariness 
on the part of the Latvian 
authorities. 72
The whole uneasy histo-
ry of Latvia was reflect-
ed in the fate of Mikhail 
Vladimirovich that the 
young state wants to re-
write ardently. But the 
victims of this rewrit-
ing become honest peo-
ple whose merits are now 
called crimes. 73
In the court of the small 
Latvian town of Jelga-
va, the case of former 
official of the Minis-
try of State Security 
Nikolay Larionov con-
tinues to be reviewed. 
He is accused of geno-
cide against the Latvi-
an people. According to 
the prosecutors, former 
militia official
Larionov took part in 
mass repressions. Be-
cause of him 500 per-
sons, 60 of whom died, 
were exiled from Latvia 
in 1949.74
The Russian MFA be-
lieves that the prosecu-
tion of the pensioner is 
in conflict with inter-
national legal norms. 
Moreover, the statement 
of the Russian MFA 
also points to the mor-
al side of a trial against 
an elderly person whose 
condition is becoming 
worse every day. 75
The beginning of an-
other trial in this Bal-
tic State coincided with 
the discussion in the 
monitoring committee 
of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council 
of Europe of the state of 
affairs in Latvia in the 
area of human rights 
and national minori-
ties. The Latvian MFA 
reported on the alleged-
ly “positive assessment” 
by the deputies of the ef-
forts by the Latvian au-
thorities in this field. In 
reality everything is ex-
actly the opposite.76
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Veterans as Victims
Here, the victim image goes beyond individual veterans being tried in 
Latvian courts. Russian media reports construct the image of a “non-person-
alised”, “non-personified” veteran who served in the Red Army and now lives 
in Latvia facing total “injustice” and “undeserved humiliation.” The discur-
sive strategy of painting reality in stark black and white shades is employed 
here. Thus, for, example, the readers of Moskovsky komsomolets are told that 
SS legionnaires will celebrate Victory Day. The report reinforced perceptions 
of a stark difference in status and in the financial situation of the soldiers of 
different armies. The following definitions are offered in the article77:
Table 5
THEY WE 
Fascists
SS combatants
Latvian neo-fascism
Latvia – part of the 3rd Reich
Heroisation
Those in love with the 3rd Reich
Hitler’s executioners and their Baltic assistants
Liberators
Veterans
Front fighters
It might seem to them that their insane sentences make People’s com-
missar Beria, Minister of state security Abakumov, and maybe Stalin 
himself writhe, there are people who take too long to comprehend, but it 
might just be time to check the calendar.78
While those on trial contribute to constructing the image, so do invited 
experts who did not participate in the fighting. One example of an expert 
opinion was that of an opposition Latvian deputy:
“Right wing deputies believe that Latvia was not liberated, but occupied in 
1944. And therefore they do not want to grant privileges to Soviet veterans,” 
announced deputy chairman of the Concord faction Andrey Klementyev.79
 67 Nil Ushakov, “Novosti,”Radiostantsiya “Mayak – 24,” 9 November 2004, 16:38.
 68 Aleksandr Ushakov, “Rossiya razogrevaet stary sup,” Kommersant’, 15 July 2002, 
p. 7 EV.
 69 Ibid.
 70 Ekaterina Zorina, “Vesti,” Telekanal “Rossiya,” 2 December 2004, 20:00.
 71 Ruslan Bystrpov, “Novosti,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak,” 2 December 2004, 18:30, 20:00.
 72 Ekaterina Zorina, “Vesti,” Telekanal “Rossiya,” 2 December 2004, 20:00.
 73 Danuta Dembovskaya, “Shest’ tysyach evro za dva goda tyurmy,” 21 March 2004.
 74 Natal’ya L’vova, “Glavnaya tema,” Telekanal “3 kanal,” 10 September 2002, 19:10.
 75 Rostislav Murzagulov, “V Latvii vozobnovilos’ sudebnoe slushan’e po delu byvshego 
sotrudnika KGB N. Larionova,” Telekanal “ORT,” 16 September 2002, 09:00.
 76 Aleksei Lyaschenko, “Latviya prodolzhaet “okhotu na vednym,”” Krasnaya zvezda, 
17 September 2002, p. 3.
 77 Abik Elkin, “Hende-Hoch, antifashisty!” Moskovsky komsomolets, 8 May 2004.
 78 Nikolay Golikov, “Nezrimyi boi,” Voenno-promyshlennyi kur’er, No. 48, 15 December 
2004, p. 8.
 79 Kseniya Sterzhanova, “Novosti,”Gudok, 27 November 2004, p. 8.
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Aleksandr Kazakov, a citizen of Russia who was expelled from Latvia 
for fomenting unrest against the education reform, described the situation 
in Latvia:
From the moment of the restoration of independence of the Republic 
of Latvia, a state mythology was consistently built up according to 
which Latvia was occupied by Russians in 1944. This mythology re-
quired the demonisation of our soldiers in endless trails against war 
veterans. 80
At the same time, if you watch TV, you certainly saw our SS legionnaires. 
Now, alongside them are the so-called national partisans. In previous 
times they were called “forest brethren.” This state mythology of occupa-
tion was professionally and purposefully rooted in the consciousness of 
the Latvian people by so-called Western Latvians. Now they simply rule 
the country. The President of Latvia is an émigré, and ministers, leaders 
of key factions of the Saeima are all Western Latvians who went through 
the quality school of the “cold war” in youth organisations, the ideology 
of which was built on revanchism and Russophobia. These people have a 
very powerful lobby in the United States and now they rule the country, 
so to say, shards of the “cold war.”81
Such an understanding of history is also revealed in other themes, pro-
viding a particular topicality to the second part of the researched period, 
namely 2004 and 2005. However, to begin, let us examine one of the calen-
dar events.
The Latvian Riflemen
The authorities did not touch the calling card of Soviet Rīga, the monu-
ment to the Latvian Red riflemen. The signs on the pedestal were 
changed. Now this is a monument to the Latvian combatants in World 
War I and for the first Latvian republic. But almost all Rīgans now call 
it the “Riflemen’s monument” despite 12 years of independence.82
One of the main strategies used in reports on the topic of the Latvian 
riflemen is to unify the image through denial. This technique of argumenta-
tion does not mention the sources and subscribers of other viewpoints that 
are being refuted in the reports. One such “myth that is collapsing” offered 
by Moskovskaya pravda is that of the stance of the riflemen towards Latvian 
independence.
The investigation had another purpose. Each of those shot dead in Bu-
tovo was accused of the same thing: “..entered a counter-revolutionary 
 80 Natal’ya Evteeva, “Novosti,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak,” 13 October 2004, 15:00.
 81 Ibid.
 82 Andrey Medvedev, “Reveno,” Telekanal “RTR,” 20 February 2002.
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nationalistic Latvian organisation existing in the societal system of b of 
the Latvian riflemen and prepared the armed overthrow of Soviet power, 
organizing terror acts against leaders of All-Russia Communist Party 
(B) and Soviet power with the goal of dividing a part of the territory of 
the USSR in order to create a “Greater Latvia.”
It is hard to imagine the facial expression of the president of Latvia Kar-
lis Ulmanis (died in 1942 in Krasnovodskaya exile) if he had learned 
then about such fantastical intentions of his compatriots. 83
The main genre of writing about the Red Riflemen is essays, whether 
in print media or television, and all created a stereotypical image of Latvian 
riflemen as unusually cruel and disciplined soldiers:
At the beginning of the revolution these regiments retained some dis-
cipline and even a well known monarchical feeling. They got infected 
with Bolshevism later, but because they retreated from the Germans 
in February 1918 beyond the borders of their homeland, they became 
the most ardent defenders of the Soviet government, remaining the 
most disciplined units of the Red Army. They became the bodyguards 
of Lenin in the Kremlin and the executors of the most terroristic orders 
of Trotsky.84
Until now historians cannot comprehend how quiet and decent Latvia 
could produce the Latvian Red riflemen. Let us list the main “merits” 
of these combatants, who behind their backs, were simply called bandits. 
During the days of the October uprising the Latvian riflemen did not 
allow the units of the Northern front to move to Petrograd, which con-
tributed in no small manner to the victory of the revolution in the capi-
tal. From November 22 the riflemen participated in the suppression of 
counter-revolutionary revolts in Petrograd, guarding the Head quarters 
of the revolution, the Smolny institute, but then the Kremlin. In January 
1918 they suppressed the revolt of the Polish Corp of general Dovbor-
Musnicky in Belarus, and took part in the battle with Kaledin. The 
Latvian rifleman division under the command of Vacietis over powered 
the left socialists’ revolt in Moscow and the anti-Bolshevik uprising in 
Yaroslavl in 1918, the anti-Soviet rebellions in Murom, Ribinsk, Kaluga, 
Saratov, and Novgorod. Mountains of corpses remained behind them 
everywhere. 85
The Latvian riflemen topic is beyond standard historical chronology, 
but connects “Latvians” to the power that subsequently “occupied” Latvia.
 83 Vidvud Shtraus, “Poezd Trotskogo na Butovskom poligone,” Moskovskaya Pravda, 
1 December 2004, p. 6.
 84 Lolly Zamoisky, “Obmanuvshie smert’,” Rossiya, No. 32, 5 August 2004.
 85 Viktor Sokolov, “Naslednitsa latyshkikh strelkov,” Voenno-promyshlennyi kur’er, 
No. 9, 16 March 2005, p. 1.
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All Quiet on the Eastern Front
In the period under review, the front line returned to the newspapers 
and television screens. Instead of bullets and artillery, the “combatants” 
“shot” articles, broadcasts and signals which “blew up” emotions. The target 
was not the Latvian elite, to which journalists and the “heroes” of the news 
reports frequently refer, but the inhabitants of Russia – readers, listeners, 
and viewers.
Russia’s media went into a defensive position to protect a certain in-
terpretation of history, a collective consciousness. To wit: the media did not 
allow the construction of a position different from its usual point of view 
not only on its own territory, but also on foreign territory. Journalists re-
flected this stance as a defence against attacks coming from an unfriendly 
country.
Analysis of four years of media coverage allowed the clarification of 
painful historical points. In general, these were events of the 20th century – 
the role of the Latvian Red Riflemen in establishing Soviet power, the role 
of Latvian soldiers in SS operations, the role of the Soviet army in the “lib-
eration” of Latvia, as well as contemporary Latvia, where “history is being 
rewritten.”
The most sensitive period is linked with the Second World War – was it 
“liberation” or “occupation”? In the Russian media itself, there is no ques-
tion, as “liberation” is an axiom that requires no proof. The Russian media 
construct the “wrong” perception of events by stressing certain kinds of 
information and keeping silent about other aspects, using a black and white 
approach, and avoiding all shades of grey.
In the time period under review, the Russian media divided Latvia into 
“compatriots” who argue, resist and do not accept the “new,” i.e., renewed 
Latvia’s history. At the same time, this group is portrayed as being par-
ticularly threatened by the Latvian side. In fact, it is stressed that it is 
precisely because of this group that any retreat in the “information war” is 
impermissible.
The media constructed an enemy image in line with the best traditions, 
using various techniques of argumentation. Thus, thorough research on 
the images that appeared in the press and TV and radio broadcasts would 
require years. This chapter includes an analysis of the main lines of his-
tory that could be observed during the period in question, widely employing 
quotations for illustrative purposes. The quotations help understand the 
strategies and techniques, both intentional and unintentional, that are used 
by Russian journalists.
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Latvian Culture in Russia’s Media
Kristīne Doroņenkova
“Cultural expansion is more fearful than any political propaganda” 1
Introduction
This chapter analyses how the Russian media portrayed contemporary 
Latvian culture from 2002 through mid-2005. The Baltic States were part 
of the Soviet Union de jure for 50 years, but de facto all three states retained 
a “foreign touch” and were considered by many Russians to be “our abroad.” 
Culture distinguished the Baltic States from the core of the Soviet empire, 
both attracting and alienating Russians from the Baltic States. The Baltic 
as a “window to Europe” is still widely cited in the Russian media even 
today.2 To intellectual Russians, the Baltic States are not just a window, 
but a bridge between Russia and Europe, constituting “our Europe.” This 
frame of reference and language inherently recognises the Baltic States as a 
separate entity within wider Europe.
It is no overstatement to claim that Latvia has been the most popular 
section of the “window to Europe” for two-and-a-half centuries. The Soviet 
period merely consolidated this perception, popularised previously existing 
symbols and created new symbols, such as the Baltic Sea resort Jūrmala, the 
popular song festival “Jūrmala,” the “Dzintari” concert hall, Rīga, composer 
Raimonds Pauls, singer Laima Vaikule, and more. All are well known among 
common Russians and evoke nostalgic memories of the Soviet past. A more 
critical tone can be seen when the media link culture, history and politics. 
For example, a positive message about a bilateral cooperation programme 
signed for two years between the Latvian and Russian Ministries of Culture 
swiftly became negative as the Russian media began to cover the reform of 
minority education in Latvia, with some commentators even proposing a 
cultural embargo against Latvia and comparing Latvia to fascist Germany 
in the 1930s and South Africa under apartheid.3
During the time period in review, rarely a day went by in the Russian 
media without some reference to Latvian culture, with the exception of a pe-
riod of just over a month in 2003. One can provisionally divide the coverage 
into two main groups: 1) reports related to Latvia’s or Latvian culture, and 
 1 Radiostantsiya “Mayak,” 14 March 2002.
 2 See, e.g., Ekaterina Shergova, “Yurmala ne teryayet svoey privlekatelnosti dlya 
rossiskikh turistov,” Telekanal “3 Kanal”, GOROD, 15 December 2004, 18:15.
 3 “Kogda muzi pomalkivayut,” Literaturnaya gazeta, 21 January 2004.
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2) reports on Russia’s culture and Russian culture in Latvia. Surprisingly, 
the former is more common. There is a tendency to discuss Russia’s culture 
in Latvia in the context of certain, mostly annual events, for example, the 
music festival “New Wave.” Despite the patronage of Jūrmala municipality 
and its international status, the event is essentially a Russian cultural event 
on the territory of Latvia. On the other hand, reports on Latvian culture are 
rarely tied to regular events, but reflect particular exhibitions or perform-
ances on tour or ad hoc news.
Another finding that runs against conventional wisdom is the predomi-
nantly positive tone of coverage of cultural issues, particularly on perform-
ances by Latvian theatre groups in Russia or exhibitions of Latvian artists 
in Russia. This does not exclude some criticism, arrogant patronising, irony 
or other negative expressions. The tone of coverage must be filtered through 
the broader political and historical context at the time. A series of articles 
that speculated on the possible collapse of Turaida Castle in Latvia or cov-
ered restoration work on an Orthodox church in Latgale serve as useful 
examples. Both appeared in a historical and political context not favouring 
Latvia in the eyes of the Russian public. Journalists frequently referred to 
the Soviet period as a time when Latvian architectural monuments were 
restored and preserved.4
There is a curious tendency in positive reports on Latvian culture: 
authors seek to find a link between Latvian and Russian culture, almost 
as if the former were a product of the latter. On the one hand, this might 
be explained by the desire to reflect Latvian culture as a derivative subset 
of the culture of the big neighbour, which is often referred to as a source 
of inspiration. This approach reflects a certain patronising attitude. On 
the other hand, sometimes the drawing of parallels or providing a familiar 
Russian frame of reference could also facilitate conveying information to 
the Russian public. These alternative explanations seem to apply on differ-
ent occasions.
For example, coverage of an exhibition in St. Petersburg on the eve of 
the city’s 300th anniversary by a Latvian artist of works devoted to the last 
Russian tsar and his family was generally positive. In discussing the unique-
ness of the miniature sculptures of each member of the family, the journal-
ist referred to “one of the sources – old traditional Russian lubok, with its 
picturesque rendering and humour.”5 Another example is referring to names 
that are well known to the Russian public in reports on Latvian artists. A 
Russian reader might better remember a Latvian-born film cameraman if 
his work were presented in reference to his cooperation with world famous 
Russian movie director Sergei Eisenstein. Parallels are a convenient tool 
that can be used to serve different purposes.
 4 See, e.g., “Turaidskomu zamku ugrazhayut opolzni,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak,” 
8 February 2002.
 5 “Latvisky master P. Hudobchenko sovmeshaet starie traditsii i novye tehnologii v 
lepke skulpturnikh miniatyur,” TV ORT, 7 April 2002.
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Latvian Traditions (and the Lack Thereof)
Traditions are an important part of any nation’s cultural heritage. 
The way one celebrates festivities, pays tribute to forefathers, and observes 
commemorative occasions all contributes to creating the overall image of a 
country and its people. The Russian media are silent or disinterested on this 
dimension of Latvia. Christmas, perhaps, is an exception, though reference 
to Christmas often has political overtones in light of the fact that Russia and 
Latvia celebrate Christmas on different days.6 The Russian media follow 
closely the annual discussions in Latvia on whether or not to grant official 
holiday status to Orthodox Christmas. Similarly, in late February, the me-
dia actively discuss whether Latvia will revive commemoration of Women’s 
Day on March 8. While Russian commentators often criticise Latvia for not 
granting holiday status to Orthodox Christmas, there is little mention of 
the traditions themselves. Reporting is generally confined to statements 
such as “former Soviet republics” quietly celebrating Catholic Christmas,7 
“Rīga looks very touching before Catholic Christmas,” and the “municipal-
ity and the populace of Rīga prepare for the holidays with particular love 
and thoughtfulness.”8
Līgo, the midsummer celebration, is the most widely celebrated occa-
sion in Latvia. This national holiday was forbidden in Soviet times, as it was 
viewed as an expression of nationalistic sentiment. Regardless of the regime 
in power, Latvians have always celebrated Līgo. Despite its importance to 
Latvians, the Russian media rarely report on Līgo.9 Unlike Latvian opera, 
ballet and theatre, which belong to universal culture, Latvian midsummer 
celebrations are unique, and have been elevated to the level of the main 
national holiday.10 Despite the paucity of coverage, there was no reference 
to historical or political issues, a feature more common in reports covering 
celebration of more neutral festivities, like the Shrovetide carnival.11
 6 Yevgeny Vostrukhov, “Ukrali Rozhdestvo: Latvisky seim v ocherednoi raz 
otkazalsya priznat’ pravoslavnoe Rozhdestvo gosudarstvennym prazdnikom,” 
Gudok, 30 December 2004, p. 12; “Kabinet ministrov Latvii obsudil vozmozhnost’ 
predat’ pravoslavnomu rozhdestvu statusa vykhodnogo dnya,” MA, Novosti, 6 
January 2003, 22:00.
 7 Tatyana Ilyina, “V Rige Rozhdestvo prinyato otmechat’ ne shumnymi narodnymi 
gulyanyami, a v tikhom semeinom krugu,” Segodnya, Telekanal “NTV”, 25 
December 2004, 08:00.
 8 Natalya Antopova, “Neprekritaya nagota staroi Rigi,” Rossiya, 6 February 2003, 
pp. 28-29.
 9 See e.g. “V Latvii proshlo prazdnovanie drevnego yazicheskogo prazdnika Yanov 
den’,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak-24” Novosti, 23 June 2003, 16:40; Aleksey Sukhanov, 
“Segodnya,” Telekanal “NTV,” 24 June 2004, 15:00; Evgeny Agoshkov, “Novosti,” 
Telekanal “1 kanal,” 24 June 2004, 12:00.
 10 Myriad festival occasions are celebrated in Europe during the warm summer 
months, e.g., Notting Hill Carnival in London, Munich Festival in Germany, etc., 
but none are as important in the national culture as Līgo. This is perhaps also the 
only national ”pagan” festival in Europe.
 11 Zhanna Agalakova, “Maslenichnaya nedelya v Latvii: kommentarii rukovoditelya 
folklornoy gruppi “Skandinieki” Helmii Stalte,” Telekanal “ORT,” 24 February 
2003, 14:00.
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Reporting on traditional Latvian art was more common and the Russian 
audience was kept informed about exhibitions of Latvian ceramics in Russia 
and in Latvia near the “famous St. Peter’s Church” in Rīga.12 An exhibition 
of floral design on the eve of New Year’s festivities13 and 123-metre long am-
ber beads made in the traditional Latvian manner also merited media cover-
age.14 Here, reporting was neutral, with no reference to politics or history.
Medieval Latvian traditions were also reported to Russians in annual 
coverage of the Festival of Medieval Times in Cēsis, leaving a comprehen-
sive impression about both the festival and traditions in medieval Latvia.15 
Medieval musical traditions also earned coverage through a story on the 
International Medieval Music Festival in the internal yard of the Dom 
Cathedral.16 Reporting on Latvian national cuisine emphasised the image 
of Latvia as a warm and “delicious” country that has both unique and com-
mon features.17 Latvian bread, “well known far beyond the boundaries of 
the republic,”18 is part of Latvia’s image. Nostalgia characterised reports on 
“Rīga Black Balsam,” popular in Soviet times.19
Religion in Latvia: Orthodoxy on the March
Religion is another common topic for the Russian media. According 
to official Latvian data and sociological surveys, the Orthodox Church is 
the third largest confession in Latvia. However, Russian media reports 
regularly question this fact and suggest that the Orthodox community is 
larger. According to one report, Orthodox believers became the largest re-
ligious community in Latvia, which came as a surprise to the Republic that 
“traditionally considers itself Protestant.”20 According to another report, 
there are “considerably more” Orthodox than Catholics and Lutherans in 
 12 Natalya Tingayeva, “V Rige tserkvi Svyatogo Petra prokhodit vystavka 
original’nikh izdeli iz keramiki,” Telekanal “1 kanal,” 24 October 2004, 10:00
 13 Oksana Rostovtseva, “V Latvii v dni novodnikh prazdnikov sostoyalas vystavka 
tsvetochnogo dizaina,” Novosti, 3 January 2003, 10:00.
 14 Mariya Abalkina, “V Latvii izgotovleni yantarnie busi dlinnoi 123 metra,” 
Radiostantsiya “Mayak,” 17 August 2003, 19:00.
 15 Matvey Glebov, “Letit strela iz arbaleta,” Moskovskaya pravda, 4 July 2002, p. 7; “V 
Latviskom Tsesisskom zamke nachalsya festival “Srednevekove,” Radiostantsiya 
“Mayak-24,” 14 June 2003, 19:00; Oksana Himich, “Srednevekovaya mozaika,” 
Moskovsky komsomolets, 12 June 2003, p. 6.
 16 Ol’ga Kokorekina, “V Latvii prokhodit mezhdunarodni festival srednekovoi 
muziki,” Telekanal “ORT,” 22 June 2002, 15:00.
 17 Anatoly Gendin, “Putra na utro. Sekreti Latviiskoi kukhni,” Izvestiya, 30 April 
2002, p. 9.
 18 Rustam Suleimanhil, “Pekari Latvii gotovyatsya k Novomu godu,” Telekanal 
“ORT,” 6 December 2002, 12:00.
 19 Natalya Antipova, “Neprekritaya nagota staroi Rigi,” Rossiya, 6 February 2003, 
pp. 28-29.
 20 “Novosti,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak-24,” 1 December 2004, 07:15.
 21 Yevgeny Vostrukhov, “Ukrali Rozhdestvo: Latviski seim v ocherednoi raz 
otkazalsya priznat’ pravoslavnoe Rozhdesvo gosudarstvennim prazdnikom,” 
Gudok, 30 December 2004, p. 12.
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Latvia.21 Claims about the size of Latvia’s Orthodox community usually 
serve as a point of departure for discussing the issue of recognising Orthodox 
Christmas as an official holiday.
Russia’s media report with some enthusiasm on the role of the Orthodox 
Church as a link between Latvia and Russia, particularly when mentioning 
the number of Latvians currently being baptised into Orthodoxy “despite 
the bad times.”22 The fact that interwar Latvian Orthodox priest Jānis 
Pommers became the only canonised Latvian makes this link even closer.23 
Pommers was known as a defender of Russian schools, which was appar-
ently not the only reason for his canonisation, but sufficient for consump-
tion by the Russian audience, especially in the context of discussions about 
minority education reform in Latvia. Russian Patriarch Alexei II even noted 
the impossibility of paying a visit to Latvia unless the problems of Russian 
language were resolved.24 In 2004 the Russian Orthodox Church was even 
said to be “supporting the efforts of Russian diplomats in defence of the 
interests of the Russian-speaking populace.”25 Interestingly enough, though 
the “language problems” had still not been “resolved,” this did not prevent 
the Patriarch from visiting Latvia two years later.
Despite occasional politicisation of religion, reports on Latvia hosting 
Orthodox religious relics portrayed it as a land of religious diversity and 
harmony. An article devoted to the hosting of the Tikhvin Icon of the Saintly 
God Mother in Rīga went so far as to claim that the “people of different 
nationalities and political beliefs that came to pay their tribute to the icon 
sensed a unity hitherto unfamiliar to them – we are Orthodox.”26 While 
claims about high Latvian officials identifying with Orthodoxy are clearly 
exaggerated, the message of Latvia as a country friendly to Orthodoxy was 
clear. What is more, Russian media have contributed to creating the image 
of Latvia as a country that extends full support to Old-Believers, a religious 
group that split off from Orthodoxy and sought refuge in Latvia from perse-
cution in Russia proper in the 17th century.27
In a story on an Orthodox Church in Daugavpils, “a religious building 
with no comparison in the world,”28 the author not only provides infor-
mation on the building, but also an odd interpretation of Latvian history. 
For example, the author refers to Latvian territory as part of Russia be-
fore German knights arrived in the 12th century and to the period of the 
1920s not as the period of Latvia as an independent state, but as a time 
“after civil war [in Russia].” At the same time, the Russian media also 
reported favourably on the recent renovation of the Christ Birth Orthodox 
Cathedral in Rīga, which had been converted to a planetarium during the 
 22 “Spasennoe tvorenie Rastrelli,” Gudok, 8 May 2004.
 23 “Novosti,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak,” 1 March 2002, 6:20.
 24 “Novosti,” Radiostantsiya “Ekho Moskvy,” 30 March 2004, 11:30.
 25 Oleg Nedumov, “Patriarkh zastupilsya za sootechestvennikov,” Nezavisimaya 
gazeta, 7 April 2004, p.1.
 26 Evgeny Vostrukhov, “Blagodat’ nad Baltiskoi zeml’oy,” Gudok, 10 July 2004, p.12.
 27 Vladimir Taranov, “Goryachie novosti,” Parlamentskaya gazeta, 16 July 2002, p. 7.
 28 Nikolay Myshinsky, “Khram kocheval za voiskom,” Tribuna, 19 April 2002, p. 12.
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Soviet years.29 Moreover, the Russian media particularly like the Dome 
Cathedral and St. Peter’s Church in old Rīga.30
Popular Art and Nostalgia for the Common Past
Nostalgia towards former republics and territories is still quite strong 
in Russia. Indeed, according to sociological surveys held in 2006, 68% of 
Russians regret the disintegration of the Soviet Union.31 Regret is strongest 
among the elderly (83%) and considerably lower among youth (44%) who 
have few or no memories of living in the Soviet Union. Nostalgia is linked 
not only to the loss of superpower status, but also with vivid cultural memo-
ries, particularly those brought into each home by means of television or the 
film industry.
More than a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, several 
Latvian cultural figures who made their names during the Soviet period 
remained very familiar to the Russian public. If modern Latvian theatre 
had to be newly discovered by Russian audiences, several Latvian musicians 
known from the 1970s and 1980s are not only remembered, but still ap-
preciated in Russia. A story about jubilee concerts by famous Latvian com-
poser and jazz pianist Raimonds Pauls in April 2002 referred to “Concerts 
in Moscow – the nights of nostalgia after the melodies of youth.”32 Indeed, 
Pauls is considered to be “the most famous Latvian within the former Soviet 
Union.”33 The concerts, held in the largest and most prestigious concert hall 
in the State Kremlin Palace, were widely covered, and with few exceptions, 
all reports referred to the Soviet past, when Pauls experienced the peak of 
his popularity and earned the title of “Maestro.” The media used various 
adulatory labels in reference to the Soviet period of Pauls’ work, but largely 
ignored new work with young Latvian singers who also participated in the 
concert.34 It seems that for many elderly Russians, Raimonds Pauls is the 
image of a lost past that came back for several evenings. Indeed, as one 
newspaper wrote: “Everything worked out. The Maestro is back.”35
For many Russians Laima Vaikule stands next to Raimonds Pauls as 
a symbol of Latvia. Interestingly, while her 50th birthday passed virtually 
 29 “V Rige nachalas’ blagotvoritel’naya aktsiya “Rozhdestvensky svet”,” Radio-
stantsiya Radio Rossii, 9 January 2003, 20:00.
 30 See, e.g., ”V Rige na vremya rozhdestvenskikh prazdnikov otkrylsya dlya 
poseshcheniya Domsky sobor,” Russky kuryer, 24 December 2004, p. 23.
 31 Valery Fedorov, “Russians’ attitudes towards reintegration 15 years after the 
collapse of the USSR,” December 8, 2006, http://www.eurasianhome.org/xml/t/
expert.xml?lang=ru&nic=expert&pid=889, last accessed on 12 December 2007.
 32 Interview with Raimonds Pauls, Izvestiya, 19 April 2002.
 33 Yolanta Kachaeva, “Raimond Pauls: Ya znayu gryaz’ i uspekh,” Trud, 11 September 
2003, p. 25.
 34 See, e.g., Yuri Yarotsky, “Starinnie chasi esche idut,” Kommersant’, 22 April 2002, 
p. 21 EV or Maksim Kononenko, “Shest’ tysyach chelovek na bek-vokale,” Gazeta, 
22 April 2002, p. 14.
 35 Maksim Kononenko, “Shest’ tysyach chelovek na bek-vokale,” Gazeta, 22 April 
2002, p. 14.
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unnoticed in Latvia, Russia’s media devoted considerable attention to it. 
Vaikule’s professional career during the Soviet era was of greater interest 
than her current activities, as she was “the most stylish singer of the Soviet 
Union” and “our foreign singer.”36 She symbolises the “famous Baltic style” 
of Soviet–era Jūrmala, where she began her career. For a Russian audi-
ence, she is not a Latvian singer, but “our singer” from Latvia, “our foreign 
singer,” whose Latvian origins may be apparent in her accent and appear-
ance. Vaikule’s name is frequently mentioned in Russia’s media and she is a 
frequent guest on Russian television. These appearances contribute to the 
popularisation of Latvia’s image, as every time she is mentioned, so is her 
link to Latvia.37
Without exaggeration, the Latvian actress Vija Artmane symbolises an 
entire epoch not only for Latvian spectators, but for television viewers and 
cinema goers throughout the former Soviet Union. That is why her 75th 
birthday was noticed not only in Latvia, but also in Russia, where she was 
presented and honoured with several awards for her contribution to the 
development of cinematography.38 The coverage of Artmane’s anniversary 
provided an occasion for referring to the Soviet past, but also for bringing 
up other political and social issues. Only on rare occasions did reports focus 
exclusively on Artmane’s professional work or private life.39 More often, the 
media sought to blame the “nationalistic Latvian state” for “being hostile” 
to the actress, allegedly because “she was friendly to Russia.” This “hostil-
ity,” in turn, is portrayed as having resulted in severe health problems.40
Artmane is not the only Latvian actor that left a deep impression 
on the Russian public. According to one opinion poll, Latvian actor Ivars 
Kalniņš “was declared as the most attractive actor in Russia in 2002.”41 
While Kalniņš’ popularity hails from the Soviet period, he is still in demand 
 36 “Vaikule provela prazdnechny kontsert v “Rossiya”,” Kommersant’, 12 March 
2004; interview with Vaikule, Rodnaya gazeta, 26 March 2004; “Vaikule 50 let: 
Snezhnaya koroleva,” Kultura, 1 April 2004.
 37 See, e.g., Vasily Samotokhin, “Laima znachit – “Schastye,” Granitsa Rossii, 29 
September 2003, p. 16; Marina Eratova, “Laima Vaikule: pet’ ya ne khotela, a stala 
pevitsey,” Sel’skaya zhizn’, No. 94, 2 December 2004, p. 15; Anna Veligzhanina, 
“Laima Vaikule: samye dorogie sobaki zhivut u menya!”, Komsomol’skaya pravda, 
11 April 2003, p. 60.
 38 Lidiya Andreyeva, “Ne koroleva ya, a derevenskaya. U Viyi Artmane – yubiley,” 
Kultura, No. 32, 19 August 2004, p. 1.
 39 See e.g. Dmitry Mel’man, “Snezhnaya koroleva. Viya Artmane: “Ya govorila svoemu 
muzhu; tebe nuzhno zhenit’sya na bufetchetse, a ne na aktrise”,” Moskovsky 
konsomolets, 21 August 2004, p. 4.
 40 See, e.g., “My vas lyubim, Viya!”, Tribuna, 21 August 2004, p. 6; Evgeny Agoshkov, 
“Novosti,” Telekanal “1 kanal,” 21 August 2004, 12:00; Vera Serebrovskaya, 
“Sobytiya,” Telekanal “TV-Centr.” 21 August 2004, 12:00; Mariya Dubova, “Viya 
Artmane: “Mnogoe ne nravit’sya, chto ya lyublyu Rossiyu,”” Novye izvestiya, 
27 August 2004, pp. 1,17; Marina Eratova, “Narodnaya artistka SSSR Viya 
Artmane: aktrisu khotyat videt’ tol’ko schatslivoy...”, Sel’skaya zhizn’, No. 1-2, 
13 January 2005, p. 15.
 41 Karen Markaryan, “Ivar Kalnin’sh ne schitaet seks na storone izmenoi,” 
Komsomol’skaya pravda, 4 March 2003, p. 21.
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among Russian film makers. He is often interviewed by the Russian media, 
and these interviews indirectly inform the Russian audience about past and 
present day cultural life in Latvia. The death of Dzintra Ritenberg, “one of 
the most beautiful actresses of Soviet cinematography,”42 was also reported 
in the Russian media. While Russians might know few young Latvian ac-
tors, the Russian media continue to pay tribute to Latvian actors of the 
Soviet era.
Several younger Latvian cultural figures have also made an imprint 
in the Russian media, and foremost among them is the Latvian pop group 
“Brain Storm.” As one Russian journalist wrote, “Brainstorm is one of the 
few groups from the countries of the former USSR that managed to achieve 
popularity not only in Eastern but also in Western Europe.”43 “Brainstorm” 
often performs in Russia and draws media attention. Soon after their first suc-
cessful appearance on the international stage in 2001 during the Eurovision 
song contest, Brain Storm conquered the Russian public with the hit “My 
Star” and other popular compositions.44 Gunārs Kalniņš is another ‘new 
generation’ singer who attracted the Russian media.45 He was not entirely 
new to a Russian audience, who saw him in his childhood days in the popular 
music band “Dzeguzīte” that became well known in the Soviet Union in the 
mid-1980s. Reports on the young musicians from “Brain Storm” or former 
“Dzeguzīte” singers cannot draw parallels with Soviet culture or invoke nos-
talgia, as they are part of contemporary Latvian popular culture.
Latvian Theatre, Opera and Music: Surprisingly Good
The Russian media comment frequently and overwhelmingly favour-
ably on performances by theatre troupes from Latvia, the Latvian National 
Opera and Latvian musicians. Occasionally, reporting contains direct or 
indirect commentary on Latvian foreign policy, ethnic relations, minority 
policy, and history.
Latvian opera was rediscovered by Russian spectators in spring 2003, 
when the theatre toured the Russian capital for the first time in 23 years. 
Since then Latvian opera and ballet performances take place regularly on 
the stages of Russian theatres. The quality of the performances and acting 
is well covered in the Russian media. The first visit was reflected in the 
media as something of a test of Latvian theatre after it had gone through 
 42 Matvey Glebov, “Krasota po-Rizhski: Umerla Dzidra Ritenberg,” Izvestiya, 11 
March 2003, p. 13; Pavel Sigalov, “Umerla vdova komunista,” Kommersant’, 12 
March 2003, p. 22.
 43 Svyatoslav Biryulin, “Shkolnye druz’ya: Den’ rozhdeniya kluba “B2” otmetili 
vystuplenyem latviskoy gruppy “Brainstorm”,” Vremya novostei, 20 October 2003, 
p. 10.
 44 Ulyana Kalashnikova, “Triumf obmansskov: “V hit-paradakh “Brainstorm” 
golosoval za sebya sam,” Moskovsky komsomolets, 7 November 2004; see also 
“Nashestviye,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak,” 13 August 2004, 14:08.
 45 See e.g. Yekaterina Makarova, “Pribaltiisky “kukushonok” stal zvezdoy,” Ogonek, 
No. 14, 7 April 2005, p. 62.
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difficult times in the post-Soviet years.46 Leaving aside the political context, 
the Latvian National Opera earned praise for its singing and aesthetics.47 
Opera could be the only art form where Russians seem to accept Latvia’s 
dominance and admit that there is much to learn from their smaller neigh-
bour. It is worth adding that Russian media also pay tribute to Latvian 
ballet dancers well known from the “joint past.”48
After Latvia joined the European Union, Russian commentators ren-
dered the annual Latvian International Opera Festival in Rīga a component 
of West European culture overnight. Opera and ballet are used to illustrate 
not only the divergence between Russians and Latvians within Latvia, but 
also between different historical epochs. In Russian media reports, ballet is 
associated with the Soviet past and attended mostly by Russians in Latvia, 
while opera is alleged to have received the status of a state art.49 Moreover, 
some Russian media directly attach the responsibility for such division to 
Latvians with comments such as “some civil servants in Latvia try to di-
vide music into “our” and “alien” categories and preach slogans such as:”We 
have no need for alien genius!’”50 Fortunately, there are counterbalancing 
first hand opinions by Russian artists working with Latvian theatres, who 
contribute significantly to diluting the image of Latvia as a country with 
total cultural separation between the two communities. For example, they 
note that Latvians are common spectators of performances in Rīga’s Russian 
Drama Theatre.51
According to one report, the sets and costumes in modern Latvian 
theatres are “elegant,” “full of style” and “fineness.” The Latvian National 
Opera is “one of the best examples of European theatre,” while the New Rīga 
Theatre is “one of the most fashionable theatres in Europe.”52 The compari-
son of Latvia’s “Dailes” Theatre to Moscow’s Artistic Academic Theatre53 is 
probably the best compliment any foreign theatre could ever receive from 
a Russian theatre director. The same director expressed high praise about 
Latvian actors prepared in the Academy of Culture in Rīga. Russians could 
“learn something” from the Latvian Drama Theatre and Opera for their 
 46 Natalya Zimyanina, “Alcina pomanit i ne barosit,” Vremya MN, 17 May 2003.
 47 Sergey Biryukov, “Aida iz Rigi,” Trud, 20 May 2003, p. 3;“Gastroli Latviiskoy operi 
v Bolshom teatre: kommentarii direktorov teatrov,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak-24,” 28 
May 2003, 13:25; Andrey Hripin, “Opera iz Latvii – okno v Evropu,” Nezavisimaya 
gazeta, 2 June 2003; Dmitry Cilikin, “Pikovaya dama vyigrala,” Vedomosti, 22 
March 2005, p. A8.
 48 Ilya Okunev, “Ya khochu tantsevat’ 100 let,” Moskovkaya pravda, 17 January 2005, 
p. 6.
 49 “Zakonchilsya Rizhskii operny festival”, Izvestiya, 19 June 2004
 50 Evgeny Vostrukhov, “Chaikovsky v Koknese,” Gudok, 12 January 2005, EV.
 51 “Rezhiser Trostenyatsky – Rīga pokoryaet raz i navsegda,” Izvestiya, 30 April 
2004.
 52 Pavel Sigalov, “Revizor v obshchepite,” Kommersant’, 14 November 2003, p. 30; 
See also Novye izvestiya, 29 January 2004, Moskovsky komsomolets, 29 January 
2004, Rodnaya gazeta, 13 February 2004, Parlamentskaya gazeta, 13 April 2004, 
Izvestiya, 20 February 2004.
 53 “Rezhiser Trostenatsky “Rīga pokoryaet raz i navsegda,” Izvestiya, 30 April 2002.
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unique approach to classics, Gogol or Verdi.54 Russia’s media have taken a 
particular liking to Alvis Hermanis, the director of the New Rīga Theatre.55 
His rendition of Gogol’s “Reviser,” with the plot and setting transferred from 
the 19th century to the 1960s-1970’s Soviet Union, earned high praise. After 
Latvia’s Valmiera’s Theatre performed a play by famous Latvian writer 
Rūdolfs Blaumanis in the Russian city of Novgorod, Russians ”discovered” 
Blaumanis and an additional performance was scheduled.56 Similarly, the 
Theatre of Opera and Ballet of the Russian city of Perm staged Handel’s fa-
mous opera “Alcina” after being inspired by the performance of the Latvian 
National Opera. The author of the report acknowledges that Rīga’s perform-
ance was much better in all regards.57
A journalist interviewing the director of Rīga’s Russian Drama Theatre 
was quite astonished to hear that Latvians attend performances as often as 
Russians and that Latvian actors often play major parts on the stage of the 
Russian Drama Theatre.58 Despite allegations of “Russophobia” from time 
to time in the Russian media, Latvian theatres often stage Russian classics 
such as Gogol and Chekhov and the director of Latvia’s “Dailes” theatre 
has noted that Latvians like Russian classic literature very much,59 thereby 
breaking another stereotype.
While many Latvian theatres and artists individually earned praise in 
the Russian media, some media coverage also included negative interpreta-
tions of Latvian policy. For example, after paying tribute to the director 
of one of Moscow’s theatres for his new performance, Literaturnaya gazeta 
went on to mention his past post in Latvia as director of the Theatre of Young 
Spectators, where both Latvian and Russian troupes used to work. The the-
atre was closed in the 1990s, and the director “experienced the full degree of 
unpopularity and Baltic negativism towards the word “internationalism”.”60 
The newspaper suggests that the director was forced to leave Latvia if he 
wanted to continue his work.
A similar tone could be sensed during Latvia’s NATO accession 
when Rīga’s Theatre of Russian Drama was due to stage a performance 
of Chekhov’s “Seagull” in Moscow. Reviews contained both criticism and 
 54 See, e.g., Marina Shimadina, “Agafya v Zastekolye: “Zhenit’ba Gogolya v 
postanovke pizhskogo teatra “Dailes”,” Kommersant’, 20 December 2003, p. 8.
 55 See, e.g., Marina Davidova, “Dno zasteklili,” Izvestiya, 20 February 2004, p. 10. 
Roman Dolzhansky, “Ledovy tvorets “Led” Vladimira Sorokina instsenirovan 
v Germanii,” Kommersant’, 26 January 2005, p. 22; Gleb Sitkovsky, “Starik i 
Moyva. ‘Dolgaya zhizn’ v Vene,” Gazeta, 27 May 2005, p. 25; Roman Dolzhansky, 
“Obshchaya starost’,” Kommersant’, 30 May 2005, p. 21 EV.
 56 Matvey Glebov, “Khroniki,” Izvestiya, 23 April 2002, p. 9.
 57 Gyulara Sadih-zade, “Zamahnulis na Gendelya. V Peterburge proshli gastroli 
Permskogo teatra operi i baleta,” Gazeta, 26 January 2005, p. 13.
 58 Marina Pereleshnaya, “Direktor Rizhskogo teatra russkoi drami Eduard Tsehoval 
o problemakh i tvorcheskikh planakh,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak-24,” 17 October 
2003, 13:35.
 59 “Novosti kul’turi,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak,” 18 December 2003, 18:38.
 60 Ol’ga Galahova, “Turgenev po-estonski,” Literaturnaya gazeta, 18 February 2004, 
p. 10.
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praise, but the latter had less to do with the performance, and more to do 
with the existence of a Russian Theatre troupe in Latvia as such. It was 
“the oldest foreign Russian-speaking troupe” and the actors were “people 
who on the territory of a sovereign state preach drama requested by few and 
in a language required by no one.”61 The theatre of the “sovereign state” 
that has “pompously joined NATO”62 was able to make a respectable stag-
ing of Chekhov’s play, but political discourse overshadowed coverage of the 
performance. However, at about the same time, there were also very posi-
tive reports about performances staged in Rīga by the Theatre of Russian 
Drama and the Latvian National Opera,63 wherein the Latvian National 
Opera building was referred to as one of the most beautiful opera buildings 
in the world with a wonderful choir and orchestra. The talent of Latvian 
opera singers was also noted.64
The Russian media gave high praise to Latvian organ player Iveta 
Apkalna’s “professionalism” when she performed at the opening of an 
International contest of organ players in Moscow without mentioning her 
background or the ongoing educational reforms in Latvia that occasioned so 
much vitriolic comment in Russia (see the chapter by Dmitrijs Petrenko).65 
The same is true for performances by Latvian violin player Davids Geringas, 
the “favourite pupil of Mstislav Rostropovich,” whose concerts became “one 
of the finest events of the opening season.”66 Another politically unbiased 
report was devoted to violin player from Latvia Elīna Bukša, whose talent 
was praised without reference to, for example, Latvia’s attempts to rewrite 
history, – a story popular in the Russian media at that time.67
While the Russian media regularly cover Latvian theatre, opera, 
and music performances, modern Latvian literature and poetry is largely 
ignored. Occasionally, the Russian media comment on Latvian writers 
writing in Russian. For example, one reviewer called Imants Auziņš, who 
had done numerous translations of Russian poets, a “wonderful Latvian 
poet.”68 Another reviewer of a couple of poems, essays and stories written 
by various Latvian authors claimed they provided a “broad panorama of 
the current literature of our recent neighbour in the Union’s “communal 
apartment.”69
 61 Yelena Yampol’skaya, “Leto nad trupami,” Russky kuryer, 6 April 2004, p. 10; Irina 
Tosunyan, “Zakoldovanie ‘Chaikoi’,” Literaturnaya gazeta, 14 April 2004, p. 10.
 62 Yelena Yampol’skaya, “Leto nad trupami,” Russky kuryer, 6 April 2004, p. 10.
 63 Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy, 10 April 2004, Parlamentskaya gazeta, 13 April 
2004.
 64 Aleksey Parin, “Pestrota bez ozareny,” Kultura, No. 36, 16 September 2004, p. 11.
 65 “Prelyudiya k sezonu,” Novie izvestiya, 1 September 2004, p. 10.
 66 Yelena Al’chenko, “Revolyutsiya ot Geringasa,” Tribuna, 28 September 2002, p. 
3; Yuliya Usova, “Bashmet ustupil “Solistov” na odin vecher: Zavtra v Moskve 
proidet unikal’ny koncert,” Rossiiskaya gazeta, 28 September 2002, p. 7.
 67 Arkady Petrov, "...Vmeste – tselaya strana!”, Kultura, No 21, 2 June 2005, p. 10.
 68 Oleg Torchinsky, “Ya mir uslyshal, kak blaguyu vest,” Moskovskaya pravda, 16 
November 2004, p. 4.
 69 Viktor Shirokov, “Koleso obozreniya,” Literaturnaya gazeta, No. 49, 8 December 
2004, p. 7.
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Latvian Film and Television: Not as Good as Ours
If Latvian theatre in general earned positive reviews in the Russian 
media, the same cannot be said about the Latvian film and television in-
dustry. Admittedly, until recently the Latvian film industry was woefully 
underfunded and in a rather pitiful state, much the same as in all the former 
non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union. The scanty output of Rīga’s film 
studio did not go unnoticed by the Russian media, which was wont to con-
trast it either with the Soviet past or with contemporary Russia. Thus, the 
“Russian film industry is working, while Rīga’s film studio is lying idle” or 
“today Rīga’s film studio is a dead kingdom” producing a couple of movies 
a year.70 The main message here is that “the legendary film studio” that 
worked productively during the Soviet era is lying idle in the sovereign 
present.
Occasionally, the contrast between Latvian and Russian film is used 
by the Russian media to assert Russia’s cultural superiority: “The Russian 
film festival in the capital of Latvia is an inspiration for the populace of 
the sovereign state.”71 Other illustrative examples of a patronising attitude 
include statements such as the “cultural life of the country would be poorer 
without Russian films” or “Russian cinematography in present day Latvia 
[…] is an essential cultural background.”72 Interestingly enough, while the 
film festival became an annual event, only in 2005, on the eve of the 60th 
anniversary of Victory Day, did veterans receive free tickets.73 Undoubtedly, 
this largesse was noted by Russian media, particularly on the backdrop of 
a sea of reports and articles on how “inhumanely” the Latvian authorities 
treat Soviet veterans. Notwithstanding its limited capabilities, the Latvian 
film industry is still able to participate in film festivals in Russia presenting 
new movies.74 Moreover, some Russian specialists have expressed apprecia-
tion for the new generation of Latvian actors: “we do not have a joint film 
industry with Latvia any longer, but this does not mean that good actors 
cannot be known by their names and appearances.”75
While Russian commentators are not particularly impressed by Latvian 
cinema production, they nevertheless admit the strength and professional-
ism of the Latvian school of documentary film and photography. Indeed 
the talent of Latvian documentary film makers has also been recognised 
through awards received in Russia.76 The Russian media also commend the 
Latvian school of photography in general and the photographer Gunārs 
 70 “Festival v Rige zavershilsya,” Novie izvestiya, 29 March 2004; Vita Mach, “Kadr 
odin, rubl’-dva,” Delovaya khronika, 10 December 2002, p. EV.
 71 “Festival v Rige zavershilsja,” Novie izvestiya, 29 March 2004.
 72 Kommersant’, 30 April 2004.
 73 ”Vesti,” Radiostantsiya “Radio Rossii,” 4 March 2005, 7:30; “Novost’ dnya,” 
Parlamentskaya gazeta, 10 March 2005, p. 25.
 74 See, e.g., Leonid Vasilyev, “Nika” raspravlyayet krylya,” Trud, 26 February 2003, 
p. 5.
 75 Roman Dolzhansky, “Latyshskie strasti,” Kommersant’, 19 December 2003, p. 32.
 76 See, e.g., Anna Fedotova, “Gran-pri telekinoforuma “Vmeste” dostalsya Latviskim 
teledokumentalistam,” Telekanal “Ren TV”, 16 September 2002, 17:30.
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Binde in particular, who even under social realism did not praise social-
ism,77 but demonstrated flawless relations between form and colour with 
a deep comprehension of his subject matter.78 Another photographer who 
earned praise from the Russian mass media was Roberts Johansons, whose 
personal exhibition in Moscow was referred to as one of the most stylish in 
recent times.79
Not surprisingly, the Russian media also find that Russian television 
compares very favourably with Latvian television. Russian TV programmes 
are widely viewed in Latvia, and many people not only enjoy entertainment 
from Russia, but receive most of their information about current and glo-
bal affairs from Russian news broadcasts. Thus, the festival called “Days 
of Russian Television in Latvia” is quite popular. The Russian media por-
trayed the Days as a remarkable event for Latvians “who got an opportunity 
to meet and come into contact with Russian TV stars.”80 As one journalist 
put it with a hint of nostalgia, “we used to live in one country and amicably 
watch one central television.”81
The image of Latvia as a country lacking television professionals was 
reinforced by discussion surrounding a new morning programme in the 
Russian language on a Latvian channel. The programme invited a well-
known journalist from Russia to act as co-presenter, as the producers were 
unwilling “to suffer with local television staff who have limited experience 
and some problems with the [Russian] language.”82 According to Russian 
news reports, an additional benefit to inviting a journalist from Russia was 
the opportunity to receive news “from TV presenters known from the Soviet 
era.”83 It should be mentioned that due to low ratings this programme was 
closed about five months after it was launched.84 In fact, the appearance of 
a “well-known journalist” from Russia did not help the “suffering” of local 
television, though some of the media blamed Latvian authorities who could 
not tolerate “the only Russian speaking show on Latvian television.”85
On the other hand, Latvian actors from various generations are fre-
quently invited to play both supporting and leading roles in Russian mov-
ies and TV series.86 Moreover, some Russian journalists found that certain 
 77 N.A., “Art-Kur’yer,” Moskovskaya pravda, 14 July 2004, p. 5.
 78 N.A., “Priglasitel’ny bilet,” Argumenty i fakti, Prilozheniye “Moskva,” 14 July 
2004, p. 21.
 79 Sergey Safonov, “Prismotris’ k khudozhnikam. Neizvestnie portreti Roberta 
Johansona,” Gazeta, 31 March 2005, p. 31.
 80 ”Dni Rossiskogo televidiniya v Latvii,” ORT, 24 April 2002.
 81 ”Dni televideniya v Latvii,” REN-TV, 23 April 2002.
 82 Nikolay Myshinsky, “Molchanov na eksport,” Tribuna, 13 August 2004, p. 9.
 83 Aleksandr Orlov, “Vremya bol’shoy stirki. V novom telesezone zriteli 
rasproschayutsya so mnogomi starimi znakomimi,” Novie izvestiya, 13 August 
2004, p. 10.
 84 Ruslan Bystrov, “Novosti,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak-24”, 17 January 2005, 17:00.
 85 N.A., “Telenovosti,” Moskovsky komsomolets, No 11, 20 January 2005, p. 12.
 86 See, e.g., Masha Davtyan, “Starik Hottabich ugodil v set’. V roli internet-dzhina 
snyalsya sam Sharikov,” Moskovsky komsomolets, 16 October 2004, p. 3.
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Russian-language Latvian television productions would be worth showing 
in Russia as well. For example, commenting on a Latvian-made produc-
tion entitled “Rīga Balsam on the Russian Soul,” one journalist noted that 
“it will be a pity if our TV spectators will not have an opportunity to test 
‘Balsam’.”87
“New Wave”: The Present is a Well-Forgotten Past
No other cultural event in Latvia receives the amount of media cover-
age as the annual “New Wave” pop festival held in the seaside resort of 
Jūrmala. The festival was and remains primarily a Russian cultural event 
with marginal Latvian and international participation. While ostensibly of 
recent pedigree, the festival can trace its roots to a very similar festival 
called “Jūrmala” that took place regularly in the 1980s. Russian journalists 
often stress the element of revival, portraying the festival as “our return to 
Jūrmala.” However, discussions of the “return” occasionally include note 
of how “we” were “forced” to leave Jūrmala. Some journalists attribute the 
blame for the interruption to Latvian national consciousness and Latvians 
thinking “they will get along without us.”88
Every year the festival is marked by scandal, soul-searching among 
Latvian officials about whether to attend, and disagreements among the or-
ganisers. The impression that Russian organisers consider the song contest 
their event even though it takes place on the territory of another sovereign 
country was bolstered when numerous Latvian journalists working in both 
the Latvian and Russian languages were not granted accreditation.89 Despite 
the Latvian location of the “New Wave” festival, the festival is dominated by 
Russian basics.90 Some commentators even go so far as to claim that “New 
Wave” is almost the only cultural link between Latvia and Russia.91
Symbols of Cultural Presence
While “New Wave” has become a symbol of Russia’s cultural presence 
in Latvia, another such symbol is the Moscow Cultural and Business Centre 
in Rīga – better known as Moscow House. The land and the building were 
acquired in 2002 by the Moscow City government and the renovations were 
rushed to meet a spring 2004 deadline. A chain of similar centres exists in 
other cities of the world. Apart from their declared cultural or business role, 
these are symbols of Moscow’s soft power. Indeed, Russian commentators 
 87 Boris Gordon, “Rizhsky Bal’zam,” Ogonek, 5 May 2003, p. 59.
 88 Tamara Martynova, “Golosa iz bezmolvstviya,” Vesti, 23 May 2002, p. 7.
 89 Anna Novitskaya, “Rossiisky show-biznes gonit volnu v Latvii,” Novaya gazeta, 22 
July 2004, p. EV.
 90 See Konstantin Bakanov, “Pesenny non-stop,” Novie izvestiya, 28 July 2004, p. 
5; Ol’ga Tarakanova, Nikolay Mishinsky, “Yurmalu nakrolo “Volnoi,” Tribuna, 
28 July 2004, p. 8; Kirill Pazhitnov, “Puteshestvie iz “Chikago” v Yurmalu,” 
Rossiiskaya gazeta, 5 August 2003, p. 16.
 91 Anna Pomazova, “Pervy kanal izmenyaet “kontseptsiyu”? Konstantin Ernst 
“zashchischaet” favoritov teleefira...”, Russky kuryer, 6 August 2004, p. EV.
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have referred to Moscow House as “the embassy of Moscow on the banks of 
the Daugava” from which one can clearly see railways “leading from Rīga 
to Russia,” where one can hear “Russian sounds of Karelian granite” repre-
senting Russian national culture in Latvia.92 It is important to bear in mind 
that Moscow House appeared from the East at around the same time as the 
European Union and NATO “arrived” from the West.
Interestingly, Russian media coverage started months before the centre 
was actually opened. The first event on the eve of opening of the House 
was the Victory Day celebration. Subsequently, Moscow House became the 
locale for the annual celebration of Victory Day.93 The opening was positively 
reflected in the Russian media and Moscow House was portrayed as a future 
centre of Russian culture in Latvia. In the context of complicated bilateral 
relations, the Centre was portrayed as an example of cooperation.94 Despite 
the significance attributed to Moscow House on the eve of its opening, the 
Russian media virtually ignored it for several months until it hosted the 
United Congress of Russian Communities in Latvia, a would-be umbrella 
group for Latvia’s Russians.95 Moscow House then became the subject of 
journalistic tributes: “Moscow House in Rīga promotes relief from stereo-
types and promotes relations between Russians and Latvians” and “Moscow 
House demolishes the stereotypes of Latvian Russophobes and therefore is 
dangerous for Latvian ethno-radicals.”96
The Russian media devoted considerable angry attention to discussing 
the fate of another symbol of a Russian cultural presence in Latvia, the halt 
in broadcasting of Russian Radio in Latvia in 2002. While at issue was a 
commercial radio station providing entertainment that had violated Latvian 
broadcasting provisions, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs became 
actively involved in the case connecting the closure of the station with the 
alleged “suppression of the rights of national minorities.” The culmination 
of the story was a statement by the head of the station: “It is not without 
reason that Latvian functionaries are afraid – cultural expansion is more 
fearful than any political propaganda.”97 Another example of this “fear” was 
a wildly covered “persecution of Russian dolls” when Rīga’s municipality 
considered the possibility of banning the sale of these traditional Russian 
souvenirs. Albeit the ban was never enacted, it received wide coverage in the 
Russian media.98 This assertion provides some insight into the role of cul-
ture in Latvian-Russian relations. In the case of Russia, cultural expansion 
 92 “Dom Moskvy v Rige,” Gudok, 5 February 2004, p. 6
 93 See, e.g., “Vesti,” Radiostantsiya “Radio Rossii,” 23 February 2005, 12:00.
 94 Anna Averina,”Sobytiya,” Telekanal “TV-Tsentr,” 8 April 2004, 14:00.
 95 Oleg Meshkov, “S’ezd nepobezhdyennikh,” Slovo, No. 38, 8 October 2004, p. 5.
 96 Yelena Stepanova, “Gde zhivet zhudovishche? O dome Moskvy v stolitse Latvii,” 
Vechernaya Moskva, 8 October 2004, p. 7.
 97 Radiostantsiya “Mayak,” 14 March 2002.
 98 See, e.g., “Bez komentariev,” ITAR-TASS, Vremya novostei, 21 April 2005, p. 
12; “Ekho,” Radiostantsiya “Ekho Moskvy” 15 April 2005, 14:00; “Novosti,” 
Radiostantsiya “Mayak,” 15 April 2005, 11:45; Yelena Morozova, “Pul’s planeti,” 
Pravda, No. 53, 20 May 2005, p. 3.
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(e.g., in the form of “New Wave,” the Moscow House, or media broadcasts 
from Russia) is indeed a form of political propaganda. Culture rarely comes 
“by itself,” but brings with it the contested past and present, history and 
politics.
Latvia occasionally has a symbolic presence in Russia as well, providing 
an opportunity to observe the reaction of the Russian media to a Latvian 
cultural “invasion.” The garden of Rīga in Moscow or Rīga’s Days in Moscow 
are good examples of a Latvian symbolic presence. The Rīga Days were 
not widely covered, but the few reports on an exhibition of contemporary 
Latvian artists were overwhelmingly positive. These reports also referred to 
a past when “for Russia, the Baltic republics substituted for the ‘abroad’”99 
and masterpieces by Latvian weavers and sculptors were a sign of good taste 
and a touch of chic under socialist realism. The role of the exhibitions was to 
provide “lost acknowledgment.”100
Latvian Song and Dance Festival vs. Eurovision 
Song Contest
Since the end of the 19th century, the song and dance festival that 
takes place in Latvia every four years is one of the most important events 
in the cultural calendar reflecting traditions from every part of the country. 
Despite its cultural value and significance, the festival merits only passing 
reference in the Russian media on one occasion, as opposed to the extended 
coverage given to “New Wave” or the Eurovision Song Contest that took 
place in Rīga that same year. By way of explanation, one Russian journal-
ist claimed that “all songs on the central stages of the festival are in the 
Latvian language and musicians and dancers give preference to the national 
traditions of the core nation.”101 The lack of interest may also be explained 
by a general lack of awareness about any foreign folklore, which was evident 
in the meagre coverage of the Days of Latvian Culture as well.102
In contrast, the Eurovision song contest drew far more elaborate cover-
age in Russia. Maria Naumova, a Latvian singer of Russian origin who won 
the festival in 2002, attracted considerable attention in the Russian media. 
Reports claimed that “the victory of Naumova is a victory for all Russian-
speaking inhabitants of the Baltic States,” called her “Our Masha”103 (Nasha 
Masha) and noted that “though the victory went to Latvia, a Russian won 
nonetheless.”104 Russian commentators detected an additional link to Russia, 
claiming that a Russian composer accidentally discovered Naumova, then 
“handed” her over to Raimonds Pauls, who made her popular in Latvia.105 
 99 Vladislav Flerkovsky, “Novosti kul’tury,” Telekanal Kul’tura, 31 May 2002, 00:00.
 100 Ol’ga Kabanova, “Svobodno sotkannoye iskusstvo,” Izvestiya, 5 June 2002, p. 8.
 101 Nikolay Myshinsky, “Vse v odin golos,” Tribuna, 2 July 2003, p. 7.
 102 N.A. “Latyshskaya kultura v Moskve,” Vechernaya Moskva, 15 November 2002, p. 
4.
 103 Aleksandr Bratersky, “Masha, da ne nasha,” Izvestiya, 27 May 2002, p. 2.
 104 Irina Mihailina, “Kakaya pesnya bez skandala”, Rossiskaya gazeta, 27 May 2002, 
EV.
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Despite Russian interest in her, Naumova herself disappointed expectations 
when she noted that she did not aspire to perform on the Russian musical 
stage.106
While some of the coverage was positive, sarcasm was also evident 
in some reports. For example, one commentator indicated that there was 
“pleasing news for Russian patriots – agrarian Latvia will go bankrupt in 
organising a European song contest next year.”107 Indeed, before the song 
contest the Russian media were replete with stories about possible can-
cellation of the festival due to the financial difficulties experienced by the 
Latvian organisers.108 When the song contest took place, Russian media 
were generally positive towards the organisers and paid more attention to 
the performance of Russia’s entry.109 However, there was a touch of arro-
gance in reports claiming that the arrival of the Russian pop-group TATU 
was “a big event for the capital of Latvia.”110 The wildly politicised imagina-
tion of some Russian journalists was evident in speculation that the Latvian 
authorities would only allow a citizen to represent the country and that the 
song performed had to be written by a citizen of Latvia.111
Conclusion
The image of Latvian culture presented in the Russian media is quite 
diverse and extends beyond references to Raimonds Pauls, Laima Vaikule 
and the “New Wave” festival in Jūrmala to include contemporary Latvian 
theatre, opera, classical and pop music and more. One finding is that Russian 
media coverage of Latvian culture is more common than Latvian media cov-
erage of Russian culture. However, it does bear mentioning that the Latvian 
media market is divided into Russian and Latvian language outlets, and 
 105 Artur Gasparyan, “Masha, da ne nasha...”, Moskovsky komsomolets, 27 May 2002, 
p.1, 3.
 106 Matvey Glebov, “Mariya Naumova, pobeditelnitsa konkursa “Evrovideniye-2002”: 
pust’ Alla Borisovna zaglyanet na moi sait,” Izvestiya, 12 August 2002, p. 3 EV.
 107 Sergey Asharin, “Maksim Galkin podsuzival Izrail’u,” Mir novostei, 28 May 2002, 
p. 25.
 108 See, e.g., N.A. “Finansovie problemy Rigi stavyat pod ugrozu sriva mezhdunarodny 
festival sovremennoy muziki “Evrovidenie”,” Ezhednevnie novosti. Posmoskovye, 
31 January 2003, p. 3; N.A., “Mezhdunarodny festival sovremennoi muziki 
“Evrovidenie” mozhet byt otmenyen Latviyei iz-za finansovikh problem,”, “Vesti,” 
Radio Rossii 31 January 2003, 14:27; Yelena Bugaiskaya, “Evrovideniya ne 
budet?”, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 31 January 2003, p. 6.
 109 Abik Elkin, “Evrovidenie startuyet na kosmodrome,” Moskovsky komsomolets, 20 
May 2003, p. 2; Kseniya Larina, “Organizatori konkursa “Evrovidenie” pridumali 
original’noe vizual’noye reshenie glavnoi sceni koncertnogo zala,” Radiostantsiya 
“Ekho Moskvy” 20 May 2003, 10:27; Ekaterina Andreyeva, “Simbolicheskoe 
znachenie dizaina konkursnoi sceni: Latviya – eto planeta, gde izpolnyayutsya 
mechti,” Telekanal “1 kanal,” 24 May 2003, 21:00.
 110 “Priezd gruppi “Tatu” stal bolshym sobytiem dlya Latvii,” Radiostantsiya “Ekho 
Moskvi,” 20 May 2003, 13:20.
 111 Nikolay Myshinsky, ““Tatu” v tsentre... uspekha ili skandala?”, Tribuna, 23 May 
2003, p. 4.
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that the former covers Russian cultural life more often than the latter. To 
put it simply: they are more interested in us than we are in them, at least if 
one looks through the prism of the media.
The image of Latvian culture is mixed with both positive and nega-
tive messages, though reporting on theatre and opera are generally posi-
tive. Latvian celebrities who made their names in the Soviet era, such as 
Raimonds Pauls and Laima Vaikule, are far more frequent guests in broad-
casts and articles than younger Latvian artists. Often, reference to Pauls 
and Vaikule carries associations and memories of Soviet Latvia – presently a 
foreign country requiring Russians to obtain a visa to visit. It is striking how 
little attention is paid to Latvian traditions, particularly the song and dance 
festivals. While this lack of attention might reflect a general Russian lack of 
interest in traditional cultural production, it also might reflect perceptions 
that those “national” traditions carried the seeds of “nationalism,” which 
then redounded to the disadvantage of Russians in Latvia and the rupture of 
ties between Latvia and Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
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Russia’s Media on Latvian Accession 
to the EU and NATO
Toms Rostoks
Introduction
This chapter analyses how Latvia’s accession to the EU and NATO 
has been portrayed in Russia’s media. The research covers the period from 
January 2002 until May 2005 and reflects news and analyses from newspa-
pers, radio and television. The main aim of this chapter is to detect whether 
there has been change in the way Latvia’s accession to these organisations 
has been covered over time in Russia’s media. There is plenty of evidence 
that Russia opposed Latvia’s EU and NATO membership, but how was this 
reflected in Russia’s media? What is the approximate ratio between positive 
and negative views expressed over Latvia’s accession? Some observers in 
Latvia have argued that Russia has come to accept Latvia’s accession, but 
has this trend been expressed in Russia’s media? The first two parts of this 
chapter address methodological issues and general observations, the third 
deals with Latvia’s accession to NATO, while the fourth covers Latvia’s ac-
cession to the EU.
Methodology
Latvia certainly is not the focal point of attention in Russia’s media. 
However, when Russia’s media paid attention to Latvia during the period in 
review, accession to the EU and NATO was one of the dominant themes. As a 
consequence, the amount of information available for analysis is enormous. 
Thus, instead of examining all the media coverage for the period in review, 
the research focuses on the most decisive moments of Latvia’s integration in 
the EU and NATO.
The analysis was divided into the following sections:
1. A baseline for analysis was provided by analysing coverage of Latvia’s 
accession and membership in the EU and NATO in the first and last 10 
days of the time period under investigation (21-31 January 2002 and 21-
31 May 2005).
2. Analysis of Russian media coverage of Latvia’s NATO membership 
proceeded as follows. First, Latvia’s accession to NATO was analysed 
by examining how Russia’s media covered the Prague summit, where 
Latvia and a number of other Central and East European countries 
were invited to become members of the alliance (15-30 November 2002). 
Second, the analysis focuses on how Latvia’s actual accession to the 
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alliance was covered in early spring 2004 (22 March – 8 April 2004). 
Third, the analysis looks again at how Russia’s media covered Latvia’s 
NATO membership one year after accession (25 March – 8 April).
3. Four periods were chosen for analysis regarding Latvia’s EU membership. 
First, the analysis examines Russian media coverage of Latvian accession 
in the context of the December 2002 Copenhagen summit, when Latvia 
and nine other candidate countries were invited to join (5-20 December 
2002). Second, the analysis investigates Russian media coverage of the 
referendum on Latvia’s EU accession (13-27 September, 2003). Third 
comes an overview of coverage during Latvia’s entry into the EU (23 
April – 11 May 2004). Fourth is an investigation of how Russia’s media 
covered Latvia one year after its accession to the EU (27 April – 6 May 
2005).
Although the research covers only a small part of the three and a half 
year period for which a full media archive is available, it concentrates on 
periods when the most important events regarding Latvia’s EU and NATO 
membership took place. These events evoked intense commentary in Russia’s 
media.
General Observations
A few general observations are necessary to set the context for this re-
search. First, Russia’s media found NATO enlargement more interesting 
and important than EU enlargement. This was reflected both by the signifi-
cantly higher number of news items and opinions devoted to NATO, as well 
as the more emotional tone of the coverage.
Second, Kaliningrad was by far the most widely covered issue regard-
ing EU enlargement. Although developments around this enclave/exclave 
are not the focus here, it should be noted that the relative importance of 
Kaliningrad (as seen through the prism of Russia’s media) has been much 
higher than the accession of any of the candidate countries or any other 
issue related to EU enlargement. As a consequence, Lithuania emerges as 
an actor of key importance in the context of EU enlargement. This comes as 
no surprise, because in this case EU enlargement directly affected the eve-
ryday lives of almost 1 million Russian citizens living in Kaliningrad. From 
a Russian perspective, the accession of Latvia to the EU did not generate as 
serious a problem as that of Lithuania.
Third, it should be noted that most of the media stories dealt with 
below involved a whole group of countries, as Latvia did not enter the EU 
and NATO alone. The only specifically Latvian event of major importance 
included in the analysis was the referendum on EU accession held in Latvia 
in September 2003. But even in this case, the Latvian referendum was 
preceded by a similar vote a week earlier in Estonia, so the two referenda 
somehow became blended together in Russian coverage. That Latvian ac-
cession to the EU and NATO was covered as a group activity generates 
some drawbacks for analysis. Latvia cannot be analysed as an individual 
case, but one must first try to understand Russia’s stance towards EU and 
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NATO enlargement in general before seeking to ascertain whether Latvia 
is portrayed as a special case.1
The Image of Latvia’s NATO Membership in Russia’s 
Media
Few would disagree that Russia’s attitude towards NATO enlargement 
has been rather negative, and this attitude has largely been shared by gov-
ernment officials and Russia’s media. However, it would be an exaggeration 
to argue that all media commentary has been negative. Most of the news 
regarding NATO enlargement and Latvia’s accession to NATO has been 
neutral, but it is different when it comes to opinion pieces, interviews and 
analyses regarding Latvia’s accession to NATO. Therefore it would be fair 
to argue that on balance Latvia’s accession to NATO has been portrayed in 
a negative light in Russia’s mass media.
It would also be a mistake to assume that coverage of Latvia’s accession 
to NATO has been one-dimensional because there are many stories, symbols 
and images embedded in news materials and analyses. Media coverage re-
flected a wide diversity of views on Russia, Latvia, NATO, the implications 
of enlargement and the transformation of the alliance. Moreover, the views 
of a wide range of actors are presented in Russia’s media regarding NATO 
enlargement. Before turning to an analysis of Latvia’s image in the context 
of the Prague summit and enlargement in spring 2004, it is worth describ-
ing the case of the Audriņi radar station in Eastern Latvia in greater detail, 
as this story demonstrates the complexity of the issue and the multiplicity 
of actors involved.
The Audriņi Radar Station
At the beginning of 2002, the Latvian government’s intention to build 
a military radar station in Audriņi, a small village in the eastern part of 
Latvia, erupted into the news in both Latvia and Russia. The local popula-
tion protested against the government’s plans, but the situation was further 
complicated by the statements of Latvian Minister of Defence Ģirts Valdis 
Kristovskis. According to Krasnaya Zvezda, Kristovskis accused local activ-
ists of acting on behalf of Moscow and called them “psychos.”2 The same 
article claimed that the protests were unprecedented and reflected broader 
dissatisfaction with the Latvian government’s NATO bid. Relying on highly 
dubious data provided by an anti-NATO NGO in Latvia called the “Power 
of Reason,” the newspaper even claimed that one third of the population 
of Latvia was against joining NATO, while the share of those sceptical of 
 1 While Russia’s media did not pay that much attention to Latvian NATO accession 
as a separate case, the same was not true for the Baltic States as a whole, insofar 
as this meant that the alliance would expand into the territory of the former Soviet 
Union.
 2 Vyacheslav Elin, “Mif o “Russkoi ugroze” vnov’ stal dominiruyushchim v 
vyskazivaniyakh Latviskikh politikov,” Krasnaya zvezda, 19 January 2002, p. 3.
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NATO reached 87%.3 Krasnaya zvezda created the perception of a large 
scale protest not only against a particular radar station, but also against 
Latvia’s NATO membership as such. Other newspapers noted that a net-
work of Russian-speaking NGOs in Latvia called the Latvian Coordination 
Council of Social Organisations had stepped up to support the protesters of 
Audriņi village.4
The Audriņi story was picked up by other Russian media and inter-
preted differently. One interpretation held that, until the beginning of 2002, 
Latvia’s prospects for membership in NATO had been very vague and that 
the Audriņi affair was the first concrete sign for Russia of NATO’s eastward 
expansion after the first post-Cold War enlargement.5 The Audriņi case also 
showed the linkage between Russia’s media and NATO sceptics in Latvia. 
Russia’s media claimed to defend the interests of Russian-speakers in Latvia, 
but in this case, the Russian TV channel ORT played a key role in inform-
ing and mobilising people in Audriņi and its surroundings. ORT claimed to 
be the first to inform the local population about the Latvian government’s 
plans to erect a radar station in the village.6
Coverage of the Audriņi case created the image of a gap between the 
Latvian government and society. The Russian media pointed out that NATO 
membership might be too costly for Latvia and that it would deal a heavy 
blow to the country’s economic and social situation. Vladimir Taranov wrote 
in Parlamentskaya gazeta that approximately one half of Latvia’s population 
was sceptical about NATO membership and that defence expenses related to 
Latvia’s NATO membership were estimated to grow by 100 million lats each 
year, the bulk of which was to go towards expensive military equipment im-
ported from the United States. This figure was contrasted with the number 
of abortions in Latvia in an attempt to demonstrate the damaging impact of 
high military expenditures on the social fabric of society.7
The Prague Summit: November 2002
In November 2002 the NATO summit in Prague adopted a decision to 
invite seven candidate countries, Latvia among them, to join the alliance. 
This event was widely reported in Russia’s mass media. While the majority 
of articles covering the event were neutral and informative, analyses and 
opinion pieces were rather negative. The Russian media presented a wide 
variety of opinions regarding the outcome of the summit, and some were 
even critical about Russia’s policy towards NATO enlargement. The range 
of actors whose views were presented included Latvian officials such as 
 3 Ibid.
 4 Nikolay Myshinsky, “Zachem krestyaninu radar,” Tribuna, 23 January 2002, p. 
7.
 5 Elena Kochaeva, “Zhiteli vostochnoi chasti Latvii protestuyut protiv vozvedeniya 
v etoi chasti strany radara,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak,” 18 January 2002, 09:00.
 6 Olga Kokorekina, “Zhiteli Latvii vystupayut protiv ustanovki natovskoi 
radiolokatsionnoi stantsii,” Telekanal ORT, 25 January 2002, 18:00.
 7 Vladimir Taranov, “Chlenstvo v NATO dolgo stoit,” Parlamentskaya gazeta, 24 
January 2002, p. 7.
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the Prime Minister Einārs Repše, Latvian ambassador in Russia Normans 
Penke, president of Latvia Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, state secretary of the 
Latvian Ministry of Defence Edgars Rinkēvičs and others. Even the mayor 
of the Latvian city of Ventspils Aivars Lembergs was cited in Russian news-
paper Gudok as being against Latvian NATO membership.8
On the Russian side, of course, officials such as Sergey Yastrzhembsky, 
Sergei Shishkarev and Konstantin Kosachev were widely cited, as were politi-
cal scientists Vyacheslav Nikonov, Ivan Safronchuk, Andrei Kokoshkin and 
military experts Alexander Ivashov, Yuri Baluevsky, Valentin Varennikov. 
The leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Gennady 
Zyuganov was probably the most critical voice regarding NATO enlarge-
ment in November 2002. However, the harshest standpoint vis-à-vis the 
Baltic States was taken by leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky. A very significant role was also played by journalists, 
who were often very critical regarding NATO enlargement.
Overall, the image of NATO in Russia’s media was not very positive, not 
least because, as Sergey Yastrzhembsky argued, NATO is not well-suited for 
facing the threats of the modern world, such as terrorism, proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, violent nationalism, etc.9 As a consequence, 
many commentators voiced incomprehension about the need to enlarge 
NATO, which was portrayed as an ineffective alliance. Political scientist 
Vyacheslav Nikonov argued that enlargement was NATO’s strategic mis-
take, as increasing the number of members would weaken the alliance.10 
Similar language was used by Russian journalist Yevgeny Grigoryev, who 
wrote that NATO was becoming “hypertrophied.”11
Russia’s media frequently noted that NATO was very different from 
what it used to be at the end of the Cold War. This has two meanings. First, 
NATO as a defensive alliance is not as credible as it was before. Second, 
new member states were probably going to be disappointed, because the al-
liance they were joining would be very different from the one to which they 
applied.12 The image of a changing alliance allows journalists to suggest 
that applicant countries are naïve. One journalist wrote that the applicant 
countries were joining an alliance that is qualitatively different from what it 
used to be, but candidate countries have not noticed.13 Some Russian experts 
 8 “Novosti,” Gudok, 27 November 2002, p. 1.
 9 Evgenij Revenko, “Strany Baltii – v spiske 7 pretendentov na chlenstvo v NATO,” 
Telekanal RTR, Vesti nedeli, 17 November 2002, 20:00.
 10 Lyuba Shary, “Kogo eshcho primut v NATO? Vozmozhno Ukrainu. No eshcho ne 
skoro,” Moskovsky komsomolets, 19 November 2002, p. 4.
 11 Evgeny Grigoryev, “NATO vse dal’she dvizhetsya na vostok. No Putin uzhe ne 
sprashivaet “A zachem?”, khotya voprosi ostayutsya,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 
20 November 2002, p. 2.
 12 “Sobytiya,” “Vilmars Heninsh: eshcho vperedi predstoit mnogo raboti, chtobi 
dostich’ tekh standartov, kotorie ot nas trebuyet NATO,” Telekanal “TV-Tsentr,” 
21 November 2002.
 13 A. Minayev, “Sammit NATO: Anglisky prem’er zaranee predupredil, chto ne syadyet 
rjadom s Kuchmoi. Prishlos’ menyat’ alfavit…”, Novaya gazeta, 25 November 
2002.
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argued that the main benefits of NATO membership for new member states 
would be psychological, rather than real.14
A very different view emerges from stories about NATO enlargement 
when views of the Russian military establishment are included. Here, 
NATO appears as a malicious and evil organisation posing a real military 
threat to Russia.15 This view is shared by Gennady Zyuganov, who argues 
that from the military-strategic point of view, NATO creates a grave mili-
tary threat to Russia.16 NATO enlargement is a threat, because the distance 
between NATO member states and strategically important military and 
civilian objects in Russia is significantly reduced.17 Not surprisingly, NATO 
thus emerges as a “global military monster” whose primary purpose is to 
ensure world dominance and the oppression of non-Western civilisations, 
and enlargement is a means for ensuring this global dominance.18 Others 
see NATO as a U.S. instrument for extracting financial resources from poor 
Central and East European countries. According to this view, candidate 
countries have to rebuild their military during NATO enlargement, and this 
means that they have to buy expensive military equipment from the U.S. In 
short, NATO enlargement is a racket.19
The image of Russia created in Russia’s media was a mixed one. On 
the one hand, the official view was that Russia could not hold back sov-
ereign nation states that had decided to apply for NATO membership. At 
the same time, Russia was presented as the voice of reason claiming that 
NATO enlargement is irrelevant, because it would not increase security in 
Europe. Moreover, it may decrease Russia’s security, unless four new mem-
ber states in the alliance (the Baltic States and Slovenia) joined the modified 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE).20 On the other hand, it 
was well-known that Russia was against NATO enlargement, and therefore 
the fact that three former republics of the Soviet Union would join the alli-
ance was seen as a major defeat by some reporters and experts. One news-
paper wrote that Russia was “defeated again” and this time the defeat was 
especially painful because the three Baltic republics would join NATO.21 The 
 14 N.A., “Po mneniyu Ivana Safronchuka, armii Latvii, Litvy i Estonii ne vnesut 
sushchesvennogo vklada v mirovuyu bor’bu s terrorizmom,” Radiostantsiya 
“Radio Rossii,” interview, 21 November 2002, 18:10.
 15 Ivan Safronov, interview with Leonid Ivashov, “Dlya Rossii NATO – eto moshchny 
element voennoi ugrozy,” Kommersant’, 21 November 2002, p. 11.
 16 G. A. Zyuganov, “Seryoznaya ugroza interventsii,” Sovetskaya Rossiya, 
23 November 2002, p. 1.
 17 Dmitry Litovkin, Natal’ya Ratiani, “Obraz vraga,” Izvestiya, 23 November 2002, 
p. 4.
 18 Igor’ Kortchenko, “NATO priobretaet novoe kachestvo,” Nezavisimoe voennoe 
obozrenie, 29 November 2002, pp. 1-3.
 19 N.A., “Reket dlya byvshego sotslagerya,” Rossiskaya gazeta, 29 November 2002, 
p. 4.
 20 Aleksandr Yakovenko, “Ofitsial’noe mnenie,” Argumenti i fakti, 27 November 
2002, p. 4.
 21 Evgeny Grigoryev, “NATO vse dal’she dvizhetsya na vostok. No Putin uzhe ne 
sprashivaet “A zachem?”, khotya voprosy ostayutsya,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 
20 November 2002, p. 2.
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loudest critics were Gennady Zyuganov and experts from Russia’s military 
establishment, who blamed Putin’s administration for not doing enough to 
stop NATO’s expansion. In an interview, Leonid Ivashov argued that Russia 
had missed an opportunity to use its influence to stop NATO enlargement.22
However, the image of a defeated Russia is not prevalent in Russia’s 
media. It is balanced by an image of Russia as a country whose importance 
as a partner for NATO is much greater than the process of enlargement. 
The Russian press wrote that although Vladimir Putin was not physically 
present in Prague, his presence could be felt anyway, because Russia had 
become a more important partner for the U.S. and NATO after the terrorist 
attacks of September 11.23 In other words, a country’s importance for the al-
liance should not be measured in terms of membership, and Russia is an im-
portant ally even if it doesn’t have a prospect of membership. Besides, it was 
argued that Russia would exact “revenge” against the Baltic States, as these 
countries were trying to escape from Russia, but might meet again within 
the NATO framework. Moreover, Russia’s voice might turn out to be louder 
and more relevant than all the voices of new member states combined.24
Latvia’s image in Russia’s mass media is predominantly negative, but 
this image has several variations. First, Latvia was depicted as a corrupt 
state that did not meet the accession criteria and thus, did not deserve to 
become a NATO member.25 The media frequently mention that the Russian 
minority is oppressed in Latvia, and this would prevent Latvia from gaining 
NATO membership. However, opinions on the issue of the Russian minority 
diverged. One opinion was that Latvia would be pressed hard by NATO to 
solve the problems of Russian-speakers after enlargement.26 Another opinion 
was that nothing was going to change and that the conditions of Russian-
speakers were unlikely to improve after Latvia’s accession.27
Second, Latvia was depicted as a country whose military forces were 
very weak and unable to defend Latvia.28 Third, there was a rather powerful 
image that Latvia and the other Baltic states would be unable to bear the 
financial burdens of NATO membership. Russia’s media argued that the 
financial burdens of NATO membership would have a very serious negative 
impact on the socio-economic conditions of a large part of the population.29 
 22 Igor’ Kortchenko, “NATO priobretaet novoe kachestvo,” Nezavisimoe voennoe 
obozrenie, 29 November 2002, pp. 1-3.
 23 Melor Sturua, “Amerike ne nado NATO?”, Moskovsky komsomolets, 23 November 
2002, p. 5.
 24 Aleksei Lyashchenko, “Baltiskaya eiforiya,” Krasnaya zvezda, 28 November 2002, 
p. 3.
 25 Aleksei Smirnov, “Ati-bati, Balti – v NATO,” Novie izvestiya, 22 November 2002, 
pp. 1-6.
 26 N.A., “Rossiya nadeetsya, chto posle prisoedineniya k ES i NATO v Latvii budut 
soblyudat’ prava natsionalnikh men’shinstv,” Radiostantsiya “Ekho Moskvy,” 22 
November 2002, 13:30.
 27 Aleksei Lyashchenko, “Baltiskaya eiforiya,” Krasnaya zvezda, 28 November 2002, 
p. 3.
 28 Evgeny Vostrukhov, “Prazhsky bal dlya zolushki…”, Gudok, 26 November 2002, p. 
7.
 29 Ibid.
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It was also typical that generalisations drawn from one applicant country 
were readily applied also to other countries. Examples from Lithuania’s 
military expenditures were readily applied to other candidate countries.30
Fourth, Latvia was portrayed as a naïve country that did not fully un-
derstand the true intentions of its Western partners. Some commentators 
held that Latvia might be admitted to NATO only because of its strategic 
location. The logic of this argument was very straightforward. NATO was 
interested in gaining access to Latvia’s military infrastructure, thus, it did 
not matter whether Latvia was ready to join the alliance or not. NATO’s stra-
tegic interests were more important.31 While Latvia thought that Western 
countries were genuine partners and that it was joining an alliance of coun-
tries with similar values, Latvia’s only importance was its strategic location. 
Essentially, some in Russia saw NATO enlargement as a mutually beneficial 
exchange of alliance membership for military bases.32 This is a very telling 
image, because Russia is depicted as being smarter than Latvia.
NATO Enlargement (Spring 2004) and Its Aftermath 
(Spring 2005)
Discussion about NATO enlargement in Russia’s media in spring 
2004 was qualitatively different from that in November 2002 about the 
outcome of the Prague summit. This time the debate revolved around 
practical manifestations of NATO’s enlargement, of which the most visible 
was patrolling of Baltic airspace by NATO fighter jets. The other issue 
brought up with remarkable frequency was adherence of the Baltic States 
and Slovenia to the CFE treaty. Discussions about NATO’s intentions were 
not as prominent as they were one and a half years before. Moreover, the 
media also discussed the impact of NATO membership on the behaviour of 
new member states.
The people given the opportunity to express their views in Russia’s 
media were largely the same. Latvia was represented in the discussions 
by Defence Minister Atis Slakteris, Ambassador to NATO Imants Lieģis, 
Foreign Ministry State Secretary Normans Penke, General Raimonds 
Graube and Foreign Minister Rihards Pīks. Despite the relatively large 
number of Latvian officials whose views appeared in Russia’s media, their 
views were clearly a small minority compared to the number of opinions 
voiced by Russian officials and experts. Russia was represented by such 
government officials and politicians as Andrei Kokoshkin, Sergei Lavrov, 
Yuri Baluevsky, Alexander Yakovenko, Mihail Margelov, Konstantin 
Kosachev, Alexander Grushko, Vladimir Chizhov, Dmitri Rogozin and 
 30 N.A., “Reket dlya byvshego sotslagerya,” Rossiskaya gazeta, 29 November 2002, 
p. 4.
 31 Valentin Varennikov, “Rossiya v kol’tse,” Argumenti i fakti, 27 November 2002, 
p. 4.
 32 Aleksei Lyashchenko, “Baltiskaya eiforiya,” Krasnaya zvezda, 28 November 2002, 
p. 3.
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Gennady Zyuganov. Political scientists and military experts were repre-
sented by Leonid Ivashov, Ivan Safranchuk, Oleg Bogomolov, Konstantin 
Simonov and Igor Panarin.
The presence of NATO fighter jets in Baltic airspace was certainly not 
the foremost of Russia’s concerns, but together with the radar built on Latvian 
territory, it was the most visible sign of Baltic NATO membership, therefore it 
was widely covered by Russia’s mass media. The Kremlin’s attitude towards 
NATO enlargement in spring 2004 was either neutral or slightly negative, but 
the arrival of NATO fighter jets in the Baltic States was considered a threat to 
Russia’s security. Some argued that this step did not reflect the spirit of coop-
eration and mutual reciprocity that Russia and NATO had lately developed.33 
Some experts referred to NATO enlargement as “one of the greatest mistakes 
in the history of the Western countries.” The actual day of NATO enlarge-
ment was even called “X hour.”34 Some voices in the military establishment 
went so far as to call for shooting down every NATO airplane that acciden-
tally crossed the Russian border.35 Some Russian commentators argued that 
after the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russian planes had not committed a 
single breach of Baltic airspace, but that NATO airplanes breached Russia’s 
airspace almost every month.36 What is more, Russian commentators noted 
again that Latvia would have to pay around USD 8 million every year to cover 
expenses related to patrolling of its airspace, and this was portrayed as a lot 
of money for a small country such as Latvia.37
Russian media discourse also contained more hostile views. For example, 
one military expert argued that NATO enlargement was like cancer and that 
Russia’s national security was in grave danger.38 Another article argued that 
NATO was actually preparing to attack Russia.39 The Russian State Duma 
called upon President Vladimir Putin to discuss the issue of NATO enlarge-
ment in the next meeting of the National Security Council.40 Some experts 
noticed that Vladimir Putin had started to pay more attention to Russia’s 
military. This was interpreted as a sign of nervousness possibly caused by 
NATO expansion.41 Some journalists argued that the growing unease about 
NATO enlargement had been stimulated artificially, that the image of an 
external enemy was being used for promoting patriotism in Russia.42
 33 Garin Petr, “Novosti”, Radiostantsiya “Mayak,” 23 March 2004, 19:00.
 34 N.A., “Etot den’,” Radiostantsiya “Ekho Moskvy,” 25 March 2004, 16:11.
 35 Mariya Dmitrieva, “Sshibat’ da ne rassusoluvat’. Samoleti NATO letayut vdol’ 
granits Rossii,” Rossiya, No. 12, 1 April 2004, p. 2.
 36 Larisa Verbitskaya, “Dobroe utro,” Telekanal “1 kanal,” 02 April 2004, 06:06.
 37 Al’ga Kokorekina, “Vechernie novosti,” Telekanal “1 kanal,” 29 March 2004, 18:00, 
21:00.
 38 Leonid Ivashov, “Rakovaya opuhol’ NATO razrastaetsya,” Voenno-promyshlenny 
kur’er, 24 March 2004, pp. 1-7.
 39 Vyacheslav Tetekin, “Smelie shagi v kusti,” Sovetskaya Rossiya No. 45, 6 April 
2004, p. 3.
 40 Vitaly Buzuyev, “24”, Telekanal “REN-TV,” 29 March 2004, 19:30.
 41 Vyacheslav Tetekin, “Brosok cherez krasnuyu chertu,” Sovetskaya Rossiya, 
27 March 2004, p. 7.
 42 Andrei Rodionov, “Ekho,” Radiostantsiya “Ekho Moskvy,” 29 March 2004, 13:00.
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Some reports created the impression that it would be a lot easier for 
Russia to accept NATO enlargement were it not for the fact that the Baltic 
States and Slovenia had not adhered to the CFE treaty. This was the reason 
why Russia worried about NATO enlargement, and this gave a firm basis 
for some sceptics to argue that it had been NATO strategy to create a “grey 
zone” next to Russia’s border with no limits on the number of troops and 
military equipment concentrated in the Baltic States (Slovenia was only a 
minor concern). Thus, the issue of extending the CFE treaty to the three 
Baltic States became a question of key importance in Russian media dis-
course about NATO enlargement in spring 2004. This concern was most 
clearly articulated by Russian government officials Alexander Yakovenko 
and Konstantin Kosachev. In an interview, Yakovenko voiced the Kremlin’s 
concerns about the latest round of NATO enlargement because there was a 
whole range of unsettled issues in the relations of countries such as Latvia 
and Estonia with Moscow. The most pressing issues were the alleged dis-
crimination against the Russian-speaking population in both countries and 
the fact that the Baltic States and Slovenia were not part of the CFE trea-
ty.43 In an interview, Kosachev presented a very detailed account of Russia’s 
concerns that the Baltic States and Slovenia were not party to the CFE 
treaty. He drew the conclusion that it was in NATO’s interests to preserve 
uncertainty with regard to the arrangement of conventional armed forces in 
Europe. Therefore, Russia should be worried not about NATO enlargement 
as such, but rather about its possible consequences with regard to the place-
ment of armed forces in the four new NATO member states.44
One year after Latvia’s accession to the alliance, in spring 2005, Latvia’s 
NATO membership did not receive much attention in Russia’s media, because 
there were other, more pressing issues on the agenda, such as the border 
issue and Latvia’s unilateral declaration in April, different interpretations 
of history, the “resurgence of fascism” in Latvia and more. However, when 
Latvian NATO membership was mentioned, most of the coverage was nega-
tive, because NATO was still seen as an unfriendly alliance. Consequently, 
because spring 2005 was one of the lowest points in bilateral relations be-
tween Latvia and Russia, Latvia’s NATO membership was portrayed in a 
negative light. Latvia was depicted as a country unable to meet its obliga-
tions to the alliance.45 Moreover, Russia’s media portrayed Latvia as a coun-
try building military bases that could only be used against Russia. Thus, 
Latvia appeared as a hypocritical country that was profiting from Russian 
transit through its ports, but at the same time building military bases that 
were likely to be used against Russia.46 Latvian Transport Minister Ainārs 
Šlesers was the only positively evaluated figure in Latvian politics, because 
 43 N.A., “Informatsionnaya programma,” Radiostantsiya “Ekho Moskvy,” 29 March 
2004, 18:00.
 44 N.A., “Skandali dnya,” Radiostantsiya “Govorit Moskva,” 29 March 2004, 19:50.
 45 Aleksei Lyashchenko, “God v semje NATO,” Krasnaya zvezda, No. 56, 05 April 
2005, p. 3.
 46 Viktor Sokolov, “Konechno, protiv Rossii,” Voenno-promyshlenny kur’er, No. 11, 30 
March 2005, p. 2.
latvkriev-medijos-A.indd   136 2008.07.16.   16:32:06
137
during a press conference he stated that he was against building military 
bases in Latvia.47 Apart from this one ray of light in Latvian politics, Latvia’s 
image did not improve after one year in NATO.
In spring 2004 Latvia’s image was not so different than in fall 2002. 
Latvia was still portrayed as a small, poor and unfriendly country not ready 
for NATO membership. Russia’s media frequently mentioned that the size 
of Latvia’s armed forces was very small and expressed doubts about Latvia’s 
ability to sustain its NATO membership financially, anticipating that NATO 
membership would adversely affect Latvia’s social spending.48 In sum, Latvia 
was one of the few countries that arguably was not prepared to become a 
member of the alliance, but was accepted by NATO for reasons unknown to 
Russia, generating some security concerns.
Russia, on the other hand, was portrayed as a country whose security 
interests were not taken into account during the process of NATO enlarge-
ment. NATO was portrayed as an unresponsive, hypocritical actor which ad-
vanced its hidden interests behind of mask of fake willingness to establish a 
genuine collaborative partnership with Russia. Interestingly, Russia’s image 
emerges as a foil to NATO’s hypocritical behaviour. While NATO enlarge-
ment was an example of the “old” pattern of behaviour characteristic of the 
Cold War, Russia was a progressive power trying to build a Europe without 
new dividing lines. While NATO enlargement was a security threat beyond 
Russia’s ability to control, Russia was seen as too big and too important not 
to be taken into account or to be subjugated by Western powers. What really 
emerges from the analysis is the image of a Russia that is morally superior 
to its partners or opponents in the West. Russia is certainly portrayed as 
morally superior to Latvia – a small, poor and unfriendly country that dis-
criminates against its Russian-speaking population. Latvia’s “unfriendli-
ness” further came to light in spring 2005 amid speculation that Latvia was 
using its recent NATO membership to boost its claim to the Abrene district 
that had been part of Latvia before World War II and had subsequently be-
came part of Russia after the break-up of the Soviet Union.49 However, this 
moral superiority could not fully alleviate Russia’s security concerns regard-
ing Latvia’s accession to NATO.
The Image of Latvia’s EU Membership in Russia’s 
Media
The Copenhagen Summit: December 2002
Russia’s media scarcely covered the Copenhagen summit, and news re-
ports mentioned Latvia primarily as one of a number of countries scheduled 
to join the EU on the 1 May 2004. One reason the Copenhagen summit 
was not widely covered in Russia’s media was that the NATO summit in 
 47 Evgeny Vostrukhov, “Protiv natovskikh baz,” Gudok, 25 March 2005, p. 7.
 48 Otdel’ mezhdunarodnoi zhizni, “NATO u nashikh granits,” Krasnaya zvezda, 1 
April 2004, pp. 1-3.
 49 Ivan Demidov, “Russky vzglyad,” Telekanal 3, 29 May 2005, 15:25.
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Prague had taken place three weeks earlier, and Russia’s media were still 
writing about NATO enlargement. EU enlargement was simply not yet on 
the agenda.
However, this does not mean that the possibility of Latvia’s EU mem-
bership was not discussed in late 2002. Latvia’s candidacy was character-
ised as premature due to the Latvian economy’s lack of competitiveness and 
the very high number of non-citizens. Moreover, Latvians were portrayed as 
sceptical regarding the country’s EU membership, even more sceptical than 
Russians living in Latvia.50
The Copenhagen summit was covered in Russia’s media largely in terms 
of difficult issues such as the last-minute deal between Germany and Poland 
and the issue of scheduling the date of the beginning of Turkey’s accession 
negotiations. Russian commentators also noted that this enlargement round 
would not add much to the EU in terms of economic power.51 Russia was 
present in Copenhagen indirectly, as Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi stated that the 
future of the EU is unthinkable without Russia’s participation.52 This sug-
gested that despite the importance of enlargement, there were other issues 
such as establishing a working partnership between the EU and Russia that 
were perhaps more important than the enlargement process.
The image of Latvia in Russia’s media in the context of the Copenhagen 
summit was marked by two issues. First, Russian commentators acknowl-
edged that Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania had managed to achieve remark-
able results during accession negotiations.53 Second, commentators noted 
that Latvia had serious problems with regard to its Russian-speaking mi-
nority.54 In sum, coverage of the Copenhagen summit was insufficient to 
create a detailed image of Latvia, Russia and the EU.
Latvia’s Accession Referendum: September 2003
If Latvia was hardly noticed by Russia’s media in the context of the 
Copenhagen summit, Latvia’s accession referendum was a very different 
case. As mentioned before, this referendum was the only event included in 
the analysis where Latvia was not part of a larger group of countries. In 
the case of the referendum, a wide variety of officials, experts, politicians 
and also ordinary people participated in creating Latvia’s image in Russia’s 
media. Russia was represented by Vladimir Chizhov, Boris Malahov and 
Dmitry Rogozin. The European Union was represented by enlargement com-
missioner Günter Verhoigen. Vladimir Petrovsky was the voice of Russian 
 50 Vladimir Gur’ev, “Ne v vostorge ot popadaniya v “desyatku,” Kontinent, 27 
November 2002, p. 3.
 51 Yuri Yershov, “Bazar istoricheskogo masshtaba,” Rossiskaya gazeta, 14 December 
2002, p. 3.
 52 Aleksei, Lyashchenkov, “Evrosoyuz razbuhayet,” Krasnaya zvezda, 17 December 
2002, p. 3.
 53 Arkadiush Sarna, ““Tretyi put’” vymoshchen blagimi namereniyami,” 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 16 December 2002.
 54 Aleksei Lyashchenkov, “Evrosoyuz razbuhayet,” Krasnaya zvezda, 17 December 
2002, p. 3.
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experts. Latvian officials and politicians were represented by President 
Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, Ambassador to Russia Normans Penke, Minister of 
Agriculture Mārtiņš Roze, Prime Minister Einārs Repše, Russian NGO 
activist Igors Pimenovs, First Secretary in the Embassy in Russia Argita 
Daudze and Foreign Ministry spokesperson Atis Lots. One newspaper arti-
cle featured an interview with two Latvian “experts” Aivars Straume and 
Viktors Dinēvičs. Moreover, Russia’s media appeared to be interested in por-
traying the opinions of ordinary people living in Latvia about the accession 
referendum.
The case of the accession referendum is interesting because Latvia was 
widely represented by its government officials and politicians who were 
mostly positive about Latvia’s accession to the EU. What is more, Russian 
officials did not have negative views about EU enlargement. However, they 
pointed out that the issue of the Russian-speaking minorities should be 
resolved before Latvia’s accession. Russian commentators raised this issue 
whenever Latvia acceded to a new regional organisation and, in this case, 
frequently stressed that the EU must now assume the responsibility of de-
fending the rights of Russian-speakers living in the Baltic States.55 A similar 
tactic could be seen in the case of NATO enlargement, when Russia tried 
to use the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in September 2003 to influence 
Latvia with regard to alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers. 
While Russian commentators viewed the situation of Russian-speakers as 
problematic, Latvia’s EU integration as such was not. This does not mean 
that coverage of the accession referendum in Latvia was positive. The role of 
EU enlargement commissioner Günter Verhoigen was a separate issue, as he 
was seen as an EU official visiting Latvia to scare the local population into 
the EU by arguing that Latvia would become a Third World country in the 
event of a vote against accession.56
The referendum on Latvia’s integration in the EU marked the first time 
in the chosen sample that a Russian media outlet gave a platform for the ex-
pression of views by Latvians who were not officials. The extreme nationalist 
Russian newspaper Zavtra chose as Latvian experts two Eurosceptical in-
dividuals, historian Aivars Straume and former politician Viktors Dinēvičs, 
who are never portrayed as experts by the Latvian media. Interestingly, the 
interview was several times longer than other interviews with Latvian and 
Russian officials or experts. Straume declared that Latvia would become 
a colony of the EU, while Dinēvičs argued that for him, the Soviet Union was 
a better choice than the EU.57 These views were more pessimistic than that 
of Russian political scientist Vladimir Petrovsky, who argued that Latvia’s 
accession to the EU was in Russia’s interests. Nevertheless, Petrovsky was 
sceptical regarding Latvia’s preparedness for EU membership because its 
 55 Aleksei Lyashchenkov, “Baltisky uzel,” Krasnaya zvezda, 12 September 2003.
 56 Vladimir Taranov, “Kommisiya ES pugaet Latviyu,” Parlamentskaya gazeta, 13 
September 2003, p. 7.
 57 Evgeny Antonov, “Referendum v otdel’no vzyatoi strane. Ili golosuy – ne golosuy, 
vse ravno poluchesh… ES,” Zavtra, 18 September 2003, p. 6.
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economy was rather weak and its restructuring was not completed yet.58 
Latvia was also portrayed as a country whose EU membership would not 
immediately lead to becoming part of the Schengen agreement and adopting 
the single currency. Unemployment was also mentioned as a problem Latvia 
would likely face after integration.59
Russian journalists covered Latvia’s EU accession referendum in a 
rather negative way due to the exclusion of non-citizens from this important 
vote. Russian commentators claimed that a quarter of Latvia’s population 
was non-citizens, and this cast doubt on the legitimacy of the referendum. 
The participation of non-citizens could have made a big difference, as in 
Daugavpils, Latvia’s second largest city with a majority Russian-speaking 
population, a majority voted against EU accession. Russian commentators 
noticed that voting took place along ethnic lines.60
Another theme picked up by journalists was that the Baltic States to-
gether would bring almost a million Russians into the EU, many of whom 
were utterly disappointed by how they were treated by their respective na-
tional governments.61 Russia’s media were divided over whether the situation 
of Russian-speakers in Latvia would improve after accession. One view was 
represented by Russian-speaking NGO activist Igor Pimenov, who argued 
that Russian-speakers in Latvia would be taken into account only if Latvia 
became an EU member state.62 Claiming that Latvia’s accession would not 
solve the problem of non-citizens and discrimination against Russian-speak-
ers, others urged ethnic Russians in Latvia to vote against Latvia’s acces-
sion to the EU.63 Some news reports noted that Latvia (along with Estonia) 
had a rapidly growing economy,64 and that the accession referendum was a 
nation-wide festivity,65 but this kind of coverage was the exception.
EU Enlargement (Spring 2004) and Its Aftermath 
(Spring 2005)
Russia’s media covered Latvia’s entry into the EU in detail. A broad 
range of opinions by officials, politicians, experts and activists were present 
 58 Kolosov, “Vstuplenie stran Baltii v ES: kommentarii politologa Vladimira 
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2003, pp. 28-29.
 60 N.A., “Latviya lishila prava golosa tret’ svoego naseleniya,” Rossiya, 22 September 
2003, p. 2.
 61 Yulius Stross, “Latviya i Estoniya privedut s soboi v ES million russkikh,” 
Kommersant’, 17 September 2003, p. 10.
 62 Vladimir Vodo, “2/3 Latvii vstupili v Evropu. Ostal’nie poidut tuda za kompaniyu,” 
Kommersant’, 22 September 2003, p. 10.
 63 Samir Shahbaz, “Bol’shinstvo obshchestvennikh organizatsii russkoyazichnikh 
grazhdan Latvii prizyvali golosovat’ protiv vstupleniya v ES, tak kak ono ne budet 
sposobstvovat’ resheniyu politicheskikh problem,” Telekanal “TV-Tsentr,” 20 
September 2003, 14:00.
 64 Aleksei Strogin, “Dom, kotory stroit Evropa. Ukrepit li Evrosoyuz prinyatie v ego 
ryadi Estonii i Latvii?”, Rossiskie vesti, 24 September 2003, p. 13.
 65 Kirill Pozdnyakov, “Dlya osveshcheniya referenduma v Latviyu pribyli okolo 300 
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in media discourse. Russian officials in the discussion included Dmitry 
Rogozin, Mihail Margelov, Pavel Medvedev and Sergei Lavrov. Europe was 
represented by (Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner) Gil Robles 
and Hans Pottering, while the range of Latvian officials, politicians and 
activists included Naturalisation Board head Eiženija Aldermane, MEP 
Tatyana Ždanoka, Naturalisation Board official Lolita Danga, nationalist 
youth activist Raivis Dzintars, extremist publisher Aivars Garda, anti-
minority school reform activist Aleksandr Kazakov, Latvian TV producer 
Brigita Rozenbrika, Latvian EU commissioner Sandra Kalniete and presi-
dent Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga. Latvian economic experts were represented by 
head of the Institute of Economics Raita Karnīte, while experts from the 
Russian side were Alexander Pikayev and Sergei Markov. Ordinary Latvians 
were interviewed and asked about their opinions regarding Latvia’s acces-
sion to the EU.
Russia’s media discussed Latvia’s accession to the EU in several 
contexts. First, commentators widely discussed the issue of alleged dis-
crimination against the Russian-speaking population and the problem of 
non-citizens. Along with the Kaliningrad transit issue, alleged discrimina-
tion against Russian-speakers in Latvia (and Estonia) was the issue that 
reportedly was the most salient in Moscow’s relations with the EU.66 Some 
even claimed that this problem might become the defining issue of Russia’s 
relations with the EU.67 Others were of a different opinion, claiming that 
European politicians in Brussels were adopting double standards with re-
gard to the Russian-speaking population of Latvia. Alexander Pikayev was 
not of the opinion that Latvia’s EU membership would lead to substantial 
changes in this respect.68 However, there were reports in Russia’s media 
about European politicians ready and willing to criticise Latvia, with Alvaro 
Gil Robles being the most notable example.69
Russian commentators expressed concern about the potential impact 
of new member states on EU policy towards Russia. Along with the other 
Baltic States and Poland, Latvia was named as being pro-American and non-
democratic.70 As the best way to overcome the impact of the Baltic States and 
Poland on EU foreign relations, Russian political scientist Sergei Markov 
suggested building warm relations with big member states of the EU who 
supposedly shared Russia’s strategic interests.71 In many ways, this vision of 
Russia sharing important interests with large EU member states has been 
visible in EU-Russia relations. Because of this commonality of interests, 
Russia did not need to be overly concerned about the potential impact of 
 66 Sergei Trusevich, Oksana Ushakova, “Rasshirenie ES – problema dlya Rossii,” 
Parlamentskaya gazeta, 24 September 2003, p. 2.
 67 N.A., “V svyazi s rasshireniem Evrosoyuza,” Parlamentskaya gazeta, 07 May 2004, 
p. 4.
 68 Vladimir Averin, “Panorama”, Radiostantsiya “Mayak-24,” 22 April 2004, 12:15.
 69 Maksim Egorov, “Latviya podarit ES svoikh negrazhdan,” Trud, 23 April 2004, p. 
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 70 Andrei Svjytenko, “Otkrytaya studiya,” Radiostantsiya “Radio Rossii,” 27 April 
2004, 18:14.
 71 Ibid.
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smaller EU member states on the common foreign policy.
Russian commentators also discussed the impact of EU enlargement 
on Russia. With the completion of the 2004 enlargement, the terms of 
trade between accession countries and Russia would change, but the media 
contained various opinions regarding the impact of these changes. Some 
argued that Russia’s losses would amount to USD 150-300 million, while 
others claimed that Russia would gain from alterations of the trade regime.72 
Commentators discussed the visa issue in the context of EU enlargement, 
but news about an increase in visa prices73 were balanced by the prospect of 
establishing a visa free regime or at least visa facilitation for certain social 
groups in Russia.74
With regard to Latvia, some reports noted that prices would grow af-
ter integration in the EU. Latvian economist Raita Karnīte was quoted as 
saying that a modest increase in prices was expected,75 but other sources 
claimed that prices in Latvia would rise considerably.76 Commentators also 
claimed that some medicines from Russia, Belarus and Ukraine were going 
to vanish from drug stores, as they would not meet high EU standards.77 
Russia’s media also noted that many Latvians panicked and started to buy 
basic foodstuffs such as salt, sugar and flour, fearing both an increase in 
prices and unavailability after accession.78 Some commentators also noticed 
that many Latvians were preparing to leave their country in search for a 
better life and job opportunities in other EU member states that had opened 
their labour markets.79
Russian media reports stressed that not all social groups in Latvia 
would benefit from EU membership, with beneficiaries including students, 
bureaucrats and (some) businesspeople. However, reports claimed that other 
groups would have to deal with the adverse effects of EU membership, such 
as increasing prices, and that the number of eurosceptics increased consid-
erably with EU enlargement.80 Last, but not least, it was acknowledged that 
the number of applications for Latvian citizenship increased considerably 
prior to Latvia’s EU membership due to differing legal rights between citi-
zens and non-citizens.81
Overall, the Russian media portrayed the EU as taking up responsibil-
ity for dealing with the discrimination against Russian-speakers in Latvia. 
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However, with few exceptions, the EU was not seen as very responsive with 
regard to Russia’s allegations about Latvia’s discriminatory policy against 
Russians. Russia’s media seized upon instances when European politicians 
were critical against Latvia, but this criticism did not result in concrete steps 
by the Latvian authorities to improve the situation of Russian-speakers. 
Although the EU as a whole was portrayed as unresponsive to Russian con-
cerns, some of its biggest member states were portrayed as Russia’s allies 
that shared important strategic interests with Russia. Therefore the results 
of the French referendum were readily interpreted as a no-vote against “me-
chanical” enlargement of the EU, against the inclusion of member states 
(most notably, Latvia) where the rights of hundreds of thousands were 
not observed and where former Nazi war veterans were “marching in the 
streets.”82
In general, with the possible exception of Kaliningrad, Russian media 
discourse did not portray EU enlargement as something negative for Russia. 
Only minor adverse effects, such as increases in visa prices and inconven-
iences related to readjustment to the new trading regime with new member 
states, were expected. This was in stark contrast to media coverage of NATO 
enlargement, which was seen as adversely affecting Russia’s interests.
The most important features of Latvia’s image in Russia’s media are 
that Latvia was ill-prepared for EU membership. As a consequence, it would 
take its problems, such as a large proportion of non-citizens, into the EU. 
While some media reports acknowledged that Latvia achieved what it had 
desired and that accession was a national holiday with many festivities, 
for the most part, media reports noted that membership was problematic. 
Increasing prices, the inability to integrate most Russian-speakers, a ban on 
certain kinds of medicines, the arrogant attitude of the older member states 
of the EU and the fact that many people in Latvia were waiting for the open-
ing of foreign labour markets were the main drawbacks of EU membership 
used in Russia’s media to shape Latvia’s image.
Conclusions
Russia’s media treated NATO enlargement as far more important 
than EU enlargement. First, coverage of NATO enlargement was more 
emotional.83 Second, far more articles covered NATO enlargement. Third, 
even in periods selected to analyse EU enlargement, articles on NATO en-
largement predominated. It should come as no surprise that the image of 
Latvia in Russia’s media in the context of NATO enlargement was mostly 
negative. Moreover, this image did not change over time and was as negative 
in spring 2005 as it was at the beginning of 2002 because the alliance itself 
has been viewed negatively in Russia and there were no significant fluctua-
tions in Latvian-Russian relations in the period between January 2002 and 
 82 Maksim Yusin, “Frantsuzi skazali “nyet” bezdumnomu rasshireniyu Evrosoyuza,” 
Izvestiya, 31 May 2005, p. 7.
 83 Perhaps, with the exception of Kaliningrad issue, but this may be of more interest 
to those who would like to investigate Lithuania’s image in Russia’s mass media.
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May 2005. In fact, the spring of 2005 probably represented a low point in 
Latvian-Russian relations, and this was reflected in Russian media coverage 
of Latvia.
Representatives of Russia’s military establishment expressed the most 
negative views about Latvia’s NATO membership. Government officials and 
politicians, with the notable exceptions of Gennady Zyuganov and Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky, were less negative. It would be fair to say that representatives 
of this group were concerned about NATO enlargement and its effect on 
Russia’s security and the situation of Russian-speakers in Latvia. The third 
and least negative group were political scientists, who were least opposed 
to NATO enlargement as such, but still somewhat negative with regard to 
Latvia’s NATO accession. Journalists form the fourth group, and, although 
this group is far from being coherent, on balance it was more negative than 
those political scientists who participated in the construction of Latvia’s im-
age in Russia’s media.
Russia’s media portrayed Latvia’s accession to the EU in a less negative 
manner, though some of the same factors that adversely affected Latvia’s 
image in the context of NATO integration were also present. While EU 
enlargement did not raise any military concerns in Russia, the image of 
discrimination against non-citizens and Russian-speakers in general largely 
shaped the somewhat negative image of Latvia in both cases (NATO and 
EU). In sum, this issue is probably the major driving force behind the nega-
tive image of Latvia in Russia’s mass media and spills over into the por-
trayal of almost every aspect of Latvian-Russian relations. Thus, one could 
even argue that there is no independent image of Latvian EU and NATO 
membership, as the more powerful image Russian-speakers being oppressed 
overwhelms all other topics.
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The Latvian Economy – 
the Offshore Next Door
Nils Muižnieks
Introduction
This chapter examines the way Russia’s media portrayed the Latvian 
economy, Russian-Latvian economic relations and the business environment 
in Latvia from the beginning of 2002 through mid-2005. This chapter will 
not cover directly treatment of economic issues pertaining to EU enlarge-
ment (see Toms Rostoks’ chapter above), though Latvia clearly became a 
more attractive place for investment and tourism from Russia as EU acces-
sion approached and after it took place.
Two topics dominated the coverage – Ventspils port and the banking 
system, particularly Parex Bank. Here, the focus will not be on Russian-
Latvian energy relations and the volume of banking conducted per se, as 
these are topics treated elsewhere,1 but on how these topics were used to 
define Latvia for a Russian audience. A third topic treated below, that of 
Latvia as a tourist destination, did not receive the same volume of media 
coverage as Ventspils or Latvian banks, but provides useful insight into the 
persistence of nostalgia about Latvia in general and Rīga and Jūrmala in 
particular. Moreover, tourism entails everyday contact between people from 
Russia and Latvia, providing a platform for discussions about the nature of 
these interactions.
Several other aspects of the Latvian economy garnered attention in 
Russia’s media as well, such as the gas market, the development of Rīga-
Moscow economic ties, the activities of Latvian construction companies in 
Russia and vice versa, and others. However, coverage of these topics was spo-
radic or not instrumental in defining Latvia for Russia’s media consumers.
The context of the media coverage should be kept in mind. The period 
2002 to mid-2005 witnessed the very rapid growth of the Latvian economy 
and the emergence of new business opportunities with Latvia’s entry into 
the European Union and NATO. At the same time, Russia’s economic rela-
tions with all of its neighbours in the “post-Soviet space” were undergoing 
 1 See Vyacheslav Dombrovsky and Alf Vanags, “Latvian-Russian Economic 
Relations,” and Andris Sprūds, “Latvian-Russian Energy Relations: Between 
Economics and Politics,” both in Nils Muižnieks, ed., Latvian-Russian Relations: 
Domestic and International Dimensions (Rīga: Academic Press of the University of 
Latvia, 2006), pp. 98-109 and 110-118, respectively.
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“economisation” at this time, with Russia assertively defending its economic 
interests and trying to secure control of the energy infrastructure in transit 
countries. Booming hydrocarbon prices had not only filled Russian state cof-
fers and injected the Russian political elite with a new sense of self-confidence, 
they had also generated a growing middle class and a large number of tycoons. 
While the tycoons viewed Latvia as a convenient place to keep their money or 
invest, the middle class rediscovered Latvia as a tourist destination.
The tonality of coverage varied greatly depending on the topic. 
Journalists and experts covering Ventspils recalled the former role of the 
port in Russia’s oil export economy, noted with resentment the high tariffs 
the Latvian side long demanded, but commented with deep satisfaction the 
turning of the tables with the redirection of oil transport to the Russian port 
of Primorsk. Treatment of Latvian banks and tourism, on the other hand, 
portrayed Latvia in an overwhelming positive light, as a great place to keep 
one’s money, invest, and visit.
The Latvian Economy: Booming (Unfortunately)
A few pieces provided coverage of the Latvian economy in general, 
though often the three Baltic States were portrayed as a single unit. The 
portrait painted was often contradictory, as were the emotions expressed 
by Russian commentators. The rapid growth of the Baltic economies evoked 
amazement, jealousy and sometimes even outrage. At the same time, some 
commentators could draw satisfaction by pointing to the decline of once 
mighty industries and brands from Soviet-era Latvia or persistent social 
problems.
Several Russian commentators used the term “Baltic Tigers”2 to char-
acterise the Baltic economies, as they were experiencing “a rate of economic 
growth unbelievable in the current situation.”3 The “Flourishing Baltic”4 
had the “highest rate of economic growth among the 10 future members of 
the EU.” This success required explanation: some of the reasons were not 
linked to anything in particular the Balts did, rather “the Baltic countries 
were able to use their God-given advantages,” which included a “beneficial 
geopolitical position with access to the Baltic” and “cadres and technologi-
cal potential.” At the same time, it had to be admitted that the Balts had 
implemented “relatively fast and radical market reforms.”5
While some commentators merely dryly noted Baltic success, others 
used it to voice resentment at Latvia’s treatment of Russians or to note the 
 2 Vladimir Skripov, “Pryzhok ‘Baltiiskikh tigrov’,” Ekspert Severo-Zapad, No. 19, 
(128), 26 May 2003, pp. 14-15; Aleksandr Bezlepkin, “Poslednee zapadnoe 
preduprezhdenie,” Izvestiya, 22 July 2003, p. 5. Aleksandr Bezlepkin, “’Baltiiskie 
tigri’ prygnuli v mire,” Izvestiya, 27 June 2003, p. 5.
 3 Aleksandr Bezlepkin, “’Baltiiskie tigri’ prygnuli v mire,” Izvestiya, 27 June 2003, 
p. 5.
 4 David Fairlamb, “Prosvetayushchaia Baltika” Profil’, 14 July 2003, pp. 44-5.
 5 Vladimir Skripov, “Pryzhok “Baltiiskikh tigrov,” Ekspert Severo-Zapad, No. 19, 
(128), 26 May 2003, pp. 14-15.
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injustice of Russia having lower investment ratings than the Baltic States. 
“Today, the standard of living in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia is one and a 
half to two times as high as ours. It’s offensive to see, especially considering 
the manifestly anti-Russian bent of many Baltic politicians, the parades of 
former SS soldiers in Rīga, and the open racism of local ‘patriots’.”6 “Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania have investment ratings (notwithstanding the strong 
dependence of their economies on “unstable Russia” and the practice of 
apartheid, which is far more serious than other Russian political risks).”7 As 
noted elsewhere in this volume, disapproving references to Latvian minority 
policy were quite frequently included in stories on a wide range of topics, 
thereby constantly reminding the Russian audience about the alleged “dis-
crimination” of local Russian-speakers.
Several pieces traced the fate of brands from Latvia which had been 
famous during the Soviet era. One journalist waxed particularly nostalgic: 
“Citizens of the USSR fell into ecstasy at the word ‘Dzintars’ [a Latvian cos-
metic brand – NM]. Teenagers could, like adults, swagger in front of their 
friends with a gleaming moped “Rīga-12.” And before the Olympics, city folk 
received a minibus of unprecedented design called ‘RAF’” [Rīga Autobus 
Factory – NM]. Past success was contrasted with the recent decline of the 
Latvian industries producing these brands. RAF, noted the journalist, was 
sold for a sum that the director refused to divulge, because it was “humiliat-
ingly low.” The Rīga Traincar Company or RVR bankrupted in 1998, and 
the director is cited as saying “We cannot compete with the West, but we 
have prospects in the East”. The fate of VEF, the acronym for the State 
Electotechnical Factory, was even more dramatic: “from the former flag-
man of Soviet radio electronics, where 20,000 people worked, only cement 
flagstones and coverings are left.” The journalist noted that “Latvia lost 
many brands dear to the hearts of Russians.”8
While some authors traced the decline of Latvian brands to the Soviet 
break-up and subsequent structural readjustment, others linked it to broad-
er faulty policies on the part of the Latvian government, particularly in the 
realm of minority policy. “In the new Latvia not only was the population 
divided into true citizens and newly arrived “occupants”, but the role of bul-
wark of the “occupation” was assigned to the largest enterprises – not only 
military, but also peaceful “RAF”, and even their own native “VEF,” “Alfa,” 
“Radiotehnika” and “Kommutator” all died.”9
In Russia’s extreme nationalist press, the decline of Latvian industry 
was portrayed as the result of a conscious policy to force Russians out of 
the country: “primarily Russians worked at these enterprises and now, 
 6 Leonid Zhukhovitsky, “Pochemu my zhivem khorosho?,” Vechernaya Moskva, 
No. 139, 29 July 2004, p. 4.
 7 Oleg Anisimov and Igor’ Terent’ev, “Pyataya vlast’,” Finans, 2 December 2003, pp. 
16-22.
 8 Vladimir Gendlin, “Spokoinoy nochi, latyshi,” Kommersant’- Den’gi, 15 October 
2002, pp. 30-34.
 9 Evgeny Vostrukhov, “VEF v roly “ okupanta,” Gudok, 14 May 2003, p. 7.
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deprived of the right to earn their slice of bread, they inescapably had to 
leave.” While Latvian ethnic prejudice contributed to Latvian industrial de-
cline, this decline also reflected the backward nature of Latvians in general: 
“despite all their European “civilisational” pretensions, the Balts […] never 
stood out with their intellectual abilities. By birth and by rearing they were 
primarily pig-keepers, raising bacon for Europe. The Baltic republics have 
also remained such bacon countries.”10 Such outright disparaging remarks 
towards Latvians as whole were quite rare and appear to be the preserve of 
the extremist media in Russia.
A Sovetskaya Rossiya commentator also discovered a backward Latvia, 
with peasants living in “degrading poverty, rapidly dying out.” The Latvian 
countryside was awash in alcohol: “everybody drinks: children and adults, 
men and women, girls and teenagers.” “Women in the countryside are often 
killed, regularly beaten, without particular malice, and the women do not 
complain to the police, but just change their partners – legal marriages in 
the countryside are a rarity. One sees families with 5-6 children, and all 
from different fathers.” Again, backwardness and related social pathologies 
are attributed to conscious government policy: “These are the symbols of 
the new sovereign Latvia, where the destruction of one’s people has become 
government policy.”11
Such a one-sided view of the Latvian socio-economic landscape was 
infrequent. Indeed, on other topics, such as the Ventspils port, the bank-
ing system or tourism opportunities, one notes a grudging admiration for 
Latvia’s infrastructure, economic stability, and level of consumer service.
Ventspils: “They Can Build a Beach There”
The single most common context in which Latvian economic issues 
were mentioned in Russia’s media during the time period under study was 
on topics related to Ventspils port on the West coast of Latvia. Ventspils 
had been a major export route for Russian oil and other raw materials 
since the Soviet era, with up to 12-13% of all Russian oil exports passing 
through the port in the late 1990s. However, under Putin, Russia sought 
to lessen its dependence on various transit countries and to acquire tran-
sit infrastructure bordering Russia and beyond. This was also the case 
in relations with Latvia. Russia stopped oil transit through Ventspils in 
January 2003, redirected it to Primorsk, and signalled that the oil flow 
would resume through Ventspils only if Russia were allowed to acquire 
cheaply a significant stake in the Latvian port, something the Latvian 
authorities did not permit.
Media commentary of Ventspils was almost solely conducted by jour-
nalists, with occasional brief comments by Russian officials or analysts. 
Latvian government officials were rarely cited, though long-time Ventspils 
mayor Aivars Lembergs, often portrayed as the key figure on the Latvian 
 10 Evgeny Rostikov, “Na svyazi Minsk,” Zavtra, 24 March 2005, p. 4.
 11 Olga Ivanova, “Mogila bez imeni,” Sovetskaya Rossiya, 6 May 2003, p. 3.
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side, did manage to be featured in several long interviews12 or to be cited at 
length in several articles.13
Russian commentators readily acknowledged that “the key oil port in 
the post-Soviet space is Latvia’s Ventspils.”14 What is more, they commented 
favourably on the service and infrastructure available there: it was the 
“traditional port for the export of oil, with 40 years of experience. Russian 
oil exporters know the port well and always note its agreeable, punctual 
work. The ice-free, deep water harbour permits large DWT tankers of up to 
150,000 tonnes to transport oil cargoes the full year round, without using 
ice breakers.”15
While generally positive about the facilities and the service, commenta-
tors tended to exaggerate the role of oil transit in the Latvian economy. For 
some, it accounted for 10% of the budget;16 for others, 20-23% of Latvian 
budget revenues;17 some even claimed that Ventspils was responsible for 
“almost 25%” of the national budget!18 By suggesting such a high level of de-
pendence, Russian commentators placed Latvia in the position of a parasitic 
satellite of Russia.
However, this small, dependent satellite living well because of Russian 
exports was even capable of biting the hand that fed it. The 1990s witnessed 
what one commentator called the “harsh dependence of Russian exporters 
on Baltic providers of transit services, who, using their monopolistic position, 
began to raise tariffs.”19 Contemporary Latvians exploited their position not 
only out of the desire to reap commercial gains, but also to extract “revenge” 
upon Russia in a manner as ruthless as their forebears during the Russian 
Revolution. “With the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia lost oil terminals in 
the Baltic. For the young, growing economies of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia 
payment for transit of Russian raw materials became very good assistance. 
Evidently, in revenge for the “occupation”, they set completely merciless 
tariffs for us. In this regard, the descendants of the Latvian riflemen par-
ticularly stood out.”20
 12 Tatyana Rybakova, “Aivars Lembergs, Predsedatel’ pravleniya Ventspilskogo svo-
bodnogo porta: Rossiya seychas teryayet $1,5 millyarda v god,” Izvestiya, 14 April 
2003, p. 7; Denis Krilov, “ Aivars Lembergs: “ Odnim iz lozungov na shestviyakh 
esesovtsev byl “Lembergsa i tranzit – von iz Latvii,” Russky fokus, 27 January 
2003, pp. 23-25.
 13 Yekaterina Kravchenko, “Ventspils prosit russkogo syr’ya,” Izvestia, 14 March 
2003, p. 6. Denis Krilov, “Za Ventspils otvechaesh?” Russky fokus, 17 February 
2003, p. 17.
 14 Irina Mokrousova, “Baltiisky gambit,” Biznes, No. 79, 4 May 2005.
 15 Dmitry Ivanov, “ Bosfor i Dardanelly grozyat ubytkami,” Parlamentskaya gazeta, 
23 March 2004, p. 3.
 16 Nikolay Viktorov, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 8 April 2003, p. 10.
 17 Aleksey Chichkin, “Drugim putem,” Rossiskaya Biznes-gazeta, 1 April 2003, p. 8.
 18 Aleksey Pushkov, Telekanal “TV-Tsentr,” Postskriptum, 19 April 2003, 21:00.
 19 Sergey Gerasimov, “Baltiiski transit: rabota nad oshibkami,” Rossiiskaya gazeta, 
2 February 2005, p. 5.
 20 Gleb Borisov, “Osada Ventspilsa, ili noski vmesto nefti,” Moskovskaya promysh-
lennaya gazeta, 27 February 2003, p. 10.
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Some Russian commentators found it unfathomable that, given a choice, 
Russia would continue to use the Ventspils route for oil transit. “Until re-
cently we exported oil to Europe through Ventspils port and for this Ventspils 
received more than USD 250 million a year. It seems that it would be more 
advantageous and patriotic if these millions went to Russian, not foreign oil 
terminals.”21 The illogic of granting transit revenue to Latvia, portrayed by 
some as an unfriendly country, was underlined: “The leadership of Russia 
understood long ago that promoting the flourishing of not altogether friendly 
neighbours at one’s own expense is, to put it mildly, unreasonable.”22 While 
shifting to Russian terminals would satisfy both commercial and “patriotic” 
needs, it would also provide some emotional gratification vis-à-vis Latvia: 
“the desire to punish Latvia for the long years of its transit monopoly can 
be explained.”23
Indeed, when the Primorsk oil terminal was fully operational and Russia 
had halted all oil transit through the pipeline to Ventspils, Russian com-
mentators relished the turning of the tables on Latvia: “The Russian side 
is going to dictate the conditions. And for this we should thank Transneft, 
which built the Baltic Pipeline System and demonstrated who is the master 
of the house.”24 This situation symbolised the new found pride and assertive-
ness of Putin-era Russia, which was no longer going to be pushed around by 
anyone, least of all Latvia: “the times when Russia was required to accept 
the conditions of the Latvian side are gone and without Russian oil Ventspils 
will remain a dry port.”25 Halting the flow of oil through Venstpils was 
portrayed as a “strong blow” to Latvia, a “demonstration of strength and 
independence from our neighbours.”26 This newfound position of strength 
was occasioned by some rather harsh rhetoric. Russian observers quoted 
with approval Sergey Grigoriev, vice president of Trasneft, who remarked 
regarding Ventspils: “they can build a beach there.”27
When the oil stopped flowing, Russia made it clear that the only way it 
would resume was if Russia were allowed to acquire a controlling stake in 
Ventspils Nafta, the loading company with a monopolistic position in the port. 
“In essence, Latvia has been given harsh conditions: either allow Russian 
business control of the oil transit corridor to Ventspils, or transit will leave 
for your neighbours.”28 The Latvian side tried various tactics to prod Russia 
to rethink its stance: arranging for the chairmen of several large Russian oil 
 21 Vladimir Popov, “Vyazhite noski i ne beytes’ za tranzit nefti,” Gudok, 15 February 
2003, p. 6.
 22 Gleb Borisov, “Osada Ventspilsa, ili noski vmesto nefti,” Moskovskaya promysh-
lennaya gazeta, 27 February 2003, p. 10.
 23 Kirill Semenov, “Truby rubyat – den’gi letyat”, Rossiskaya gazeta, 31 January 
2003, p. 8.
 24 Anatoly Velednitsky, “Transneft na rasput’e,” Trud, 28 February 2003, p. 3.
 25 Dmitry Orlov, “Ekonomicheskie natsionalisty i real’nye interesy,” Nezavisimaya 
gazeta, 23 May 2003, p. 11.
 26 Nikita Nikolaev, “Truba u viska,” Rossiskie vesti, 29 January 2003, p. 7.
 27 Gleb Borisov, “Osada Ventspilsa, ili noski vmesto nefti,” Moskovskaya promysh-
lennaya gazeta, 27 February 2003, p. 10.
 28 Aleksy Chichkin, “Tsena baltiiskoy karty,” Konservator, 21 March 2003, p. 11.
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companies to send a joint letter to Putin, submission of a diplomatic note to 
Russia, and raising the issue through channels within the European Union 
and the United States. Recourse to support from international partners elic-
ited a quite angry, ironic response from Russian commentators.
Latvia was portrayed as a naïve, plaintive child, always turning to 
Europe in times of need, whereas alleged wrongdoing on the part of the 
“imperialistic” Russian “occupiers” was mentioned with dripping irony: “In 
these circumstances, Rīga found nothing better than to turn to Europe with 
complaints about the remnants of Russian imperialism.”29 “A complaint from 
Rīga to the European Union was sent not on the traditional theme of the 
Russian occupation.”30 Particular ire was sparked by Latvia’s attempt to in-
volve the United States in the dispute by raising the issue with U.S. President 
George W. Bush: “There they are, the indirect consequences of the victory 
of the United States in Iraq. Now Washington is going to tell us where and 
how to pump our oil. How do you like that?”31 Here, the commentator linked 
dissatisfaction with U.S. unilateralism in Iraq, resentment at being told what 
to do by the West in the past, with the current oil transit dispute and Latvia.
When a contraband cross-border hose transferring home-brewed alco-
hol was discovered spanning the Russian-Latvian frontier, one commentator 
detected humourous parallels: “It cannot be excluded that the harrowing 
announcements about the “dry pipeline” and the sufferings of the Latvian 
budget awakened a creative process in people with a tendency to transit-
transport research.” The author linked this “new mode of international 
communication” with a scandal involving Russian tycoon Yury Shefler, who 
had left Russia with the Stolichnaya and Moskovskaya brands and settled 
in Latvia. Together with Latvian “oligarch” Andris Skele, Shefler bought 
the spirits company Latvijas balzams and began producing the well-known 
Russian vodka from Latvia. While the author noted that the primary mar-
ket for Stolichnaya and Moskovskaya is the United States, “it is unlikely 
that Mrs. Vīķe-Freiberga will tell President Bush about this at their next 
meeting in the White House.”32 This virtuouso example of inter-textuality 
linked oil transit and moonshine contraband, the oil business and a scandal 
surrounding the well-known Russian vodka brands, with the tendency of 
Latvian politicians to complain to Western partners about Russia about all 
manner of Russian malfeasance.
Latvian Banks: Attractive, but a Little Shady 
(Except for Parex)
After Ventspils, the second most frequent Latvian economic topic cov-
ered in the Russian media overall was the Latvian banking system, with 
 29 Darya Zhdanova, “Kto ostalsya na trube?” Moskovskie novosti, 11 February 2003, 
p. 12.
 30 Evgeny Vostrukhov, “Latviya ‘nastuchala’ na Rossiyu,” Gudok, 4 February 2003, 
p. 5
 31 Aleksey Pushkov, “Telekanal “TV-Tsentr”,” Postskriptum, 19 April 2003, 21:00.
 32 Evgeny Vostrukhov, “ Tonnel’ pod granitsey,” Gudok, 9 August 2003, p. 6.
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far more than a half of all items devoted to Parex Bank alone. It should be 
noted that this was a period in which Parex was seeking a strategic foreign 
investor, and thus, was likely to have engaged in considerable international 
public relations activities. Regardless, the degree to which Parex dominated 
the coverage of Latvian banking is quite striking, as it received easily more 
than 10 times as much coverage as any other single bank. Moreover, the por-
trayal of Parex was overwhelmingly positive. Before examining treatment 
of Parex, it is useful to examine briefly portrayal of the broader banking 
system.
In general, Latvian banks are portrayed as being very attractive: “Latvia 
(and particularly Rīga) in the last several years has become the financial 
centre of the Baltic states and really enjoys the love of Russian businessmen, 
particularly now, as it plans on entering the European Union.”33 The at-
traction of Latvian banks increased significantly after the Russian Central 
Bank removed Latvia from a black list of “offshore zones” to which a special, 
strict financial regime had been applied since 1998. One commentator por-
trayed the restrictions as a means by which Russian financial regulators 
“kept the Balts on a short leash: they could be squeezed, punished”. Easing 
the restrictions was “an unexpected gift to our northwestern neighbour.”34 
Thus, Latvia was a little dog, while Russia was the stern, controlling mas-
ter. Removing the restrictions was a bone tossed to the dog. For their part, 
Russian bankers and businessmen greeted the removal of the restrictions as 
“a colossal breakthrough,”35 a decision that “should have been taken a long 
time ago,”36 the rectification of an “absurd situation”.37
Money-laundering in Latvian banks was an issue that came up sev-
eral times over the period in review. In 2002, Russian media reported on 
an American law enforcement operation that allegedly implicated Latvia’s 
Aizkraukles Bank in laundering the money of Columbian narcotics dealers.38 
In 2004, Russian media reported on the alleged involvement of Aizkraukles 
Bank in a money-laundering scheme created by the Russian company “Eko-
Buro.”39 That same year several reports appeared in Russia’s media about 
Latvian banks following the lead of United States financial institutions in 
closing correspondent accounts of Russian financial organisations, a fact 
perceived with some concern in Russian circles, as Latvian banks “occupy 
 33 Vladimir Sysoev, “Tsentrobank ubral absolyutno nenuzhnyi dokument,” Gazeta, 
4 October 2002, p. 11.
 34 Yaroslav Skvortsov, “Blizhe, chem Shveitsariya,” Kompaniya, 7 October 2002, pp. 
4-5.
 35 Natalya Kulakova, Kirill Yacheistov, “Rossiisky TsB poveril Latvii napolovinu,” 
Kommersant’, 4 October 2002, pp. 1, 15.
 36 Otdel’ finansov, “Vy dovol’ny resheniem TsB?” Kommersant’, 4 October 2002, p. 15.
 37 Anatoly Khodorovsky, “Absurd Pokidaet Tsentrobank,” Russky focus, 23 September 
2002, p. 17.
 38 Aleksandr Zakharov, Varvara Vasilyeva, “Latviisky bank priznalsya v otmyvanii,” 
Kommersant’, 16 February 2002, p. 13; N.A., Vremya novostei, 17 December 2002, 
p. 9.
 39 Aleksandr Shvarev, “Kak militsioner prokurory,” Vremya novostei, 11 August 
2004, p. 3.
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fourth place in the world in the volume of clearing operations with Russian 
banks in dollars.”40 In 2005 Russian media contained several reports on US 
allegations against two Latvian banks (VEF Banka and Multibanka) for 
money-laundering.41 In a rare attack on the Latvian banking system, “Radio 
Rossiya” even alleged that “Russian special services have announced more 
than once that field commanders from Chechnya keep their savings in 
Latvian banks, that funding goes through these banks towards terrorist 
activities on the territory of Russia.”42
While Russia’s media portrayed Latvia as an attractive place for banking 
in general, portrayal included mention of shady practices, following the lead 
of Russia’s arch-rival the United States, and even allegations that Latvian 
banks were used by terrorist enemies of the Russian state. In contrast, the 
portrait of Parex, Latvia’s largest commercial bank, was much more one-
sided in a positive direction.
Parex: “The Only Russian-Speaking Western Bank”
Articles and broadcasts devoted to Parex Bank were the second most 
frequent Latvian economic story in Russia’s media overall after Ventspils. 
This author counted 91 items devoted primarily or exclusively to Parex in 
the time period under review. The coverage often reads like advertising for 
the bank, especially when identical turns of phrase are used in various me-
dia outlets. The fact that the bank is located in Latvia often received men-
tion only incidentally or was even downplayed.
With very few exceptions, the coverage was overwhelmingly positive, 
even adulatory: Parex is a “brand which for many has become a legend and 
model of enterprise.”43 Parex has created “the best team of highly qualified 
and experienced professionals in the Baltic.”44 While Russian journalists 
themselves praised Parex, they often cited international financial jour-
nals, such as The Banker,45 Euromoney,46 and Global Finance,47 which had 
 40 Inessa Pepernaya, “Vremya zakruchivat’ gaiki,” Profil’, No. 43, 22 November 
2004, p. 74.
 41 Evegeny Vatamanyuk, Tatyana Bochkareva, “V chernyi spisok,” Vedomosti, 
25 April 2005, p. B6.
 42 Anna Solovyeva, “Iz zhizni deneg,” Radiostantsiya “Radio Rossii,” 1 June 2005, 
07:14.
 43 Karen Markaryan, “Parex uverenno lidiruyet,” Komsomol’skaya pravda, 19 March 
2003, p. 10. Kristine Bilaine, “Latviisky bank obosnovalsya v Evrope,” Rossiskaya 
Biznes-gazeta, 25 March 2003, p. 7.
 44 Yury Petrov, “Parex svodit investorov s emitentami,” Rossiskaya Biznes-gazeta, 
24  une 2003, p. 8.
 45 N.A. “Priz zhurnala The Banker u Parex,” Komsomol’skaya pravda, 25 September 
2002, p. 10; Karen Markaryan, “Bank Parex luchshy v Latvii,” Komsomol’skaya 
pravda, 30 September 2004, p. 12.
 46 Yury Petrov, “Parex bank podtverdil mezhdunarodnoe priznanie,” Rossiskaya 
Biznes-gazeta, 29 July 2003, p. 7.
 47 Karen Markaryan, “Bank Parex – luchshy,” Komsomol’skaya pravda, 20 August 
2003, p. 8. Karen Markaryan, “Parex – luchshy bank v Latvii,” Komsomol’skaya 
pravda, 13 May 2005, p. 5.
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bestowed various awards on Parex. In an unusual move, one fawning jour-
nalist from Komsomol’skaya Pravda reported having deposited USD 1000 in 
Parex himself and earning 5.5% annual interest or USD 44.40 in 10 months. 
He pointedly noted that, with a bit more patience, he could have earned a 
20% return.48
As opposed to other topics in which interlocutors from Latvia were 
rarely allowed to speak for themselves, Russian media frequently let Parex 
bank officials do the talking in interviews or through extensive quotations. 
Media outlets featured long, friendly interviews not only with Parex co-
head and co-owner Valery Kargin49 and his partner Viktor Krasovitsky,50 
but with others as well, such as Vice President Aleksandr Kvasov,51 Vice 
President Gatis Kokins,52 Vice President Evgeny Zolotarev,53 head of the 
department for sales and marketing Guntis Beļavskis,54 deputy head of 
the branch department Vladimir Ivanov,55 head of the credit card depart-
ment Andris Riekstiņš,56 President of Parex Asset Management Roberts 
Idelsons57 and others.
In such circumstances, the way in which Parex representatives por-
trayed Latvia was just as important as the way in which Russian journal-
ists portrayed it. Valery Kargin presented Latvia as “a small laboratory,” 
“a quiet, small Baltic state […] It’s a democratic country here.”58 A com-
mon turn of phrase used by Kargin was also that Latvia is “a country 
where money rests.”59 In this regard, Kargin was wont to draw compari-
 48 Karen Markaryan, “Kak zarabotat’ na fondovikh rynkakh,” Komsomol’skaya 
pravda, 26 November 2003, p. 16.
 49 Analatoly Khodorovsky, “Valery Kargin: ‘Ya okhotno dal by kredit Rossii 
kak strane’,” Russky fokus, 30 June 2003, pp. 63-5; Karen Markaryan, “My 
znachitel’naya finansovaya sila v vostochnoy Evrope,” Komsomol’skaya pravda, 
20 February 2004, p. 60; N.A., “Valery Kargin, Prezident Parex Bank: Svoy schot v 
Evrope,” Moskovsky komsomolets, 22 April 2004, p. 5; Boris Fyodorov, “Nam vypal 
zamechatel’ny shans,” Ekspert, No. 434 (444), 22 November 2004, pp. 129-130.
 50 Demis Polandov, “Viktor Krasovitsky: ‘Izmeneniya v nashikh otnosheniyakh mogut 
pouchuvstvovat’ zhurnalisty, no nikak ne bankiry,”Russky fokus 23 September 
2002, pp. 74-5; N.A., “Latviya golosuet za Evropu,” Moskovsky komsomolets 14 
October 2003, p. 5.
 51 Yuliya Govorun, “Pretekli,” Gazeta, 14 July 2004, p. 8.
 52 Andrey Nechaev, “Finansovy klub,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak,” 10 April 2004, 12:45.
 53 Vladimir Sysoev, “Vsegda legche navesti porydok v mal’enkom dome, chem v 
ogromnom zamke,” Gazeta, 15 October 2002, p. 12.
 54 Karen Markaryan, “Internet-bank: bystro, nadezhno, vygodno,” Komsomol’skaya 
pravda, 25 June 2003, p. 10.
 55 Karen Markaryan, “Parex v Londone – Parex,” Komsomol’skaya pravda, 14 May 
2003, p. 13.
 56 N.A., “U zhurnalistov sozdaetsya vpechatlenie, chto u nas tut prosto rai dlya 
moshennikov,” Gazeta, 4 December 2002, p. 12.
 57 Andrey Nechaev, “Finansovy klub,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak,” 22 November 2003, 
12:45.
 58 Anatoly Khodorovsky, “Valery Kargin: ‘Ya okhotno dal by kredit Rossii kak 
strane’,” Russky fokus, 30 June 2003, pp. 63-5.
 59 Anatoly Khodorovsky, “Latviiskaya razborka c Rossiiskim dushkom,” Russky 
fokus, 2 June 2003, p. 17.
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sons between Latvia and Switzerland, where Parex had recently bought 
shares in a private bank: “10 years ago Parex had the motto “We are 
closer than Switzerland”. Now it can be said differently: “We are already 
in Switzerland.”60
Interestingly, when addressing Russia’s audience, Kargin displayed 
reverence for both tsarist Russia and Vladimir Putin. In a lengthy inter-
view, Kargin pointed out that Parex works in a building that has housed a 
bank since 1912, “when Rīga was the largest port in the Russian Empire.” 
While respectful of tradition and Russian historical memory, Kargin also 
bowed in reverence towards contemporary Russia and claimed that the rest 
of Latvia did likewise: “We have great respect towards the policy of building 
a new Russia carried out by President Putin. For Latvian society, Putin is 
likeable.”61
Other Parex representatives also portrayed Latvia in similar terms, as 
a “small and quiet European country, where it is convenient to earn money,” 
a “place where for centuries Eastern and Western capital have met.”62 Latvia 
was a “financial bridge” with “splendid knowledge of the Russian language” 
that was “closer than Zurich.”63 Stressing the unique attraction of Parex, 
one representative even claimed that it was “the only Russian-speaking 
Western bank.”64
As opposed to other individual Latvian banks, which merited men-
tion in Russia’s media primarily in the context of allegations of money 
laundering, Parex received coverage for a wide range of new services it 
offered, branch offices it opened, or for corporate sponsorship of various 
events. Thus, the media covered such new services as the introduction of 
a new client-to-client VISA cash transfer system,65 Parex’s acquisition of 
exclusive rights to distribute American Express credit cards,66 new loan 
programmes for the purchase of cars or mortgages for housing,67 and Parex 
being the first Latvian bank to introduce the IBAN system.68 The opening 
 60 Karen Markaryan, “Parex uzhe v Shveytsarii,” Komsomol’skaya pravda, 19 March 
2004, p. 16.
 61 Karen Markaryan, “Valery Kargin: My sposobstvuyem druzhbe mezhdu Latviey i 
Rossiey,” Komsomoskaya Pravda, 27 February 2004, p. 8.
 62 N.A., “Latviya golosuet za Evropu,” Moskovsky komsomolets, 14 October 2003, p. 5.
 63 Karen Markaryan, “Parex v Londone – Parex,” Komsomol’skaya pravda, 14 May 
2003, p. 13.
 64 Vladimir Sysoev, “Vsegda legche navesti porydok v mal’enkom dome, chem v 
ogromnom zamke,” Gazeta, 15 October 2002, p. 12.
 65 Karen Markaryan, “Parex pervym v mire predlagaet novuyu uslugu VISA,” 
Komsomol’skaya pravda, 23 October 2002, p. 13.
 66 Yuliya Gorshkova, “V Latvii poyavyatsya novye kreditnye karty,” Komsomol’skaya 
pravda, 27 April 2005, p. 4.
 67 Kristina Bilaine, “Kreditnyi portfel’ dlya chastnikov,” Rossiskaya Biznes-gazeta, 
26 February 2003, p. 7. Kristina Bilaine, “’Sem’ya’stala programmoy dlya banka,” 
Rossiskaya Biznes-gazeta, 15 April 2003, p. 7
 68 Andrey Erokhin, “Banki Latvii perekhodyat na standarty ES,” Rossiskaya Biznes-
gazeta, 27 January 2004, p. 7.
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of new Parex branch offices in London69 and in Stockholm70 also earned 
coverage, as did the purchase of shares in a Swiss bank.71
Parex as a good corporate citizen in Latvia, Russia and the interna-
tional community was also a common theme. In Latvia, Parex sponsored not 
only a Russian folk festival in Rīga,72 but also donated 10,000 Euro to the 
Rīga International Institute of Transport and Communications,73 a private 
Russian-speaking institution of higher education. Parex’s largesse was not 
limited to Latvia, as it also sponsored an artist’s exhibition in Moscow.74 
Interestingly, Parex’s sponsorship of “A Baltic Celebration” in Washington, 
D.C.75 and role as the “sole corporate sponsor from the Baltic” at the Prague 
NATO summit in November 200276 also received positive coverage, which 
is particularly unusual given widespread anti-American and anti-NATO 
sentiment in Russia. Apparently, the image of being an international player 
that could even work with the Americans trumped the possible negative as-
sociations.
Amid the overwhelmingly positive coverage, the few negative stories 
about Parex stood out in sharp relief. One negative story linked Parex to 
former Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy. Rutskoy, accused of fi-
nancial malfeasance, was alleged to have a Parex credit card under his wife’s 
name, an allegation he vigorously denied.77 Another brief negative story in-
volved the closure by the Russian authorities of Parex representation offices 
in Yekaterinburg for “illegal banking activity and the removal of capital.”78 
However, neither of these stories occasioned any particular comment about 
Parex in general or Latvia as a locale for banking in particular.
 69 Kristina Bilaine, “Pareks prishel v Velikobritaniyu,” Rossiskaya Biznes-gazeta, 
3 September 2002, p. 7
 70 Kristina Bilaine, “Latviiskie bankiry vysadilis’ v Shvetsii,” Rossiskaya Biznes-
gazeta, 20 May 2003, p. 7.
 71 Yury Petrov, “Latviisky bank kupil shveytsarsky,” Rossiskaya Biznes-gazeta, 
23 March 2004, p. 7.
 72 Karen Markaryan, “Parex vozrozhdaet traditsii,” Komsomol’skaya pravda, 
14 January 2004, p. 10.
 73 Yury Petrov, “Pareks bank podderzhivaet i vuzy, i uchashchikhsya,” Rossiskaya 
Biznes-gazeta, 30 September 2003, p. 8; Karen Markaryan, “Parex pomogaet 
studentam,” Komsomol’skaya pravda, 17 September 2003, p. 18.
 74 Lyudmilla Goncharova, “Khrustal’ny soblazn,” Kul’tura, No. 14, 8 April 2004, p. 
10.
 75 N.A., “Parex bank sopredsedatel’stvoval na vtorom ezhegodnom forume ‘A Baltic 
Celebration’ v Vashingtone,” Moskovsky komsomolets, 2 December 2003, p. 2; 
Yury Petrov, “Bankiry baltii sblizhayut politikov,” Rossiskaya Biznes-gazeta, 
25 November 2003, p. 7.
 76 Kristina Bilaine, “Parex Bank priglasili v NATO,” Rossiskaya Biznes-gazeta, 
26 November 2002, p. 7. Karen Markaryan, “Finansy i politika,” Komsomol’skaya 
pravda, 27 November 2002, p. 12.
 77 Aleksey Zakharov, “Rutskomu otkazali,” Rossiiskaya gazeta, No. 22, 6 February 
2004, p. 5. Dmitry Orishchenko, “Aleksnadra Rutskogo kroyut kartoy ego zheny,” 
Kommersant’, 6 February 2004, p. 6
 78 Mariya Cherkasova, “Parex vyselili iz Yekaterinburga,” Kommersant’, 20 January 
2003, p. 14.
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The tendency to provide positive coverage of Parex was so pronounced, 
that even stories of little more than local importance became news in Russia. 
Thus, Parex’s organisation of a large corporate bash with 4,500 people to 
celebrate its 15th anniversary was portrayed as the “largest corporate party 
in the entire history of Latvia.” Parex was an international bank that hap-
pened to be in Latvia, insofar as “toasts in honour of Parex sounded not only 
in Russian and Latvian, but in German, English and even in Japanese.”79 
When Valery Kargin purchased a Maybach, an expensive automobile, this 
also became “another calling card of the success of the largest bank in Latvia 
in terms of assets and deposits.”80
Tourism in Latvia: Quiet, Romantic, and Surprise – 
No Language Barrier!
Another Latvian economic topic that was relatively frequent in Russia’s 
media was Latvia as a tourist destination. Here again, Latvia was occasion-
ally portrayed as part of a broader Baltic unit. Rīga and the seaside resort of 
Jūrmala have their own images, though no other Latvian city registered on 
the Russian tourist’s radar screen. Portrayal was overwhelmingly positive, 
and the portrayers were both tour operators, who often have a vested inter-
est in painting a positive image, but also journalists.
In 2003 a journalist noted that “Love towards the Baltic has reawoken 
among Russians.” Such love might be a bit embarrassing, were it not for the 
fact that it could be detected in Europe as well, “which lacks any psycho-
logical territorial complexes towards the Baltic, [where] one perceives not 
only a simple interest in the Baltic states, but a true fashion for the Baltic 
[..] the Baltic – something new, tasteful and occasionally even completely 
exotic.”81 Another commentator noted that “Russians are returning to the 
Baltics. The new years celebrations confirm this – the best hotels in Vilnius, 
Rīga and especially Tallinn were literally crammed with our compatriots.”82 
When a journalist asked a tour operator about the attraction, the response 
was quite simple: the Baltics are “an objectively good vacation.”83 Another 
noted that this was nothing new, since “today, as previously, a vacation in 
the Baltic is prestigious and what is more, relatively cheap.”84
 79 N.A., “Parex otmetil 15 let,” Moskovsky komsomolets, 13 January 2004, p. 2. Karen 
Markaryan, “Brendu Parex – 15 let,” Komsomol’skaya pravda, 26 December 2003, 
p. 61.
 80 Karen Markaryan, “Maybach dlya Kargina,” Komsomol’skaya pravda, 28 May 
2003, p. 13.
 81 Elena Anosova, Ada Shmerling, “Novaya Evropa,” Inostranets, 24 November 2003, 
p. 9.
 82 Vladimir Chernousov, “Kak i gde my otdykhaem,” Ezhenedel’yi zhurnal, No. 8, 
1 March 2004, pp. 71-74.
 83 Aleksey Venediktov, “Prezident Rossiskogo soyuza turizma Sergey Shpil’ko 
ob’yasnyaet problemy s polucheniem latviiskikh viz povysheniem sprosa na pri-
baltiku,” Radiostantsiya “Ekho Moskvy,” 3 August 2003, 17:07.
 84 Mariya Katsman, “Nash sezon – otkryvaem svoyu pribaltiku,” Inostranets, No. 10, 
22 March 2005, p. 7.
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Interestingly, some of the commentary surrounding the Baltic as a 
tourist demonstration betrayed a lingering incomprehension that Latvia 
and the other Baltic States were independent countries with all the associ-
ated attributes. It struck several commentators as odd that one needed a 
visa to travel to the Baltic and that they had their own currencies. “You 
can’t just buy a train ticket and go there: you need a travel passport (za-
granpasport) and visa.”85 One journalist who was particularly well-disposed 
towards Latvia even noted that, “for a citizen of Russia, who has not yet 
weaned himself from considering Latvia partly “ours”, this is an affront. 
From the beginning I felt no affront, on the contrary, I completely recog-
nized the right to historical affronts for the Latvians.”86 A tour operator to 
the Baltic explained to an incredulous interviewer: “They are proud of their 
local currencies and they all accept only local currency.” Moreover, “insofar 
as it is abroad, you need visas.”87
Given the overall image of the Baltic states as a place where the Russian 
minority lives in a difficult plight and the local populations harbour his-
torical grudges against Russia, a question “that is of interest to absolutely 
everyone is the attitude towards Russian tourists there.” A tour operator 
reassured her interlocutor that the attitude towards Russian tourists was 
“simply remarkable.” Asked about “problems with the Russian language in 
restaurants and cafes,” the same operator responded “No problems at all.”88 
Another journalist noted with amazement, “What is most interesting – Rīga 
speaks Russian.”89
Some observers recalled the former image of Latvia as the most 
European part of the Soviet Union, “a country where previously you went to 
“have a look at Europe.” Now, one could go there “for the peace and quiet, 
the romance and nostalgia.”90 Latvia’s capital Rīga and the nearby seaside 
resort of Jūrmala have more distinct images than Latvia does overall.
Rīga is “a most interesting capital of the Middle Ages,”91 “a city that 
surprises with its proportional size and peaceful atmosphere.”92 Another 
journalist implicitly compared contemporary Rīga with Soviet-era Rīga 
and stressed its European credentials: “Rīga turned out to be enchanting. 
 85 Yekaterina Dolgosheeva, “Spokoistvie, tol’ko spokoistvie,” Kommersant’, 3 July 
2003, p. 18.
 86 Marina Koldobskaya, “S’ezdit’ v Rigu,” Novoe vremya, No. 44, 31 October 2004, p. 
5.
 87 Elene Shchedunova, “Direktor turfirm ‘Skanditour’ i ‘Satmarket’ o prei mush-
chestvakh otdykha v pribaltike,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak-24,” 11 July 2003, 16:10.
 88 Ibid.
 89 Marina Koldobskaya, “S’ezdit’ v Rigu,” Novoe vremya, No. 44, 31 October 2004, 
p. 5.
 90 Yekaterina Dolgosheeva, “Spokoistvie, tol’ko spokoistvie,” Kommersant’, 3 July 
2003, p. 18.
 91 Elene Shchedunova, “Direktor turfirm ‘Skanditour’ i ‘Satmarket’o preimush-
chestvakh otdykha v pribaltike,” Radiostantsiya “Mayak-24,” 11 July 2003, 16:10.
 92 Yekaterina Dolgosheeva, “Spokoistvie, tol’ko spokoistvie,” Kommersant’, 3 July 
2003, p. 18.
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Capitalism has done her well. It is a beautiful, clean, completely European 
city, which has not yet been besmirched by tourists.”93 The highest form of 
flattery came from a journalist who went so far as to claim “One should live 
here. Maybe not all the time. Maybe just visit, but visit more often, as often 
as possible.” “Rīga is, as before, comfortable, quiet and hospitable. Those 
who say we lost her are stupid. The truth is only that we can discover her 
anew.”94
During the Soviet era, the Latvian resort of Jūrmala had competed with 
the Crimea as the favourite vacation spot for the Soviet elite. While Russian 
tourists kept away for the first decade of post-Soviet life due to inter-state 
political tensions, currency reforms and visa requirements, they were back 
in force from the beginning of the decade. Jūrmala was portrayed as a city of 
“sea, pine trees and romance,” a “city of ‘comical traditions’ and ‘intelligent 
rest’… a place where well-known actors, musicians, and artists relax.”95
While Jūrmala was a good place to visit, it was also a good place to 
invest in real estate. One article even dubbed it a “near offshore zone.” In re-
sponse to the question, “What is attractive about Jūrmala?,” one journalist 
offered the following features: “The sea, the pine trees, the mild climate… 
A high level of service, qualitative and natural products. From Moscow, it is 
an hour’s flight or a night in a comfortable train. The public actively speaks 
Russian… The prices for real estate – at the level of those in Spain, but 
lower than in Moscow… For many Rīga and Jūrmala have become a kind of 
personal offshore zone, a quiet harbour where it is possible to take shelter 
from the domestic political tempest of one’s historical birthplace.”96 Thus, 
Latvia was a calm oasis, a respite from the turbulent life in Russia.
Conclusion
The portrait of Latvian economic issues in Russia’s media redounded 
well to Latvia’s overall image, as positive features outweighed negative ones. 
Moreover, the associations evoked by Latvia and the contrast with contem-
porary Russia served to help Russian journalists define Russia for a Russian 
audience.
On the positive side of the ledger, Latvia was an economic success story 
with a well-developed infrastructure and a high level of service in ports, 
banks, and the tourist industry. To the surprise of commentators from 
Russia, the everyday attitude of Latvians toward citizens of Russia was 
quite positive and Latvians spoke Russian well and willingly. This was the 
case not only in establishments such as banks, but also throughout Rīga and 
Jūrmala. Latvia in general was portrayed as an island of calm and quiet – an 
excellent locale for keeping one’s money and for relaxing. Rīga and Jūrmala, 
 93 Marina Koldobskaya, “S’ezdit’ v Rigu,” Novoe vremya, No. 44, 31 October 2004, p. 5.
 94 Timofey Khmelev, “My uzhe daleko,” Ekspert Severo-zapad, No. 14 9171), 12 April 
2004, pp. 25-7.
 95 Mariya Katsman, “Nash sezon – otkryvaem svoyu pribaltiku,” Inostranets, No. 10, 
22 March 2005, p. 7.
 96 Lyusya Pribyl’skaya, “Blizhny ofshor,” Moskovskie novosti, 9 December 2003, p. 14.
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in the estimation of observers from Russia, were cheaper than Moscow, but 
on a par with other European destinations. Indeed, Russian observers fre-
quently applied the label “Western” or “European” to Latvia, and in the 
context of banking and tourism, this had a primarily positive connotation.
Despite the overall positive picture, a number of recurrent negative 
characteristics of Latvia were also emphasised. At least some of Latvia’s 
wealth was due to its parasitic nature, charging exorbitant fees until 2003 
for the use of the Ventspils port for oil transit and occasionally providing safe 
haven for “dirty money” from Russia. For Russian commentators, Latvia 
had the annoying habit of complaining to Europe and the United States 
about Russian historical transgressions and Russian economic and political 
pressure. Such complaints elicited nothing but irony or anger from Russian 
observers. At the same time, even positive portrayals of Latvia often men-
tioned the alleged discrimination of Russians.
The treatment of Latvia often helped to define Russia in both implicit 
and explicit ways. Discussion of Latvia brought to the mind of some Russian 
commentators memories of loss – lost empire, lost ports, lost international 
influence. At the same time, many authors stressed Latvia’s “smallness” 
which was implicitly contrasted with Russia’s grandeur. Moreover, by re-
directing oil transit or easing banking restrictions with regard to Latvia, 
Russia could assert its influence against this small neighbour. The tough 
tactics against Ventspils in particular suggested to Russian commenta-
tors that Russia was growing stronger, was no longer dependent on its 
neighbours, and could stand up to Europe and the US or Latvia backed 
by Europe and the US. While Latvia evoked memories of both the tsar-
ist era and the Soviet Union, as before, it continued to symbolise Europe, 
which has traditionally evoked in Russia not only positive associations, but 
a range of contradictory emotions and stances, from wonder to repulsion 
and inferiority complexes.
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Conclusion
Nils Muižnieks
The findings of the research confirm some widespread suspicions, but 
also yield a number of surprises. The Russian media did systematically 
manufacture an enemy image of Latvia with regard to some, but not all top-
ics. As expected, the most pronounced negative portrayal concerned Latvia’s 
treatment of Russian-speakers, Latvia’s approach to history, and Latvia’s 
accession to NATO. However, positive treatment of many cultural and 
economic topics tempered the overall negative picture. Moreover, recently, 
Russian media interest in Latvia has been declining.
The situation of Russians and Russian-speakers in Latvia is a theme 
that cuts across all other themes and comes up in stories on virtually all other 
issues. As Dmitri Trenin and Bobo Lo have argued, criticising Latvia (and 
Estonia) on the issue of the Russian-speaking minorities serves a number of 
purposes: it can not only be a useful bargaining chip in relations with Latvia 
or Brussels, it is also “an issue on which the elite can easily agree,” thereby 
contributing to the efforts of Putin (and now Medvedev) at “political and 
national consensus building.”1 Thus, demonising Latvia unifies Russia, at 
least the Russian political class.
In the portrayal of Russian journalists, Latvia not only seriously vio-
lates the rights of Russians and Russian-speakers in Latvia, but also created 
a unique, “shameful” status for many of them as “non-citizens.” Latvian 
policy, especially the reform of minority education and trials against former 
KGB and military veterans and their families, are seen as threatening the 
community as a whole, which is depicted as homogenous, united against 
the Latvian government (not ethnic Latvians), and intimately linked with 
Russia. Media treatment not only constructs Russia as a player of significant 
influence, but one which provides critical assistance to Russians in Latvia.
Latvia is portrayed as “attacking” Russia and Russian interpreta-
tions of history. The attacks take a variety of forms: “immoral” material 
and territorial claims against Russia, an almost sacrilegious questioning of 
“sacred” historical truths (e.g., about “liberation”), and legal action against 
people considered by many in Russia to be war heroes. These “attacks” force 
Russian journalists and officials to the defence and lead them to question 
Latvian motives. The primary motive Russian commentators can identify is 
revenge.
 1 Dmitri Trenin and Bobo Lo, The Landscape of Russian Foreign Policy Decision-
Making (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
2005), 16.
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The Russian media did not perceive Latvian accession to the EU to be 
nearly as problematic as Lithuanian accession, which had a direct impact on 
Kaliningrad. However, Latvia’s NATO accession, along with that of other 
countries bordering Russia, was another matter altogether. While Latvia 
itself is portrayed as small, weak, unable to afford NATO and meet its de-
mocracy criteria, NATO threatens Russia. Insofar as NATO is depicted as a 
front for the United States, Latvia is a willing accomplice to the American 
encroachment on Russian interests.
A considerable number of media items are devoted to cultural and 
economic topics, which tend to depict Latvia in a more neutral, and some-
times even positive light. The Russian media continue to evidence nostal-
gia and show reverence towards Latvian cultural figures who made their 
names in the Soviet era, such as the pianist and jazz composer Raimonds 
Pauls, the pop singer Laima Vaikule, and the actors Vija Artmane and Ivars 
Kalniņš. At the same time, the Russian media are favourably disposed to 
some contemporary Latvian pop singers, such as “Brainstorm” and Maria 
Naumova, as well as to the New Rīga Theatre and the Latvian National 
Opera. Occasionally, the Russian media reveal arrogance or a patronising 
stance, though Russian interest in Latvian culture is probably greater than 
Latvian interest in Russian culture.
The primary economic topics used to define Latvia were the port of 
Ventspils, the banking system (especially Parex Bank), and Rīga and 
Jūrmala as tourist destinations. Interestingly, stories about the gas mar-
ket, the construction industry, and Moscow-Rīga economic relations did not 
occasion wider commentary on Latvia or Latvian-Russian relations. While 
Ventspils is portrayed as an important port, the Latvian officials running 
it are portrayed as having long exploited a monopoly position to charge 
Russia exorbitant rates. When Russia rerouted oil transit to Primorsk, most 
Russian commentators thought Latvia had received a good comeuppance 
and Russia had demonstrated its newly rediscovered strength. The most 
positive portrayals involved the banking system, especially Parex Bank (the 
only “Russian-speaking Western bank”), which was depicted as very attrac-
tive for Russian depositors. Moreover, discourse about Rīga and Jūrmala as 
tourist destinations was downright enthusiastic, though the need for visas to 
travel to Latvia and Latvia’s “odd” habit of having its own currency evoked 
some bewildered Russian commentary.
The portrayal of Russia vis-à-vis Latvia requires some comment, as it 
is racked by internal contradictions. Russians in Latvia need Russia, which 
is strong, influential and a strategic partner of the West. At the same time, 
Russia is on the defensive, it is being attacked on historical topics and en-
circled by NATO. Russia can assert its strength by flexing its oil transit 
muscles, dealing with individual Western countries instead of NATO and 
the EU as a whole, stressing the superiority of some of its cultural industry 
(e.g., television, cinema) and reminding the world about the glorious Victory. 
The struggle to ward of enemies and assert status, however, makes for a 
very turbulent Russia. Escape from the turbulence of Russia can be found 
not only in the resorts of Spain, but also in Jūrmala and Rīga, which are 
close, Russian-speaking, and comparably priced.
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The interviews with journalists working in Latvia for Russian media 
outlets shed light on the mix of market, political and ideological factors 
that enter into their work. At the same time, the foregoing paragraph sug-
gests that strong psychological factors are at work in Russian perceptions 
of the West in general and Latvia in particular. Interest in Latvia appears 
to have begun to wane, as Russia turns its attention to more “problematic” 
neighbours, such as Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine. However, it seems that 
Latvia will retain a unique capacity to get Russia’s attention through the 
mix of nostalgia for Jūrmala, the presence of a large Russian-speaking 
community, economic interests, and colliding national historical myths. It 
remains to be seen whether new “enemies,” such as Ukraine or Georgia, 
will displace Latvia or merely join it as targets of official, media, and public 
animosity in Russia.
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Russia, Latvia and Latvian-Russian 
Relations: A Select Chronology of Key 
Events, January 2002 – June 2005
2002
January: TV-6, the last independent national television station, is shut down 
in Russia
Spring: Mass protests in Voronezh, Russia, against housing reform
May 24: Russia and the United States sign the Strategic Offensive Reduction 
Treaty
May 28: The first NATO summit with Russian participation
May 29: European Commission head Romano Prodi arrives in Moscow, pro-
nounces Russia a market economy
July 5-6: Latvia hosts a summit of the “Vilnius ten” NATO aspirant 
countries
August 19: 140 persons die in a helicopter crash in Chechnya
August 20: Explosions in Moscow kill several persons and leave tens 
wounded
September 11: Russia issues an ultimatum to Georgia concerning Chechen 
fighters in Georgia’s Pankisi valley
September 21: Russian President Vladimir Putin receives Latvian opposi-
tion politician Jānis Jurkāns
October 5: Latvian parliamentary elections
October: The European Commission’s annual report on enlargement recom-
mends accepting 10 candidate countries
October: Denmark refuses to extradite Chechen representative Akhmad 
Zakayev to Russia
October 23: The Nord-Ost terrorist attack in Moscow
November 7: The government of Andris Bērziņš steps down, the government 
of Einārs Repše is approved in Latvia
November 21: The NATO Summit in Prague decides to grant membership to 
7 countries, including Latvia
2003
March 20: The United States and Great Britain invade Iraq
May 21: The Russian parliament ratifies the border treaty with Lithuania
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June: The head of security at YUKOS is arrested in Russia
July 3: Platon Lebedev, one of the leaders of YUKOS, is arrested in Russia
August 21: Latvian security services impound a consignment of tank and 
plane parts at Rīga airport from Russia headed for Iran
September 4: Large protests against education reform in Latvia
September 20: 66.97% of Latvian voters vote for accession to the European 
Union
October 5: Presidential elections in Chechnya
October-April 2004: Russia resists applying the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement to new EU member-states, including Latvia
October 25: Mihail Khodorkovsky is detained in Russia
November 23: The Rose Revolution in Georgia
December 7: “United Russia” wins the elections to the Russian Duma with 
37.1% of the vote
2004
February 24: Putin dismisses the Kasyanov government
February 27: Foreign Ministry representatives from Latvia (Teikmanis) and 
Russia (Chizhov) meet
March 9: The Latvian parliament approves the government of Indulis 
Emsis
March 11: The Madrid terrorist attacks
March 14: Putin is elected to a second term as president
March 18: Representatives of the Latvian (Muižnieks) and Russian (Fedotov) 
governments meet on the margins of the United Nations
April16: Latvia concludes bilateral negotiations with Russia on its accession 
to the WTO
April 23: The Latvian Foreign Ministry announces the expulsion of a 
Russian diplomat
May 1: 10 new member states, including Latvia, enter the EU
May: Mikhail Fradkov is approved for a second time as prime minister of the 
Russian government
May 9: Chechen president Ahmad Kadyrov is killed
June: The Russian tax authorities demand that YUKOS pay USD 3.4 billion.
June 10-13: The first European Parliament elections in Latvia
June 22: The Tikhvin icon is on display at the main Orthodox cathedral in 
Latvia
July-August: The Russian Duma adopts legislation monetising social insur-
ance, evoking mass protests
August 24-5: A delegation of Latvian education experts visits Moscow to 
discuss the education reform
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September 1: The Beslan tragedy in Russia
September 1: Mass protests against the education reform in Latvia
October 29: EU leaders sign the Constitution, EC president Barrozos with-
draws his team
November 16: Viktor Kaluzhny submits his accreditation and becomes 
Russian ambassador to Latvia
December 2: The Kalvītis government displaces the Emsis government in 
Latvia
December 9: Latvian foreign minister Artis Pabriks meets his Russian 
counterpart Sergey Lavrov
December 26: Ukraine’s Orange Revolution
December: The tsunami in Southeast Asia
2005
January 12: Latvian President Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga announces that she 
will go to Moscow on May 9
February 25:Boris Berezovsky visits Latvia, evoking Russian condemna-
tion
March 8: Russian armed forces kill Chechen leader Aslan Mashadov
March 12: Municipal elections in Latvia
April 8: An official Russian delegation led by Sergey Yastrzhembsky visits 
Latvia
April 19: Joseph Ratzinger is elected Pope in Rome
April 25: Andris Teikmanis becomes Latvian ambassador to Russia
April 26: The Latvian government adopts a unilateral “explanatory decla-
ration” to the border treaty; Russia announces that ratification is “impos-
sible”
May 6: U.S. President George W. Bush visits Latvia
May 9: Latvian President Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga visits Moscow to commemo-
rate the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II, agrees with Russian 
President Vladimir Putin on the “necessity of dialogue”
May 12: The European parliament adopts a resolution on the 60th anniver-
sary of the end of World War II stressing the victims of Nazism and com-
munism
May 24-7: Latvian Transport Minister Ainārs Šlesers visits Moscow to at-
tend a meeting of European transport ministers
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